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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the mourning rituals of ‘Ashurā and the Forty Day 
Visitation Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain contribute to the social or individual life of Iraqi 
Shi’a. They also make significant contributions through creating a symbolic 
language to communicate for the community, as well as communicating with their 
essential symbolic structure. Second, the Forty Day Visitation Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain 
is one of the most significant collective mourning rituals, one that expresses unity 
and solidarity of the Iraqi Shi’a community, and helps them to represent their 
collective power, and maintain their collective existence. 
This study uses two of Victor Turner’s tripartite models. For ‘Ashurā the rite 
of passage rituals is used, which consists of the separation, margin, and re-
aggregation phase. Through this process of entering and leaving time and social 
structure, it helps in changing the social status of the participants. The other 
model used for Al-Arb‘ain is pilgrimage as a social process, which includes three 
levels of communitas: existential, normative, and ideological communitas. 
 The Shi’a in Iraq are holding a position similar to Turner’s notion of 
communitas  since they are living within a society that is Muslim and yet even 
though they are a larger population of the society, they still become marginalized 
by the Sunni population socially, economically, and politically. Social relations 
and links play a significant role for Shi’a in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain as a reflection 
between their social status as an undefined communitas and the general structure 
of Iraqi society.  
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PREFACE 
This research is the first of its type on Iraqi Shi’a at the moment in 2012. It 
was difficult for researchers to take on similar achievement in Iraq for many 
reasons such as the shortage of references, and the huge risks they could face. 
Saddam's regime practiced violent suppression of individual freedoms and banned 
Iraqi religious gatherings from practicing their rituals freely. He was keen to ban 
any kind of study no matter the content that could break the wall of isolation he 
imposed on Iraqi ethnoreligous groups such as the Shi’a. Saddam’s regime used 
to think that the Iraqi Shi’a were enemies and posed a real threat to the regime. 
That is why he was in a state of conflict with the Shi’a since assuming power in 
1968 until his fall in 2003. Amongst the tools of conflict were marginalization of 
Iraqi Shi’a internally, and banning any kind of studies related to them. Hence, my 
study of the biggest and most important mourning rituals practiced by Iraqi Shi’a 
on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain is the first study that deals with this subject. 
To study this subject well, I needed to visit Iraq and conduct an 
independent field study on these rituals in their own setting, and also to study 
every related phenomenon. Apart from the financial hardships I faced in 
conducting this study and the lack of financial support, the real difficulty was in 
the perils any researcher could face in Iraq, in the absence of security and 
ceaseless violence acts. The places for practicing the mourning rituals, attended 
by huge numbers of people, were utter targets of expected violent acts by 
terrorists and the remnants of the Baath party. Many places witnessed gory 
explosions that targeted the participants and those close by, and hundreds were 
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killed. The two co-chairs of my research continued to contact me during my stay 
to be sure of my safety during my research in Iraq. Professor Shahla Talebi used 
to send many emails to check on my safety every time she heard news of 
explosions targeting the participants of the rituals and their processions in 
Baghdad and other cities. I, by chance, survived one of those explosions; after 
leaving a place in Baghdad a huge explosion occurred a few minutes after my 
departure.  
I could say conducting such type of research in Iraq is not an easy matter. If 
studying such a subject during Saddam’s time would run the risk of trial for 
espionage and possible execution, conducting it after Saddam's time could 
endanger a researcher’s life (more details about this in the first chapter). 
Finally, I would like to mention that all Arabic translations in this Thesis have 
been translated by me, unless otherwise stated.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of Purpose 
The mourning rituals of the days of ‘Ashurā1 and Al-Arb‘ain2 for the 
martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein, his nineteen family members, and seventy-two 
followers in Karbala 680 C.E. (61 A. H.)
3
 are considered two of the most unique 
events for Iraqi Shi’a today. The location of the shrine of the martyr Al-Hussein 
in Karbala, Iraq, played a major role in the development of these rituals. The city 
evolved in significance as the center for these rituals, the sacred place in which 
the annual commemoration of the martyrdom happens and is re-enacted to keep 
the memory of the event alive in the minds of its pilgrims. Pilgrims arrive by the 
millions every year to take part in these collective rituals to express their loyalty 
and mourning over the tragedy that happened in 680 C.E. 
Commemorating ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, which started in the 7th century, has 
influenced the life of Iraqi Shi’a through their collective participation in the rituals 
which recreates their collective identity as one community. The course of these 
rituals of mourning the martyrdom are represented in several activities like crying, 
striking the chest (latm), back flagellation or lashing (zangeel), head laceration 
(tatbir), and all other kinds of activities that can inflict pain to the body, and serve 
                                                 
1
 ‘Ashurā is the tenth day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar, which is the day on which Imam 
Al-Hussein was killed on the 10th of Muharram 61 A.H (680 C.E.). 
2
 Arabic for the ‘Forty Day Visitation’ concept (Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain). 
3
 A.H. means After Hijra of Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina. This is used in the 
Islamic calendar, which consists of twelve lunar months, with about 354 days. The first month is 
Muharram, and the twelfth month is Thu Al-Hujja. There’s about an eleven day difference 
between the Islamic calendar and the Gregorian calendar, every year. Muharram 1
st
, 1 A.H. is 
equal to July 16
th
, 622 C.E. 
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as the reenactment of the battle and the anniversary of Imam Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom. This is in addition to the pilgrimage to Al-Hussein’s shrine 40 days 
after the anniversary of his martyrdom; people from everywhere in Iraq travel on 
foot to journey toward the shrine in Karbala, practicing on the road the usual 
rituals and activities like reciting enthusiastic poems and reenacting the battle. As 
is the case with most of the socially-connected rituals, the rituals of the mourning 
of ‘Ashurā  helps the Shi’a from all parts of Iraq to reconnect with each other as 
one community united together in the face of all the challenges that they have to 
meet in their daily lives. Since 2003, in conjunction with the fall of the Baath 
regime which had previously limited the practicing of the rituals of ‘Ashurā and 
Al-Arb‘ain in Iraq, the numbers have increased each year. These events gain more 
popularity annually as the increasing number of participants demonstrate (in 2012 
more than 17.5 million Iraqi Shi’a from the approximate 31 million total 
population took part in the mourning of Al-Arb‘ain). 
This study will address two essential points related to the mourning rituals of 
‘Ashurā and the Forty Day Visitation Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain. First, apart from their 
religious purpose (being performed as religious rituals), the mourning rituals of 
‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain contribute to the social and individual life of Iraqi Shi’a. 
They also make significant contributions through creating a symbolic language to 
communicate for the community, as well as communicating with their essential 
symbolic structure (Prophet Mohammed and his family). Second, the Forty Day 
Visitation Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain is one of the most significant collective mourning 
rituals, one that expresses unity and solidarity of the Iraqi Shi’a community, and 
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helps them to represent their collective power, and maintain their collective 
existence.  
B. Significance of Study 
The importance of this study stems from the fact that it explores an important 
part of the Iraqi Shi’a community through studying the continuous development 
of a mourning ritual that is gaining in participation, for the mourning of ‘Ashurā 
and Al-Arb‘ain.  
Beyond a religious obligation and experience, Iraqi Shi’a observe these 
mourning rituals as a way of restructuring their lives and the life of their 
community in a way that generates improvement, by adopting the religious 
experience and transforming it into a socio-cultural frame. These rituals, being an 
expression of the Shi’a religious experience- which is the essence of the Shi’a 
faith- bear much significance important for understanding the Shi’a faith in 
general and the Iraqi Shi’a faith specifically. This study will foster understanding 
by following the changes and cycles these rituals have been through, especially 
after the Baath regime fell in 2003, and the role they have played in these various 
changes, in addition to the role of these rituals in Iraq today. 
Another important contribution of this research is that it is the first English 
academic study focused on contemporary Iraqi Shi’a mourning rituals, especially 
rituals for Al-Arb‘ain. The rituals and practices of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain have 
been ignored academically especially in the last four decades. Since the first 
contributions of the Iraqi sociologist Ali Al-Wardi (1913-1995), to study the Iraqi 
society in which he made some references to these rituals, only a few subsequent 
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studies have ever tackled these two events and their practices by Iraqi Shi’a. 
These include the anthropologist Robert Fernea’s Shaykh and Effendi (1957), an 
anthropological study of one of the Iraqi tribes in southern Iraq; Elizabeth 
Warnock Fernea's Guests of the Sheik, another anthropological study of an Iraqi 
village done at the end of the 1950s, Yitzhak Nakash's The Shiis of Iraq, which 
studied Shi’a in Iraq up to 1958. In addition to these studies, the two Iraqi 
contributions of the ethnographer Ibrahim Al-Haydari’s (1913- ) The Tragedy of 
Karbala, an anthropological study of the mourning of Imam Al-Hussein as a field 
study in 1968 (in Arabic) and the sociologist Faleh A. Jabar’s (1946-) discussion 
of these rituals in his book The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, in which the author 
explores the Shi’a mourning rituals regardless of the historical period, but                     
obviously the rituals studied belonged to the 1970s and before that time. In spite 
of all these studies and references to the Iraqi Shi’a community’s rituals, there is 
no recent study about the Shi’a community in Iraq and the changes that happened 
throughout the last forty years, while facing the challenge of the prohibition of 
rituals from the Baath regime. After the fall of the Baath regime in 2003, practices 
arose from the Iraqi Shi’a, which are important to study.  
Another important feature of this study is that it departs from all the previous 
scholarly works for it no longer takes the Iranian Shi’a rituals as its points of 
references. Most academic studies on Shi’a have used the Iranian Shi’a model as 
their main background and taken it as a representation of the Shi’a internationally. 
Though significant and rich in the material presented, the Iranian model cannot be 
the sole representation of the Shi’a community around the world; to depict the 
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complexity, local studies for each community are required. The individual 
differences can affect the structure and development of the community itself; and 
thus, the Iranian individual is different in his frame of mind from his or her Arab 
peer, and such difference finds an expression in the structure of their respective 
communities. Such differences, in order to be noticed, need to be studied 
separately. Moreover, Iraq is still playing a significant role in the development of 
the Shi’a communities around the world, as it contains within its territories the 
shrines of many Shi’a Imams: Imam Ali in Najaf, Imam Al-Hussein and his 
brother Al-Abbas in Karbala, the site of their martyrdom, Al-Kadhumya shrines 
in Baghdad and the shrines of the last Shi’a Imams in Samarra. This is in addition 
to one of the most significant schools of Shi’a howzah teachings in Najaf. All this 
adds to the importance of studying the Shi’a community in Iraq outside the 
Iranian model, as Iraq contains the largest Arab Shi’a community. 
C. The Position of Al-Hussein in Islam 
Al-Hussein bin
4
 Ali bin Abi Talib (4- 61 AH, 626- 680 C.E.) was the 
Prophet's grandson and son to Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth Righteous Caliph of 
Sunni Islam, and the first Imam of Shi’a. His mother was Fatima, daughter of 
Prophet Mohammed and mother to Al-Hassan, Zainab, and Um Kulthum. 
Al-Hussein grew up in Ali's house, which was close to Prophet Mohammed’s 
who held him so importantly. Mohammed considered Ali's family as his own and 
its members as his family.  5 It is known that Mohammed was highly attached to 
Ali and Fatima's sons; Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, and he loved them so much 
                                                 
4
 “bin or ibn” means “son of.” 
5
 Mohammed bin Saad , Kitab Al- Tabaqat Al- Kabeer, Ed. Ali Mohammed Umar, Vol. 6, (Cairo: 
Maktabat Al- Khangee, 2001) 402.  
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and used to play with them in his home or the mosque in the presence of Muslims. 
When asked why he was attached to them, the Prophet said, “They are my son 
and my daughter’s sons.”  6 Also, another hadith mentioned that Mohammed held 
Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein’s hands and said that he who loved me and these two 
and Ali, their father, would be at the same level with me in heaven.
7
 
At every occasion, Mohammed expressed the prominence of Al-Hassan and 
Al-Hussein and his love for them and their closeness to him. Many hadiths 
narrated by Mohammed on Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein confirmed that they were 
some of the important people who he loved in the world. A reason for his love for 
them was that he was their grandfather, and they were more like his own children 
especially after he lost his three male sons (Al Qasim, Abdulla, and Ibrahim) 
when they were children. It was clear to Muslims that Mohammed was treating 
them as members of his own family and that Muslims should treat them likewise 
and show them feelings of love and respect. He tried to explain to all Muslims to 
love Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein the same as himself, and he mentioned that 
“These are my two sons. He who loves them loves me.”  8 To strengthen his care 
for them, Mohammed warned Muslims from hurting or assaulting them. So that 
he said, “He who loves Hassan and Hussein loves me, and he who hates them 
hates me.”9 That's why the majority of Muslims respect and love the Prophet’s 
                                                 
6
 Bin Saad 6:403. 
7
 Sibt Yusuf bin Farghli Ibn Al- Jowzey, Tathqiret Al- Khawass, (Tehran: Maktabat Nenawa Al- 
Haditha, n.d.) 233-34. 
8
 Abdul Rahman Ibn Al- Jowzey, Sifat Al- Safwa, Ed. Mahmood Fakhury, Vol. 1, 3
rd
 ed., (Beirut: 
Dar Al- Ma’rifa, 1985) 762. 
9
 Bin Saad 6:404.  
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grandchildren for their closeness to him and for respecting the Prophet's will and 
for their likable traits for Muslims. 
Al-Hussein was known as a humble person in spite of the prominent status he 
occupied amongst Muslims. He used to sit with the poor, treat them nicely, share 
their simple food and invite them to eat in his house.
10
 He gained the love and 
respect of almost all Muslims, especially the poor of them. 
According to the myth building story, some people refer to hadiths that are 
related to the Prophet Mohammed about his knowing of the death of Imam Al-
Hussein before the actual event. These hadiths mention that the Prophet 
Mohammed was aware of his grandson’s destiny. One of these hadiths related to 
the Prophet Mohammed tells us that the Prophet was asleep and awakened, 
frightened, and tearful. When asked why, he said that he saw Al-Hussein getting 
killed in Iraq and “Gebrail”11 had brought some soil from Karbala where Al-
Hussein would be killed.  12 Al-Hussein’s personality acquires respect from both 
Sunni and Shi’a. The reason is that Al-Hussein is one of the most prominent 
symbols related to Mohammed, spiritually and biologically. In addition, after his 
death, Al-Hussein was a symbol of heroism, defiance of oppression, and sacrifice. 
Muslims continued loving Al-Hussein after Prophet Mohammed’s death. Al-
Hussein was revered to the Righteous Caliphs for his kinship with the Prophet and 
for Al-Hussein’s respected personality. For example, Omar ibn Al-Khattab, the 
second Righteous Caliph, was known for his love and respect for Al-Hussein and 
                                                 
10
 Bin Saad 6:413. 
11
 In Islam, Gebrail is one of the higher ranking angels, who was the messenger between Allah and 
the Prophets.  
12
 Bin Saad 6:413-14.  
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he used to visit him if Al-Hussein had not visited him for a period of time.  13 Even 
Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan (602- 680 C.E.), the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty 
and the first Umayyad Caliph, who was an enemy to Al-Hussein’s family, 
answered Al-Hussein's greeting by saying “welcome to the son of the messenger 
of Allah.”14 Some stories try to make Muawiyah appear as not having a role in Al-
Hussein’s death, making him a scapegoat, but to blame his son Yazid. One story 
narrates that Muawiyah told his son, Yazid, before his death that he prepared 
Caliphate for him and subdued all Arabs to him but he feared some who might 
challenge his rule and Al-Hussein came at the forefront of them, because Al-
Hussein had refused to recognize Yazid as a Caliph during the life of 
Muawiyah.
15
 Muawiyah knew that the Iraqis would insist on asking Al-Hussein to 
challenge Yazid. So Muawiyah asked Yazid that if Al-Hussein did, forgive him 
for his kinship to the Prophet and for his position among the Muslims.  16 Instead 
Yazid did not follow his father’s advice and he was not concerned with Al-
Hussein’s position among the Muslims. He sent an army to Karbala to enforce Al-
Hussein to recognize Yazid as the Caliph, or he would be killed. I will discuss the 
battle of Karbala later on in the Historical Background chapter. 
I am not trying to give a complete historical account of Al-Hussein here when 
this research is focused on rituals. Rather, I am providing a background on Al-
Hussein’s prominence as an Islamic symbol whose roots are attached to the 
                                                 
13
 Bin Saad 6:409. 
14
 Bin Saad 6:409.  
15
 Ali bin Mohammed Ibn Al-Atheer, Asad Al-Ghaba fi Maarifet Al- Sahaba, Eds. Ali 
Mohammed Muaawad and Adil Ahmed Abdulmawjood, Vol.2, (Beirut: Dar Alkutub 
Al‘almiya, n.d.) 27.   
16
 S. Ibn Al- Jowzey 235. 
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Prophet and Islamic structure. The relation between the Prophet and Al-Hussein 
on one hand, and the Prophet and Ali from the other assisted in the manifestation 
of Al-Hussein's personality to play a major role in Islam after the Prophet and 
Ali’s deaths. Events, conflicts and sociopolitical changes helped in having Al-
Hussein as a pivot in them. Al-Hussein’s personality was prepared to play the role 
of heroism in events yet to come. He is a representation of the figure of a hero 
whom other see capable of rescuing them from persecution and bring justice to 
them. Although Al-Hussein was martyred in Karbala and his family fell captive, 
his image as a hero and symbol of the Prince of Martyrs (Sayid Al-Shuhada) 
remains present among Shi’a. Mourning rituals practiced in his memory every 
year have become solid in their sentiment to represent the events, thoughts and 
stands to an extent that they have become a part of their social, mental, 
psychological and political structure. 
D. Research Limitations 
One of the obstacles confronted in carrying out this research is a dearth of 
sources which can provide satisfactory information for this study. Undertaking 
such research topics was risky during the Baath regime, which forced scholars to 
refrain from tackling such subjects. This led to the scarcity of writings about the 
Shi’a. In addition to this, the Iraqi government prohibited the practice of ‘Ashurā 
and Al-Arb‘ain rituals since the beginning of 1981, and no public rituals took 
place until 2003. All these factors caused a difficulty in approaching these 
subjects and a lack of availability of enough sources, necessitating a field study of 
these rituals and their setting and thus most of the conclusions are dependent on 
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data gained or collected from studying the rituals as they are presently practiced 
in Iraq. 
Furthermore, since 2003 when these rituals were revived on a wide scale, the 
participants have always been at risk and prone to continuous attack. Because of 
the unstable security of Iraq, any gatherings of any kind are at risk of attacks by 
terrorists, especially if these gatherings are related to the practicing of religious 
rituals, like that of ‘Ashura  and Al-Arb‘ain. Attending the activities that mark 
these two occasions, which are usually very crowded events, put the lives of the 
participants in great danger. When the participants are in large groups, they 
become an easy and attractive target for attack by former Baath regime members, 
since their secular ideology is against Shi’a, Al-Qaeda members, as they have a 
Wahhabi ideology that is also against Shi’a, and other members for political and 
ideological reasons. Even without the threat of attacks, it is not an easy feat to 
walk for days (depending on the starting point, and the distance from Karbala) to 
reach Karbala. For example, the distance I walked from Najaf to Karbala during 
Al-Arb‘ain was about 83 kilometers that was separated into three and a half days, 
as the roads have suffered damage from many bombings, along with thousands of 
casualties, adding to the exhaustion the participants endured because of the 
physical efforts they have to exert in their pilgrimage. 
E. Scope of Study 
The study addresses the mourning rituals of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain which the 
Twelver Shi’a practiced in Iraq between 1968- 2012 for the following reasons: 
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First, the period tackled in the study is considered one of the most important 
periods in the history of mourning rituals of Shi’a in Iraq because of all the wars 
that Iraq has undergone, leading to a large number of Shi’a victims. Because of 
the tragedies of wars, the rituals witnessed acceleration in their practices as the 
Shi’a now had religious as well as social and individual motivations and aptitude 
to indulge in practicing these rituals in ‘Ashurā  and the Al-Arb‘ain. The Shi’a 
community in Iraq attempts to express grief over their social tragedies using as an 
outlet the more general grief over the tragedy of their early Imam and his 
followers in Karbala. Such an attempt lightens the stress of their harsh reality and 
pushes the pressure toward a more collective and historical event in which all the 
Shi’a participate. Such a historical perspective for practicing the mourning rituals 
provides a chance for ultimate salvation through the collective participation in 
events to show the religious commitment and devotion of the participants, which 
they believe will ensure eternal reward. 
Second, the period under study is the period that witnessed the rise of the 
Baath party, which prohibited these rituals, and its fall, after which the rituals 
revived on a large scale as a reaction to the previous prohibition as well as a way 
of resisting any attempt to marginalize the role of Shi’a in contemporary Iraq. 
These rituals contributed largely to enhancing the common identity and increased 
the solidarity of the Shi’a against the hegemony and dominance of the Baath state. 
The Baath regime came into power in 1968 with a secular orientation, which then 
gradually changed to become a more religious Sunni background. During the time 
of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the addition of God is Great (Allahu Akbar) 
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was made to the Iraqi flag, and the state used the Islamic religion as a source of 
power against the international military.
17
 Also, in 1995, Saddam Hussein used 
Islamic religious symbols to improve his image, by preventing the sale of alcohol 
and compelling Islamic punishments against thieves.
18
 The Shi’a considered the 
prohibition of practicing their rituals as an attempt by the Sunni authority to 
ignore and marginalize them from the Iraqi scene. Thus, after 2003 most of the 
Shi’a set about to practice the mourning rituals to assert their common identity on 
the one hand, and their central role within the Iraqi society on the other, after 
many decades of prohibition by the regime. Hence, it becomes important to study 
the significance of these rituals from 2003 to 2012, which demonstrates different 
ways that Iraqi Shi’a constitute a major force in the country, one unified 
community that has its common goals and common response to the challenges 
faced by their country. 
Third, the period covered by the research lacked enough sufficient studies of 
the Shi’a mourning rituals in Iraq, as noted earlier. For long decades, Iraq lived in 
some kind of isolation from the world because of the confusing policies of its 
ruling regime, which waged different wars and received many international 
penalties in addition to the domestic troubles Iraq suffered during that period. 
This affected on a large scale the production of local studies, academic or 
otherwise, about the period in question, because of the risks involved. The 
situation did not witness a great change after 2003 as the Iraqis were still facing 
great dangers in practicing and researching the mourning rituals. With this 
                                                 
17
 Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 
(London: University of California Press, 2005) 182. 
18
 Davis 232. 
13 
 
 
consideration in mind, it becomes necessary now to tackle the subject and explore 
the main factors that contributed in developing the practice of these rituals. 
F. Terminologies   
1. Mourning Rituals 
The mourning rituals referred to in this research are practiced after losing 
someone close or dear to the individual; in this research the individuals who are 
practicing the rituals are the members of the Shi’a community. These rituals 
include crying, chest beating, celebrating the anniversary and also celebrating the 
achievements and traits of the departed in different occasions. For the Shi’a 
community, the mourning rituals practiced by the Shi’a in the memorial of Imam 
Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain are considered the most 
important for the Shi’a community in general. 
2. Rituals of ‘Ashurā 
These are the group of rituals practiced by the Shi’a community to mourn the 
anniversary of Imam Al-Hussein’s martyrdom with seventy-two of his family 
members and followers in the battle of Karbala in 680 C.E. ‘Ashurā means “the 
tenth day” which is the day on which Al-Hussein was killed on the 10th of 
Muharram 61 A.H. according to the Islamic calendar. The rituals of ‘Ashurā 
usually start on the first day of Muharram and culminate on the tenth day of 
‘Ashurā, which is a formal holiday to celebrate the occasion. Among the most 
significant practices of mourning throughout the 10 days (in some cases 13 days), 
are Majilis Al-‘Aza (mourning councils) in which people read elegies for the 
martyrs and remember the different events in Karbala, chest beating (latm) is 
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done by all participants, back chain-lashing (zangeel), reading in the tenth day 
Maqtal Al-Hussein (which is the story of the battle in detail), the ‘Ashurā  
visitation (which is a pilgrimage to the shrine of Al-Hussein in Karbala), 
processions of head laceration (Mawakib Al- Tatbir) which is striking oneself 
with a sword or dagger on the tenth day, and performing passion plays (tashabih) 
that re-enact the battle; this is in addition to distributing food and drinks for the 
participants from the first day of  Muharram to the 10th day (‘Ashurā). 
3. Rituals of Al-Arb‘ain 
These are the rituals practiced on the anniversary of the 40
th
 day after the 
martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein, which is usually the 20
th
 of Safar, the second 
month in the Islamic calendar. The practices include on-foot pilgrimage to the 
Imam Al-Hussein’s shrine: a large number of people set on a journey from the 
different cities and villages of Iraq toward Karbala, 100 kilometers south of 
Baghdad. The pilgrimage is called the Visitation of the Forty Days (Ziyarat Al-
Arb‘ain), which occurs 40 days after the day of ‘Ashurā. In addition to this 
journey, there are other rituals usually practiced in this event like the re-enactment 
of the caravan (Mawakib Al-Dhaan) that brought the remaining members of Al-
Hussein’s family back to Karbala after 40 days (which I will explain later on in 
the Historical Background section) of the battle accompanied by processions of 
latm and tatbir. One of the most significant features of these rituals is the sense of 
social solidarity that emerges during the event as Iraqis provide necessities for the 
millions of pilgrims during their journey. 
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4. Mourning Council (Majilis Al-‘Aza) 
Majlis is the singular form of majalis, which is a memorial service in which 
the attendants pay tribute to the martyrdom of their Imam through reciting a 
sermon and rhythmic lamentation poetry niyahah done by a religious man called 
qari, khateeb, or sheikh. This mourning council is called quraya in Iraq, which 
means reading. These majalis are usually held on a large scale in private houses, 
mosques or other public places during the first ten days of Muharram. Usually 
they end up with the latmiya ritual led by a radood (bard who recites the story of 
martyrdom) reading elegies with rhythms that accompany and modulate the 
beating of the chest. Majlis often depends on three major factors: the sponsor of 
the majlis, the preacher or speaker who leads the participants, and the attendants 
who participate in the ritual. The popularity of this gathering, reflected by the 
number of attendants, signifies the success of the sponsor as well as the popularity 
and importance of the preacher or the reader. Most of these gatherings are held 
according to an established timetable announced by the sponsor of majlis. 
5. Processions of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseiniyya)  
The processions of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseiniyya) are a group of 
people participating together in doing the rituals of mourning mentioned above. 
Usually these processions are known as mourning processions (Mawakib Al-
‘Aza). The people who provide food, drinks and other provisions for the mourners 
are referred to as processions of service (Mawakib Al-Khidmah). Usually, every 
geographical district or tribe organizes a procession, whether for mourning or 
serving the mourners, holding a banner referring to its sponsors. 
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6. Visitation (Ziyara) 
This is the pilgrimage to the sacred Shi’a shrines during private and public 
occasions to renew vows of commitment and devotion to their Imams. This 
visitation (ziyara) is usually one of the features of piety for any Shi’a Muslim, as 
a response to what is continued in most of the Shi’a books. These visitations are 
also considered means of gaining intercession provided by the visited Imam, as he 
is considered one of the personalities that won the approval of Allah, and He can 
help to bridge the spiritual gap between person and His creator, in addition to 
providing penance for the visitors, and giving them the chance to pray for 
whatever they wish for in this life or the life after. 
The visitation (ziyara) is quite different in meaning from that of Hajj. The 
former is used to refer to the visits Shi’a Muslims undertake of their Imams’ 
shrines at any time of the year, while Hajj (the fifth pillar of Islam) means going 
to Mecca at a particular time of the year which is the month of Thu Al-Hujja to 
participate in the Hajj rituals. Many Western studies conflate the two rituals 
considering them the same and using the term ‘pilgrimage’ to refer to each of 
them. This is basically not the case in Islamic studies, which suggests 
differentiating between the two terms as each involves different rituals with 
distinct meanings (I will discuss this further in the fifth chapter). 
Many Shi’a make several visits annually to the shrine of Imam Al-Hussein. 
Some of these visitations are ordinary ones; they can be done any time of the year. 
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Others are done for particular occasions.
19
 Among all these occasions, ‘Ashurā 
and Al-Arb‘ain are the most significant for the Shi’a and usually receive wide 
participation. 
7. Visitation of ‘Ashurā (Ziyarat ‘Ashurā) 
Every year on the tenth of Muharram, the Iraqi Shi’a set off on Ziyarat 
‘Ashurā for the visitation of Al-Hussein’s shrine in Karbala as this is the most 
significant ritual practiced to celebrate the anniversary of this day. Shi’a sources 
of hadith assert the importance of ‘Ashurā visitation. There are a number of 
hadiths in Shi’a references recommending Muslims to visit the shrine of Imam 
Al-Hussein. One of these hadiths says: “Whoever visited the shrine of Al-Hussein 
(peace be upon him) and stayed over, he would be like one of his martyrs.”20 
Many of the significant pioneers of Shi’a scholars, like Sheikhs Al-Kulayni  
(864-941C.E.) and Al-Tusi (995-1067 C.E.) devoted chapters of their books 
explaining the importance and method of practicing the visitation; Sheikh Jaafar 
bin Quluweh Al- Qomi (died 978 C.E. - 368 A.H.) assigned a whole chapter in his 
book Kamil Al-Ziyarat (All the Visitations) to explain the importance and 
methodology of visiting the shrine of Al-Hussein, especially on the day of 
‘Ashurā. 
Thus, the importance of the visitation of ‘Ashurā is illustrated and encouraged 
from all the references made in the Shi’a sources, most of which note the reward 
gained from this visitation. Moreover, these Shi’a books also suggest other ways 
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to practice the visitation ritual, in case one is unable to reach the shrine (because 
of the distance or risks involved), like practicing other rituals from the roof of the 
house, or any high location.
21
 This is an important point because it allows Shi’a 
(no matter their location or circumstances) practice the rituals in secret in case of 
limitations or prohibitions of the governments, or if the distance was unreachable 
for the Shi’a. 
The rituals of ‘Ashurā visitation (Ziyarat ‘Ashurā) in Karbala includes the 
following: standing in front of the tomb, reciting formal Islamic greetings, as all 
Muslims think that martyrs are in fact alive in God’s kingdom: “Do not think of 
those who are slain in God’s way as dead, Nay, they live, finding their sustenance 
in the Presence of their Lord.” 22 Thus the visitor speaks to his Imam as if he is 
alive listening to his visitors. 
The visitor follows other rituals called “Adab Al-Ziyara” (The Customs of 
Visitation).  Among these, the visitor has to be clean in body and clothes, to show 
respect and humbleness; before the visitors come into the shrine, they must ask 
permission from Allah, the Prophet, and the Imam they are visiting to enter the 
gates, then after entering they stand as close as possible to the tomb. After that, 
the visitors pray, read Quran, pray for repentance and any specific prayer, and ask 
forgiveness for guilt or sin.
23
 In getting permission to enter the shrine, the visitor 
reads a special request written on a big board hung high next to the gates of the 
tomb. After reading the written request, the visitor comes close to the windows 
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surrounding the tomb to recite invocation (Du‘a) from specific books to ask for 
blessings and support; usually this entices an emotional response so that the 
visitor cries during invocation. Then visitors do the “Ziyara Prayer” (which is 
practiced only in visitations), and read Ziyarat ‘Ashurā (a special invocation for 
the day of ‘Ashurā) that is written on the walls near the tomb. 
8. Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain (Zyarat Al-Arb‘ain) 
This is second important visitation, after ‘Ashurā, for Shi’a in Iraq. Usually 
the rituals include going on foot to visit the shrine of Imam Al-Hussein on the 20
th
 
of Safar to celebrate the passing of 40 days for the martyrdom. This visitation is 
called restoring the head (Maradd Al- Ras), as it is believed by Shi’a that on this 
particular day, the head of Al-Hussein, which was carried on a spear with other 
heads to be shown to the Caliph in Damascus, was returned to its body when the 
caravan of prisoners came back from Damascus to Karbala. On that day, the head 
was buried with the body at the site of the battle of Karbala. 
The rituals of Al-Arb‘ain are connected with the return of Al-Hussein’s family 
from Damascus passing through Karbala as asserted by Sayid Ibn Tawoos (1193-
1265 C.E.): 
“When Hussein’s women and children returned from Sham 
[Damascus] and reached Iraq, they asked their guide to take them 
to Karbala. When they reached the spot where their Imam was 
killed, they found there Jabir bin Abdullah Al-Ansari and other 
Hashemites had come to the place to visit the tomb of Al-Hussein 
(peace be upon him). They all gathered to mourn the martyrdom of 
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their Imam with crying and latm, and started to hold funerals, 
attracting other people who came to them dressing in black which 
lasted for few days.”24 
Historically speaking, this signifies the beginning of mourning rituals for Al-
Hussein’s martyrdom, after 40 days of the event, with crying and striking the face 
and wearing black as the major features of these rituals. 
One of the most important references to Al-Arb‘ain visitation was the one 
mentioned in Tahtheeb Alahkam by Al- Tusi (dated from one of the four books of 
hadith for Shi’a), asserting the significance of this visitation as one of the signs of 
a believer (Muamin): “It is told about Hassan Al-Askari (the 11th Shi’a Imam) that 
he said Mu'min has five signs: praying, the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain, wearing the 
ring in the right hand, increasing prostration, and pronouncing loudly in the name 
of God”.25 Although the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain comes second in its religious 
importance after ‘Ashurā, which comes first, the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain has 
drawn more public attendance during the last nine years; the number of people 
attending this visitation exceeds that of ‘Ashurā. 
Visiting the tombs of the dead and celebrating Al-Arb‘ain (40 days after 
death), is a common practice in the Shi’a community in Iraq. The mourning 
council happens at the third, seventh, and 40
th
 days, as well as the annual 
anniversary after the death. There are no valid studies about the significance of 
these days in particular, but it is apparent that there is emphasis on the 40
th
 day. 
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The use of numbers in the event of death is not restricted to a certain society or 
religion, but is something that can be generalized to all societies and religions; the 
number 40 remains of great importance in most of the societies in the Near East. 
During the Baath regime, the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain in Iraq usually resulted 
in clashes between participants and the Baath regime. Thus, it explains the 
prohibition and why it was forbidden along with other rituals. At the beginning of 
the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Baath regime believed that Iraqi Shi’a would 
support the Iranian regime as it is Shi’a as well. These fears resulted in the form 
of a serious attempt to neutralize Iraqi Shi’a from supporting Iran, by stressing 
and limiting the Iraqi Shi’a power. Preventing the Shi’a from their rituals is one of 
the methods used in the conflict between the Iraqi state-referenced Sunni and Iraqi 
Shi’a. This prohibition of Shi’a rituals, like walking, to visit the shrine of Al-
Hussein in Al-Arb‘ain, played a major role in enticing defying attitudes on the 
part of the visitors against the Iraqi government. For example in 1977, armed 
confrontations happened between security forces and the visitors near Karbala 
which shocked the authorities then because of the defying spirit they witnessed in 
the visitors. Such confrontations resulted in the negative attitude of the regime 
against the rituals of Shi’a practice, especially that of walking. Also, this added to 
the meaning of the rituals practiced by Shi’a; besides their religious indications, 
they also have political bearings signifying resistance against any attempts by the 
regime to undermine their common identity and stop them from practicing their 
religion. 
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G. Methodology 
This study is based on a submission of anthropological, historical, and literary 
approaches. The ethnographic study of the Shi’a holy shrines between November 
2011 and January 2012 is based on my visit to Iraq. The study lasted almost ten 
weeks, to include the two events under discussion: ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, in 
Karbala of that year. 
In order to adequately deal with ‘The Development of Iraqi Shi’a Mourning 
Rituals in Modern Iraq,” and with a focus on the role of these rituals in the Shi’a 
society, I intend to use academic frameworks such as the sociology of religion, 
anthropology of religion, history of religion, and textual analysis of Arabic 
Islamic texts and literature. There are many symbols that can be studied under this 
topic that provide an important opportunity to explain the Iraqi Shi’a society. 
There are several common ideas among the Iraqi Shi’a rituals that deserve further 
study. These include, but are not limited to, the role of holy shrines, the rituals as 
practiced, and the groups that practice ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain rituals in terms of: 
gender, age, and social class, along with the role of women in the Shi’a rituals. 
As a researcher, I managed to gain valuable ethnographic data through 
studying the rituals of ‘Ashurā in Karbala, Baghdad, Najaf, and other Iraqi cities 
which observe this event; additionally, I collected material related to the social 
aspect of these rituals. Also, I came across many historical documents related to 
the subject of the study, and managed to record a number of different practices in 
preparation of ‘Ashurā when the major rituals of majilis, and mourning 
processions take place. Some video records and photos were taken for these 
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rituals, in addition to recording some stories and poems used in the rituals, 
reading historical books related to the subject of the study, and making field trips 
to the Shi’a cities and towns to observe at first hand some local practices like 
cooking and serving food to passengers. In addition, I took trips to the markets to 
look into the provisions usually bought in Muharram and Safar, the first and 
second month in the Islamic calendar, when the two occasions, ‘Ashurā  and Al-
Arb‘ain, take place. Women’s memorial services were also taken into 
consideration, as they are widespread in small towns.  
The method of collecting ethnographic data followed the anthropological 
approach where material is collected through participant practices, which meant 
living close to the participants and participant observations. This facilitated 
reaching accurate understanding of these practices and reaching valid conclusions. 
I also had direct and formal interviews and meetings with important Shi’a 
scholars and personalities involved in organizing the practicing of rituals of 
‘Ashurā  and Al-Arb‘ain, in addition to other meetings with regular participants 
and eye-witnesses, taking into consideration the variation of their education level 
and social background.  The focus was on living the events in the Shi’a holy 
cities, and also some other cities which held distinguished celebrations of these 
events.  
Despite the difficulties associated with carrying out this field research, which 
included the risk of violence and sheer physical exhaustion from the four day 
journey on foot from Najaf to Karbala, participating in the journey and rituals was 
of great benefit. The experience allowed for the first hand collection of data which 
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enriched the study and enhanced understanding of the emotions involved in these 
rituals. 
H. Structure of Study 
The first chapter explores the importance of studying the rituals practiced by 
Iraqi Shi’a Muslims in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, and the purpose behind the 
rituals. This chapter also highlights the major obstacles I faced in conducting this 
research, while clarifying the scope of study and the reasons why I chose this 
period in particular (1968-2012). The first chapter also provides the position of 
Al-Hussein in Islam and attempts to introduce some terminology like ‘Ashurā and 
the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. 
The second chapter deals with the rise of Shi’a Islam, the beginning and 
history of the divisions between Sunnis and Shi’a, the factors that led to the 
appearance of the Shi’a community, the difference between Shi’a divisions, and 
definition of the Twelver Shi’a. The battle of Karbala, which witnessed the 
martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein and his family, is also explored highlighting, the 
major factors that led to it, as well as the reasons why the Shi’a in Kufa did not 
support their Imam. These reasons played a role in the later evolution of the 
mourning rituals. Also, this chapter deals with the rise of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain 
rituals and their development in Iraq after Karbala, during the different historical 
eras that succeeded the death of Al-Hussein: Umayyad, Abbasid, Buyid, Safavid, 
Qajar, Ottoman, British Mandate and Hashemite Monarchy, Republican, and the 
Baath regime. The chapter also sheds light on the development of the visitation of 
Al-Hussein’s shrine in Karbala and the role it played in practicing the mourning 
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rituals on one side, and the rise of Karbala city as a religious center for Shi’a and 
the role this city played in their lives not only on the spiritual side, but also on the 
social, political and economic as well. 
Chapter three studies the mourning rituals practiced by communities and 
individuals to express their sadness for losing their beloveds. I will offer a 
psychological analysis of the purpose of practicing mourning rituals as organized 
forms of the expression of sadness. The rituals help mediate and regulate the 
emotions of the mourners as they work through their sadness and mourning. The 
mourners manage to accept the loss of their loved ones and move on to accept life 
without having the departed as part of it any more. Also, the rituals are considered 
from a sociological angle, such rituals are practiced collectively so they increase 
social solidarity and assert common identity. Also, there is an anthropological 
point of view as the rituals are studied as a transitional stage helping the 
participants to move to another stage of social integration. From an Islamic point 
of view, there is a study of the Quranic verses, hadith narratives, and a number of 
Muslim scholars who referred to these rituals as strengthening religious concepts 
like piety, humility, and obedience to God’s will. This angle highlights the 
difference between the Shi’a and Sunnis in practicing these rituals, especially the 
mourning of Imam Al-Hussein’s martyrdom and Al-Arb‘ain. In addition to this, 
the chapter studies the relationship between poetry and the mourning rituals 
generally as poetry can be a more articulate mode of expression. In the literature 
review section, I discussed the important sources that researched the topic in 
different time periods and perspectives. Finally, the chapter sheds light on the 
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identity of the individual Shi’a in relation to the practicing of these rituals and the 
changes they face trying to stop these rituals.  
The fourth chapter presents the results of the field study of ‘Ashurā rituals 
practiced in Baghdad and Karbala in 2011. The study included the preparations of 
these rituals and the most common features related to the practicing of the rituals 
like spreading tents and hanging black flags on the roofs of houses, in addition to 
the changing of flags above the shrines of Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas in Karbala. 
This work also examines the majilis of mourning, for men and women, which are 
studied to highlight the factors function in these gatherings. This is in addition to 
the analysis of marching processions in the rituals, especially that of zangeel and 
latmiya, along with the passion plays (tashabih) that reenact the tragedy in the day 
of ‘Ashurā, tatbir, the burning of tents, running of Twareej and other features that 
are acted in these performances. 
The fifth chapter studies the data collected from the field study of Al-Arb‘ain 
visitation and the rituals practiced in this event, after accompanying the visitors 
on their four day journey from Najaf to Karbala. This data highlights the activities 
practiced during this journey, studying the groups of visitors and processions 
taking part in this visitation. The chapter also discusses the role of this visitation 
in the political resistance the Shi’a practiced against the ruling regime of the 
Baath, like the confrontation that happened between the visitors and the security 
forces in 1977. 
Chapter six is devoted to discussing the important results obtained from the 
study. Also, I discussed the position of repetition as an important component to 
27 
 
 
practice rituals and its effect on the participants. This chapter also discussed the 
potential of this research and its development in further studies. 
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Chapter 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction26 
For the Muslim Shi’a, mourning is related directly to the martyrdom of Imam 
Al-Hussein bin Ali in Karbala in 680 C.E. The significance of commemorating 
this event comes from the important role Imam Al-Hussein played in the history 
of Islam on the one hand, and in the history of the Shi’a on the other. He signifies 
a figure of resistance to tyranny for Shi’a Muslims. Imam Al-Hussein is one of 
the major figures for the Shi’a, representing a wide range of religious, political 
and moral concepts. 
The events of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, the 40th 
day anniversary of his martyrdom, are the most important events in the Shi’a 
calendar. The rituals of celebrating these two events are numerous and various, 
and express together the importance of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in the 
development of Shi’a Islam. 
The person of Imam Al-Hussein holds a distinguished status and leading role 
in the structure of Islam, and in Shi’a teachings. He is the grandson of the Prophet 
Mohammad, the son of Ali (the first Shi’a Imam) and Fatima, and he is the martyr 
of Karbala, which made him a figure who symbolizes resistance against 
oppression and autocratic dominance. Al-Hussein defied the oppression practiced 
by the Umayyad rulers, fought in the battle of Karbala, where he was martyred, 
and became a symbol of Shi’a heroism and martyrdom for religious social justice, 
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and freedom. Thus, the rituals of mourning his martyrdom, along with his 
followers’, became the central event for Shi’a and commemorating this event 
represents a number of concepts beyond the mere expression of sadness. 
This chapter is a historical background about the evolution of the mourning 
rituals in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain in Iraq. As these rituals evolved in result of a 
number of social factors, it is essential to first present a background of these 
factors and conditions that led to the appearance and development of the rituals. 
The first topics to be tackled are the Shi’a-Sunni division, its reasons and the 
basic teachings of Shi’a. Also the chapter highlights the difference between 
Twelver Shi’a and other Shi’a groups, as the present study concentrates on the 
mourning rituals practiced by the Twelver Shi’a in particular. The battle of 
Karbala and the Shi’a stand toward this battle will also be explained in addition to 
discussing the mourning rituals developed in its aftermath. Along with these 
topics, the chapter sheds light on the development of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain 
commemorates and their role in asserting the common identity of Iraqi Shi’a. 
B. The Beginnings of Shi’a Islam 
1. The Shi’a- Sunni Split 
When the Prophet Mohammad died in 632 C.E., an everlasting disagreement 
started between Muslims over who would rule after him. According to important 
Islamic sources, Muslims were mostly divided into three parties: Ansar (the 
citizens of Medina who helped Prophet Mohammad when he emigrated from 
Mecca to Medina), Muhajirun (Muslims of Mecca who immigrated to Medina) 
and Banu Hashim (the relatives of the Prophet). The Ansar and Muhajirun 
30 
 
 
gathered in a place called Saqifat bani Sa’idah,27 to appoint a successor, but this 
happened with the absence of Banu Hashim, who were busy with the burial and 
funeral of the deceased prophet.
28
 
As these scholarly sources have shown, the issue was not simply just an 
egalitarian election or a hereditary action. Unlike what usually has been offered 
by Western scholars, the simplified version of the issue between the Shi’a and 
Sunni was more complicated, as the essential Islamic sources show. At that time, 
Shi’a and Sunni were not clearly formed, but at that time there were other groups 
like Ansar, Muhajirun, and Banu Hashim, each with their own distinct agenda.  
The Ansar considered themselves the most deserving group to fill the leading 
position, for they argued that they were the ones who had provided shelter and 
moral and material support to the Prophet and Muhajirun. Thus, they nominated 
one of their leaders, namely, Saad bin Ubadah.
29
 However, the Muhajirun 
believed that they deserved the leadership as they were the first to believe in the 
Prophet and his religion; they asserted that they were the first to believe in Allah 
and His messenger, they were his relatives and tribe and thus, it was only their 
lawful right to inherit leadership after his death.
30
 The Muhajirun were 
represented in this meeting by Abu Bakr, Omar bin Al-Khattab, Abi Ubayda Al-
Jarah and Mugherah bin Shuaba. The controversy between the two groups ended 
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with the appointment of Abu Bakr as the first successor of the deceased Prophet 
though some were not exactly in agreement with this choice, especially the leader 
of the Ansar, Saad bin Ubadah. 
Banu Hashim denounced this nomination and accused Abu Bakr and Omar 
bin Al-Khattab of conspiring to take over leadership while Ali bin Abi Talib, one 
of the leading figures of Banu Hashim, was the most suited candidate for the new 
position: “Caliphate can't be taken by intrigues and we are the lawful owners of it 
as we have Ali to be the best candidate.”31 However, the Banu Hashim were not 
the only protesters against the election of Abu Bakr. Many of the Muhajirun and 
Ansar refrained from attending the meeting in Saqifat bani Sa’ida and preferred 
Ali bin Abi Talib as the next leader. Among these were Abbas bin Abdul 
Muttalib, Zubayr bin Al-Awam, Khalid bin Saeed, Muqdad bin Amro, Salman 
Al-Farisi, Abu Dharr Al-Ghifari, Ammar bin Yasir, Baraa bin Azib, and Obi bin 
Kaab.
32  
Although all of these figures gave their allegiance to Abu Bakr as the 
successor of the Prophet, after Ali himself gave his support, these figures were the 
first nucleus of what would develop later to be the party of Ali or the Shi’a of Ali. 
Abu Bakr ruled for only two years. Before his death in 634 C.E. he assigned 
one of his major supporters, Omar bin Al-Khattab as his successor.
33 
During the 
era in which Abu Bakr and Omar reigned, Ali and his followers retired from 
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public life and isolated themselves from state affairs.
34 
After ten years of his rule, 
Omar was stabbed by his Persian servant, and did not survive the attack. He died 
in 644 C.E., but before that he selected six of the Sahabah (companions of the 
Prophet) to nominate his successor (shura) with a special kind of election strategy 
that definitely would assure the winning of Abdul Rahman bin Awf’s candidate. 
The Shi’a version of this story that is told noted that Ali bin Talib was ignored 
when he rejected the conditions set by Abdul Rahman bin Awf to follow the 
policy of his predecessors Abu Bakr and Omar. When Uthman accepted these 
conditions, he was nominated the third Caliph; Ali set out angrily from the 
meeting but he was followed by the other members of the shura council to force 
him into supporting Uthman as the next ruler of the Muslim Caliphate.
35
 The 
same people who objected to Abu Bakr's nomination protested again to the results 
of the shura council. Some went so far as to denounce Uthman’s personality and 
praise Ali’s in the Mosque of the Prophet itself.36  However, things remained 
relatively quiet, and no such objections were made from the close supporters of 
Ali. 
During the last years of Uthman’s rule, there was major popular protest 
against his policies: he was accused of neglecting the people’s interests, favoring 
his close relatives by giving them important positions in the state as well as 
bestowing them with lavish financial gifts, and ignoring the complaints of 
Egyptians and Kufans who had protested against the oppression by their governor 
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who was Uthman’s cousin.  37 Such claims and many others led to Uthman’s 
assassination by rebels in 656 C.E. and the nomination of Ali bin Abi Talib as the 
fourth Caliph. 
Between the Saqifat bani Sa’ida and the nomination of Abu Bakr (632 C.E.), 
and the assassination of Uthman and the nomination of Ali (656 C.E.), there were 
major changes that led to the rise of many Islamic groups and the formation of 
new alliances, which included Ali’s party or Ali’s Shi’a and some of the city of 
Kufa. They considered Ali as the first Caliph rather than the fourth, as they 
believed that the Caliphate should be only within the family of the Prophet and his 
progeny.
38
 The new groups were comprised of those protesting against Ali and 
accusing him of neglecting the case of Uthman’s murder; the most distinguished 
personality from among these groups was Aisha bint Abu Bakr, the deceased 
Prophet's wife. This group was known as the Camel group, named thus after the 
Battle of the Camel which happened between the army of Ali and the Camel army 
lead by Aisha. The battle ended with the defeat of the latter who ran away toward 
Sham (Syria) to join Muawiyah’s army.39 This group consisted of those who 
supported a relative of Uthman named Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan, the governor of 
Damascus, who rebelled against Ali and tried to fight him. This group was known 
as the group of Siffin, named after the battle of Siffin which happened between 
them and Ali’s army. In this battle of Siffin, when Muawiyah realized that he was 
losing the battle, he ordered his troops to raise copies of the Quran over their 
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heads and demand the arbitration according to the Quran.
40
 This ended with the 
winning of Muawiyah’s party because of the surrendering of Ali’s representative 
in this arbitration.
41
 Many of Ali’s supporters refused this result and accused their 
leader of weakness; thus, they dissented and fought Ali until they assassinated 
him in 661 C.E. This dissenting group was known as the Kharijites (Al-
Khawarej).
42 
The last group which appeared during that period was the Muatazila 
(isolated); they were called as such because they refrained from fighting Ali as 
well as fighting with him.
43 
Among all these divisions, two major groups were 
prominent: the group supporting Ali, known as the Shi’a of Ali, and the group 
supporting Muawiyah called the Shi’a of Muawiyah, as until that moment the 
word ‘Shi’a’ only meant supporters or followers. Thus, most of the people of Iraq 
were known as Shi’a of Ali and most people of Syria were known as the Shi’a of 
Muawiyah.
 44
 
Most of these parties and groups were the result of political conflicts between 
different sides for morale and financial gains which the seat of authority and 
power could guarantee, especially after The Righteous Caliphate (Rashidun 
Caliphate) era. This resulted in intellectual developments used by these 
movements to face and justify their political upheavals, and to develop a 
background that better suited the new reality. The rise of these parties and groups 
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from these political conflicts did not separate them from their theoretical 
framework. The appearance of Shi’a as a political party did not lead to the loss of 
its basic Islamic principles, and within its structure, religion and politics remained 
connected in the Shi’a Muslim awareness.45 
Some scholars attribute the first appearance of Shi’a to the concept of 
supporting Ali bin Abi Talib, and assert that from the beginning the rise of this 
movement was political in its implication. The first Shi’a personalities like 
Salman the Persian, Abu Dharr Al-Ghifari, Ammar bin Yasir, and Muqdad bin 
Al-Aswad, all were acting in support of Ali even when the Prophet was alive.
46 
The Prophet used to love and respect them, and it is told that the Prophet said 
“Allah ordered me to love four and told me that he loves me, and he was asked to 
name them, he replied that Ali is among them, and the other three were Abu 
Dharr, Muqdad, and Salman.”47 This group and many others showed their support 
and respect for Ali from the beginning and in many occasions such as the Saqifat 
bani Sa’idah and shura councils after Omar bin Al-Khattab’s assassination, and 
also in Ali’s fight against Muawiyah. 
After the assassination of Ali, Al-Hassan, his oldest son came to be the 
Muslim Caliph in 40 A.H. (661 C.E.). He was supported by Kufans and his 
father's advocates. His reign lasted for only six months. At the same time, 
Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan was recognized as a Caliph as well in Damascus, and 
he led an army to fight Al-Hassan, but Al-Hassan abdicated for Muawiyah after 
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long negotiations. The main reason for Al-Hassan’s abdication was not only a 
political and military reason, but Al-Hassan did not have enough support and 
encouragement from his advocates, especially after an attempt of assassination by 
one of his followers. Al-Hassan thought conspiracy and lack of support were 
sufficient reasons to have accepted the peace treaty with Muawiyah.
48
 
The treaty, according to which Al-Hassan abdicated to Muawiyah, included 
very important conditions and articles. One of these articles to be followed 
insisted that Muawiyah was not to appoint his own Caliph and had to establish a 
shura (election system).  49 Another article stated that Ali would not be cursed at in 
the presence of Al-Hassan.  50 The dispute between the Umayyad and Ali resulted 
in their adoption of a recommendation for their adherents to curse at Ali publicly 
during the whole reign of the Umayyad. Another one of these articles affirmed 
that safety should be granted to the Shi’a of Ali, and that they would not be 
persecuted or assaulted by the Umayyad and their adherents.  51 The nature of the 
peace treaty between Al-Hassan and Muawiyah reveals the powerful role of the 
Umayyad and their ability to run the crisis with their foes, and the weakness of the 
Shi’a of Ali and their fear of losing Caliphate to the Umayyad. 
Muawiyah disowned all his treaties with Al-Hassan later on. He persecuted 
the Shi’a of Ali and killed some of them like, Hijr bin Adi Al-Kindi and Ali’s 
most prominent companions in 671 C.E.  52 Muawiyah made the Caliphate position 
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hereditary and ordered people to recognize Yazid (647- 683 C.E.), his son, as 
Caliph. Al-Hussein refused to recognize Yazid as a Caliph and Muawiyah did not 
force Al-Hussein to do so.  53 Muawiyah knew the importance of Al-Hussein’s 
position to Muslims and that he was the grandson of the Prophet. Since Al-
Hussein did not support his refusal with power, Muawiyah did not want to make 
Al-Hussein’s refusal, at the time, a bigger case so it would not affect the people 
who already recognized Yazid as a Caliph. Al-Hussein and the Shi’a resorted to 
silence toward the Umayyad during all of Muawiyah’s reign. 
2. Shi’a Groups 
Ibn Mandhoor (1232-1311 C.E.), a well-known Arabic lexicographer and 
author of an Arabic dictionary, Lisan Al-Arab (The Arab Tongue), defines the 
word “Shi’a” as people who agree on something, and if they decided to do 
something together, they are called Shi’a; also any community that is solid and 
unified is Shi’a.54 Moreover, Shi’a means group or community or supporters.55 At 
that time, the word Shi’a didn't refer to certain group or people, but to any group 
of people that agreed on something. 
Julius Wellhausen (1844- 1918 C.E.), one of the famous German Orientalist, 
recognized that the main conflict in the Islamic state from 632- 750 C.E. was the 
conflict between Arab Muslims and non-Arab Muslims (Mawali). He argued that 
the word Shi’a started to be used to refer to Ali and his followers after Muawiyah 
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started his rule as a Caliph, not just a head of a political party in Syria.  56 After his 
position as a head of the Syria party during the rule of Ali, Muawiyah became the 
next Caliph following Ali’s assassination. He enjoyed total authority in his 
position as the ruler over all the Muslims’ provinces, even Kufa,57 a place 
inhabited by people who objected to his rule, and was once the residence of his 
rival, Ali. During his rule, the word “Shi’a” was used mainly to refer to the 
followers of Ali. 
However, the term Shi’a was still holding some varieties of meanings 
according to additions that followed the word, like Shi’a of Imam Al-Hassan (son 
of Ali), Shi’a of Al-Hussein; this proves that the term didn't exactly mean what it 
means today until later in Islamic history. In the times of Imam Al-Hussein, the 
use of the term Shi’a to designate a group, started to have more of a definite 
meaning, as people started to say “Al-Shi’a” (the Shi’a) instead of saying Shi’a of 
Ali or of Al-Hussein. Moreover, the term Shi’a increased significance as it started 
to refer to those Tawaboon (Penitents) after Al-Hussein’s death in Karbala, and 
their leader was called the Sheikh of Shi’a.58 
It was known about the Iraqis then that they were mostly Shi’a, and Kufa was 
their major center. Because of the conflicts between Muawiyah, living in Sham 
(Syria), and Ali, living in Kufa, people of Iraq and people of Syria were involved 
in these conflicts on opposite sides. This involvement continued even after Ali 
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and the death of Muawiyah. Ali moved the capital of Islam from Medina to Kufa 
in Iraq. This was the first time such a change occurred, because he found in Kufa 
many supporters and followers who could aid him in his struggle against 
dissenters and rebels. They fought with him in his various wars, especially the 
battle of Siffin which took place against Muawiyah who had rebelled against Ali's 
rule. 
Most Syrians supported their leader Muawiyah against Ali and the people of 
Iraq, both before and after Ali's death. Following Ali’s death, Muawiyah became 
the Caliph; which led to the loss of the status of Ali’s party and the civilians of 
Kufa. They were forced to accept Muawiyah’s rule over themselves, but kept 
waiting for the right moment to redeem their lost status. The people of Kufa, 
remained faithful to Ali as a leader in their struggle against the Syrians and the 
new Caliph, and insisted that Kufa was the right capital of Islam rather than 
Damascus. Such views made the presence of Shi’a in Iraq go beyond their status 
as a religious group; “Shi’a” became a political expression on the part of Iraqis in 
Kufa who found in Ali a symbol of their lost status.
59
 This was the main reason 
behind the spread of Shi’a Islam among Iraqis, particularly in Kufa. Most of these 
Kufis were the fighters who joined Ali in the battles of Camel and Siffin, and 
considering him as their religious, spiritual, and political leader; this compelled 
them to always support the sons of Ali, hoping this would bring back their glory 
which they had once experienced with Ali. 
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Sunnis believed that the leader of all Muslims after the Prophet is the Caliph, 
and all Caliphs enjoyed equal status, being elected unanimously, while the Shi’a 
believed that Prophet Mohammed recommended Ali to succeed him, and every 
Imam should assign his successor in his own lifetime.
60 
Ibn Hizim (994-1064 
C.E.), an important Sunni Muslim Andalusian scholar, proclaims that everyone 
who agreed with the Shi’a that Ali was the best of the people after the Prophet and 
his rightful successor (and also his sons) are themselves Shi’a; and whoever 
disagrees with this assertation are not Shi’a.61 As the Sunni did not recognize the 
rightfulness of Shi’a Imams in succeeding the Prophet, the Shi’a did not recognize 
or acknowledge the Caliphs who preceded Ali. The Shi’a believed that Abu Bakr, 
Omar and Uthman usurped their rights to succeed the Prophet, as Mohammed 
assigned Ali as Imam of Muslims after him; moreover, they believed that Ali did 
not approve these Caliphs, and he kept silent only to avoid crises.
62
 
The term “Imam” in Arabic means the one who is to be followed.63 It refers to 
any person who is followed, and is usually given a leading position.
64 
The Imam 
is the person whom people follow, whether he is a president or else.
65
 Imam can 
also refer to the leader of the prayer that Muslims follow. Thus, the Imam is the 
leader or chief of a nation, or a community, while the term “Caliph” means 
successor, which refers to the person who succeeds someone or something. 
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“Caliph” is the one who succeeds someone else, and the Caliphate is the ruler ship 
of the government.
66
 The concept of Imam and his function is the factor that 
differentiates between the various groups of Shi’a. 
The Shi’a were divided into different groups, some developed and survived 
till our present day, some disappeared and became extinct. Today, there are three 
major Shi’a groups who are still active in different places of the world. They are: 
the Twelver Shi’a, who form the majority of Shi’a, then the Zaidi, and lastly the 
Ismaili. 
The Zaidi group is called as such after their Imam Zaid ibn Ali, whose 
followers consider him the fifth Imam, being the grandson of Al-Hussein and 
brother of the fifth Imam to the Twelver Shi’a. He was killed in a revolt against 
the Umayyad Caliph Hisham bin Abd Al-Malik in 743 C.E. One of the major 
principles of Zaidi is that Ali bin Abi Talib is the best man after the Prophet, and 
that after Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein anyone of Ali’s progeny can be the Imam, 
but it is a matter of shura “All the sons agree on the next Imam, and if one of 
these sons fought his right for it then he takes it, and can become the next 
Imam.”67 The Zaidis have an opposite opinion about Imamate to those held by the 
Twelvers, who believe that the current Imam assigns the one who succeeds him as 
the Prophet did when he assigned Ali as his next successor in Ghadeer Khumm.
68
 
Ghadeer Khumm is a day to commemorate Ali’s appointment as the Prophet’s 
successor. Shi’a Muslims consider it as a festive day (Eid) observed by on the 
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18th of Thu Al-Hujja. Zaidis were the first Shi’a who managed to have an 
independent state through Hassan bin Zaid who established the Zaidi dynasty in 
Tabaristan near the Caspian Sea in 864 C.E., while the second Zaidi State was 
established in Yemen in 893 C.E. and lasted until 1963.
69
 
The Ismaili Shi’a are the followers of Ismail, the oldest son of the sixth Imam 
Jaafar Al-Sadiq; the Ismaili Shi’a consider Ismail as the seventh Imam after his 
father, rather than his younger brother Musa bin Jaafar who is the seventh Imam 
according to the Twelvers. The historian of Shi’a groups, Al-Nawbakhti (d. 922 
C.E-310 A.H), mentioned that the Ismaili believed in the Imamate of Ismail who 
died even before his father in 760 C.E., also that he was Al-Mahdi, who will 
never die, and that he is the successor as his father assigned him as the next Imam 
according to his friends and followers.
70
 This is the major difference between 
Ismaili and Twelvers, as the first considered Ismail bin Jaafar the last Imam and 
Al-Mahdi who will return at the end of the world, while the Twelvers do not 
consider Ismail as an Imam and it is Mohammed bin Hassan Al-Mahdi that is the 
twelfth and last Imam who will come back at the end of the world. 
In the tenth century, a branch of the Ismaili known as Qaramita (Qarmatians) 
established their state in Bahrain after they had already controlled parts of 
Southern Iraq, Syria and Palestine, while some other branches of Ismaili spread in 
the north of Africa and India, establishing the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt in 969 
C.E., made Cairo their capital and established the Al-Azhar School and Mosque. 
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Ismaili still follow the Imamate dynasty, their Imam today is Aga Khan whom his 
followers consider the forty-ninth Imam.
71
 
The Twelver Shi’a form the majority of Shi’a in Iraq, thus the subject of the 
study will be considered mainly from their point of view. 
3. Twelver Shi’a (Ithna Ashariyya) 
These are the Shi’a who believe that Ali bin Abi Talib was the Imam of 
Muslims after the Prophet and his successor; his sons Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein 
followed their father in the Imamate which continues in the progeny of Al-
Hussein till the 9
th
 grandson, Mohammed bin Al-Hassan. Thus, they believe in 
twelve Imams after the Prophet, and hence they are known as Twelvers (Ithna 
Ashariyya). Also they believe that Allah assigned an Imam for every generation 
by designation (nass), who is considered the leader of his nation and has the 
highest authority (wilaya). This authority is religious, in its theoretical aspect at 
least, and also political.
72 
They believe in certain qualifications for their Imam: he 
must be assigned by the Imam preceding him to be his successor, he must be 
infallible (massum), and the most knowledgeable person among his people.
73
 
The most distinguishing quality of Twelver Shi’a is their belief in occultation 
(Al-Ghayba), which emphasizes that the twelfth Imam Mohammad bin Al-
Hassan, known as Al-Mahdi, did not die, but disappeared (ghaeb) by Allah’s will 
and went into his major occultation in 941 C.E. This was not final as he would 
appear again before the end of the world to bring back justice to a world that had 
                                                 
71
 Halm 160. 
72 Berkey 131. 
73
 Momen 153-55. 
44 
 
 
been filled with oppression.
74  
The idea of Al-Mahdi is common to all Islamic 
divisions, but it is largely in Shi’a. The idea of Al-Mahdi is one of the central 
Shi’a especially the Twelver Shi’a. Twelvers believe in the coming back (Al-
Dhohor) of Al-Mahdi from his occultation, because of the necessity of preparing 
for the Armageddon. Until that time, they refer all their questions to their 
religious leaders and scholars who represent the hidden Imam in his occultation. 
No one knows when Al-Mahdi will show up exactly, but they believe that his 
appearance will most likely be on the tenth of Muharram, in ‘Ashurā but no 
definitive year is assigned.
75 
One of the factors that helped in spreading the Twelver Shi’a was the 
conversion of Persians to Shi’a Islam in 1501 C.E. as announced by their Shah at 
that time, Ismail Safavi; who announced the Twelver Shi’a as the formal creed of 
the empire.
76 
Shah Ismail brought Shi’a leaders from Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain 
so that they could activate Shi’a principles which the Safavid kingdom needed to 
face Ottoman Sunni Islam on one side and by spreading Shi’a teachings on the 
other. In the political conflict between the Safavid Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire, both sides used any factors to support their side against the other. One of 
these factors that were used as support is the religious background. The Safavid 
used its Shi’a background, while the Ottoman used its Sunni background in their 
conflict. Among these principles is the celebration of ‘Ashurā, and practicing the 
mourning rituals for the martyrdom of Al-Hussein; these being the means that the 
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Safavid dynasty followed to bring Persians to convert to Shi’a Islam, encouraging 
them to practice these rituals and make them an essential part of their Shi’a 
identity in the Safavid era.
77
 
Shi’a constitute 10-20  % of Muslims around the world, predominantly in Iran, 
Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain.
78
 They also exist as minorities in Kuwait, Qatar, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and India.
 
The Twelver Shi’a have a different 
status today; they are the majority in Iran, ruling the country religiously and 
politically since the Islamic revolution in 1979 C.E. In Bahrain, where they are 
the majority of their population, they are still searching for a better role in their 
country. As a minority living in an atmosphere surrounded by the opposing 
neighbors, the Sunni majority, the Shi’a in southeast Asia, for example Pakistanis, 
participate in Shi’a mourning rituals in a much more public way to assert their 
solidarity as a Shi’a community.79 However, the Twelver Shi’a role in Lebanon is 
quite distinguished  since 2000 when they succeeded in rising as a political power 
through the growth of Hizbollah as a struggle against the Israeli invasion of south 
Lebanon from 1978 to 2000. 
In Iraq, Twelver Shi’a constitute almost 60% of its population, most of them 
are Arabs with small proportion of Kurds, Turkmens, and Iraqis of Persian 
origins.
80 
For a long time, the Twelver Shi’a in Iraq ruled the Sunni minority 
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which viewed Shi’a as a dangerous force against its political structure. I will 
discuss this point further on in this chapter. This was the reason that most of the 
Sunni governments that ruled Iraq forbid and fought against the practice of 
mourning rituals by Shi’a for they saw these rituals as a danger for their authority. 
The rituals were used by the Shi’a to show their solidarity as a community in the 
Iraqi nation. The situation didn't change until the American invasion in 2003, 
which led to the change in the government structure in the country, adopting a 
more democratic system. After having the first democratic election in Iraq in 2005 
to elect the parliament and to write the constitution, Iraq became a federal 
republic. This new federal republic followed the Baath regime, which had ruled 
the country since 1968. In this unprecedented election, the Shi’a won the majority 
of votes and managed to form their first government in the modern history of Iraq. 
When the American forces invaded Baghdad in April 2003, the first thing the 
Iraqis did was to bring down the statue of Saddam in Firdos Square, in the middle 
of Baghdad. However, the media and news agencies which were busy taking news 
from Baghdad were surprised to find that crowds of Iraqis in mourning outfits 
were heading on foot toward Karbala (100 km south of Baghdad) to perform the 
Al-Arb‘ain visitation hailing the phrase “We’ll never forget our Hussein.” In this 
visitation almost two million Shi’a participated. As people watched, most of the 
Shi’a youth practiced the mourning rituals freely for the first time without the 
interference of authorities, putting on their black shirts and green scarfs.
81
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C. Karbala 
1. Al-Hussein Goes to Iraq 
When Muawiyah died in Damascus in 61 A.H. (680 C.E.), his successor was 
his son Yazid. The new caliph asked his governor in Medina to take the Bayaah 
(oath of allegiance) from the inhabitants of the city, especially the three most 
notable figures there: Al-Hussein bin Ali, Abd Allah bin Umar (614- 693/694 
C.E.) who is the son of the second Caliph Omar bin Al-Khattab, and Abd Allah 
bin Al-Zubayr (624- 692 C.E.), the son of one of the important companions of the 
Prophet, whose mother was Asma bint Abu Bakr (the first Muslim Caliph). 
Yazid’s orders stressed the necessity of taking the oath of allegiance from these 
men even if by force.
82 
Al-Hussein, however, refused to give his allegiance to 
Yazid expressing his rejection of Yazid’s personality: “We are the Prophet’s 
progeny and his family; we are the keepers of Allah’s message, while Yazid is 
immoral, lecherous and wine drinker; people like me would never give allegiance 
to people like him.”83 Al-Hussein left Medina heading for Mecca with his family 
to avoid the governor of Medina who was nagging over his allegiance to Yazid. 
During his stay in Mecca, Al-Hussein received a number of letters from the 
Shi’a in Kufa asking him to come to them so they could give him their allegiance 
as the Caliph instead of Yazid, as they had abstained from supporting 
Muawiyah’s son.84 Al-Hussein sent his cousin Muslim bin Aqeel to check the 
situation in Kufa: if things were as they claimed in their letters, then he would set 
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out go to Kufa.
85 
When Muslim bin Aqeel reached Kufa, he stayed with one of the 
notables in Kufa, Hani bin Urawa, where he was visited by thousands of Shi’a 
Kufans who gave him their pledge of allegiance to support Al-Hussein. Muslim 
bin Aqeel, therefore, sent a letter to Mecca telling Al-Hussein “those twelve 
thousands of Kufa citizens have passed their pledge of allegiance, and thus he 
should come to them.”86 However, this pledge happened secretly as Kufa was still 
under the Umayyad authority represented by the governor Nuaman bin Bashir. 
When the number of Muslim bin Aqeel’s supporters increased, the governor 
of Kufa knew what was planned, but he was relatively lenient with the Shi’a, an 
approach which was not well received by the other Umayyads in Kufa. They 
wrote to the Caliph in Damascus asking him to replace the governor for his 
weakness, and to send a stronger man to face the danger posed by Al-Hussein’s 
arrival.
87 
Thereby, Yazid asked his governor in Basra, Ubayd Allah bin Ziyad, to 
run the affairs of Kufa, to move there immediately and to kill Muslim bin Aqeel 
so that the Shi’a plan could be nipped in the bud. When Ubayd Allah bin Ziyad 
reached Kufa, he spoke to people and promised them rewards if they gave their 
pledge of allegiance to Yazid, but insisted that if they gave it to Al-Hussein, then 
Yazid would send an army to kill the men of Kufa and take their women as 
prisoners. When the citizens heard that, they panicked and decided not to interfere 
between conflicting leaders, and withdrew their pledge to Al-Hussein in order to 
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support Yazid, instead.
88   
With the help of the people of Kufa, Ubayd Allah bin 
Ziyad, captured Muslim bin Aqeel and Hani bin Urawa, killed them, and sent 
their severed heads to Yazid in Damascus. 
Meanwhile, Al-Hussein was setting out from Mecca to Kufa in Iraq. He 
ignored all the warnings and advice of his relatives and followers who urged him 
to put off traveling to Kufa until he was certain of the stand of the Kufans.
89
 
However, Al-Hussein believed in the Shi’a who supported his father Ali, that they 
would support him also as their letters had expressed. On his way toward Iraq, Al-
Hussein received the news of Muslim’s death and the altered stance of the 
Kufans.
90
 Then, Al-Hussein spoke to his people who had accompanied him to Iraq 
and told them about the changing circumstances and his disappointment in the 
citizens of Kufa. He added in his speech that by following him they would not 
find earthly blessings and they should be prepared for death; he gave them also 
the choice of leaving him and returning.
91 
The people decided not to follow Al-
Hussein anymore and turned their backs and returned to their homes. Only a few 
members of his family and supporters remained with him; they were hardly one 
hundred men. 
The Umayyad leader, Al-Hurr binYazid Al-Ryahi, with his troops, surrounded 
the caravan of Al-Hussein ordering them to follow him to Kufa, but Al-Hussein 
refused to submit to these orders. After some arguments between the conflicting 
leaders, Al-Hurr binYazid Al-Ryahi proposed to Al-Hussein that he should take 
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another route that would not lead him to Kufa, nor take him back to his home, and 
he would write to the Kufa governor asking for further orders. Thereby, Al-
Hussein took his followers on a different route until new orders reached Al-Hurr 
binYazid Al-Ryahi which commanded him to once again surround Al-Hussein’s 
caravan and forbid him from continuing his journey until further notice.
92 
Al-
Hussein then stopped in Karbala, a wasteland with no water resources, a few 
kilometers away from the Euphrates. By the next day, Ubyad Allah bin Ziyad sent 
an army of thousands of troops under the Umayyad leadership of Omar bin Saad 
to surround Al-Hussein’s caravan. 
Some regiments also settled on the banks of the Euphrates to prevent Al-
Hussein’s supporters among the Kufa citizens to come along to help their Imam,93 
and to prevent Al-Hussein’s caravan from taking water from the river.94 
It was another means of torture and inflicting pressure on Al-Hussein’s people 
to prevent them from reaching the river so that he would yield and give his pledge 
of allegiance to Yazid. Ibn Al-Atheer (1160-1233 C.E.), the well-known historian, 
mentions preventing Al-Hussein and his people from water before his martyrdom, 
and one of the troops in Omar’s army addressing Al-Hussein in the following 
words: “Al-Hussein, do you see how the water shines like piece of sky, but you 
will never taste any drop of it till you die.”95 Shi’a sources that tackled Maqtal Al-
Hussein tell that when the thirst became severe, Al-Hussein sent his brother Al-
Abbas with twenty men to bring water to their camp; this was on the seventh of 
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Muharram.
96 
That is why Shi’a mourners assign the seventh day to celebrate the 
martyrdom of Al-Abbas in their rituals in celebrating the anniversary of the battle. 
On the night of the tenth of Muharram 61 A.H. (680 C.E.), Omar bin Saad 
offered Al-Hussein the choice between surrendering or fighting. After meeting 
with his family and supporters to seek counsel, Al-Hussein told them they could 
all go back as the enemy was seeking him only. However, all insisted on staying 
with their Imam.
97
 
2. Martyrdom of Al-Hussein and His Family 
On the morning of the tenth day of Muharram 61 A.H., 10
th
 of October 680 
C.E., Al-Hussein gathered all the men among his family and supporters, which 
numbered seventy-two, to face the army surrounding them. After he asked the 
women and children to stay in their tents, he ordered that they be surrounded them 
by a trench filled with fire to protect them.
98 
Among Al-Hussein’s followers were 
those who joined him on his route toward Iraq; some who were from Kufa who 
reached him before he was surrounded by Omar bin Saad’s army, which stood 
now with thousands of men ready to fight the seventy-two.
99
 
 Before the battle broke out, Al-Hussein was asked for the last time to 
surrender, but he refused asserting his stance by saying “I will not be humbled, 
nor will I give in like a slave.”100  However, Al-Hussein approached Omar ibn 
Saad’s army in a last attempt to persuade them not to fight him, reminding them 
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that he was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, and the son of his trustee 
Ali; he also reminded them of the famous quote by the Prophet in clarifying the 
status of Al-Hussein and his brother Al-Hassan when he said “You are both the 
lords of Heaven’s youth.”101 He told them that such reasons are enough for them 
to refrain from fighting him, and he came to Iraq because they asked him to do so. 
They answered him promptly that they did not!
102 
Al-Hurr binYazid Al-Ryahi, 
one of the leaders in the surrounding army, was influenced by the words of Al-
Hussein; thus, he left Omar bin Saad’s army and joined the side of Al-Hussein, 
regretting his stand against his Imam. Most of Omar bin Saad’s army gave Al-
Hussein’s speech a deaf ear and insisted that he should surrender to them. After 
realizing the futility of argument, Al-Hussein retreated back to his small army 
waiting for the battle to begin. 
 The battle started with the throwing of darts by Omar bin Saad’s army toward 
Al-Hussein’s, after that it became individual and group duels between the two 
parties. Each of Al-Hussein’s supporters, before they set off toward the battle, 
approached their Imam renewing their pledge of allegiance to him as they did 
with his father.
103 
The battle took longer than was usual at that time because of the 
individual duels, which were planned by Al-Hussein and his followers as they 
were of a smaller number facing a huge army. When his opponent realized the 
plan, Omar bin Saad gave orders to his troops to advance together as a group 
because Al-Hussein and his followers were known for their skills in fencing, in 
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addition to their outstanding bravery.
104 
By the afternoon, most of Al-Hussein’s 
supporters and followers were killed in the battle, and the only ones who 
remained were his family members who were already ready to fight. 
 The first of his family to approach the battle was his eldest son, Ali Al-Akbar, 
who after fighting bravely, was surrounded by a group of troops who killed him 
and cut his body with their swords.
105 
Al-Hussein’s brothers and cousins 
continued fighting one after the other until it was the turn of Al-Qasim bin Al-
Hassan, his young nephew, who also took his sword and joined his uncle until he 
was killed.
106
 After almost all of the male members of the family were killed, Al-
Abbas, the only surviving fighter, tried to bring water for the women and children. 
Both Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas set toward the river but they were interrupted by a 
group of troops who surrounded them. While they were fighting, Al-Hussein was 
shot and injured by several darts, separating him from Al-Abbas. Al-Abbas was 
surrounded by a number of fighters and then they killed him after a strong defense 
on his part. Al-Hussein was notified that the troops had invaded his family’s tent. 
So, when Al-Hussein tried to go back to his place near the tents of the women and 
children, he was interrupted by the troops led by Shimr bin Thil-Jawshan who 
kept fighting him from all sides until he fell on the ground. Upon seeing him lying 
there, Shimr came to Al-Hussein and cut off his head in front of the remaining 
members of his family, which were mostly women and children. Then, the army 
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attacked the camps which were now void of male fighters, while the women and 
children tried to escape toward the desert. Some of Omar’s army set to plunder 
the tents, taking Al-Hussein’s clothes and in some cases, even tearing off the 
women’s clothes from their bodies.107 The story of the death of Al-Hussein, when 
it is narrated by the Shi’a is done so in a passionate manner, giving more details 
about each individual in this story. Some of the events of the battle have proof in 
historical sources, others are meant to create a dramatic tragedy without actual 
historical proof.  
 The early historians of this battle, like Abu Makhnuf (d. 773-74 C.E.), Al-
Tabari (838-923 C.E.), and writers of the death of Al-Hussein Maqtal Al-Hussein 
like Ibn Tawoos (1193-1246 C.E.) and Ibn Nama (1171-1247 C.E.), give more 
detailed narration of the events in Karbala. Such details clarify specifically how 
each member of Al-Hussein's army was killed in addition to full details about 
each one's background and their killers. The books of Maqtal which were written 
in later times concentrated on giving the detailed emotional dimension of the 
event to influence the audience and win their sympathy toward the martyrs. Thus, 
the books of Maqtal Al-Hussein devoted a number of pages to each member in 
Al-Hussein’s family clarifying each one’s role in the battle and how each 
participated in the army before being killed by the enemy. Such detailed narration 
always influenced the readers and greater audience of Al-Hussein’s story. One of 
the details, for example, that has been related by Ibn Tawoos, suggested that Al-
Hussein’s wife approached him during the battle with her infant son to ask the 
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opponent army for some water as the infant had not drunk water for three days. In 
compliance with her request, Al-Hussein took the infant, carried him high in his 
hands to ask the army for water for the child but instead, one of the enemy’s 
troops threw a dart and killed the infant.
108
 
 After the end of the battle, the heads of Al-Hussein and his followers were 
raised on the spears of the winning army so all could see them, thereby 
frightening the viewers of the Shi’a in Kufa and other cities. Women, children and 
Ali bin Al-Hussein- who was the only one of Al-Hussein’s sons to survive as he 
was seriously sick at the time of the battle and could not participate in the fight- 
were all taken prisoners and sent to Kufa to the governor’s place.109 The governor 
Ubyad Allah bin Ziyad gave an order to have the heads displayed around the 
streets of Kufa,
110 
so the citizens of Kufa would be terrified and would never think 
of seeking revenge for their Imam or rebel against their ruler Yazid. After that, 
they took the prisoners’ caravan along with eighteen heads of Al-Hussein’s 
relatives to the palace of the Caliph Yazid in Syria as a proof that military action 
against Al-Hussein’s movement had ended successfully. After spending days in 
Damascus, Yazid allowed Ali bin Al-Hussein to take his family to their home in 
Medina as Yazid realized that keeping them in Syria might endanger his authority 
because of the status Al-Hussein enjoyed as a spiritual leader. Also, he gave 
orders that the head of Al-Hussein be returned to the body in Karbala.
111 
The 
battle of Karbala caused enormous controversy among Muslims at that time, 
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endangering the authority of the Umayyad rule as they were the killers of Al-
Hussein and his family. 
Al-Hussein bin Ali and Yazid bin Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan represent the 
second generation of Muslims, and they had inherited former hostility that existed 
between their parents. Yazid’s ideas were more than an extension of the ideas of 
his father’s side to emerge as a governor rather than as a man of religion on the 
one hand, while Al-Hussein’s was also an extension of the line of his father as a 
religious leader seeking to move forward to embrace the ideas of essential Islamic 
thoughts espoused by Ali bin Abi Talib in his struggle against Muawiyah, on the 
other hand. This conflict between these two ideologies continued later on and 
developed more in the Umayyad and the Abbasid era. The Caliphate position as 
the authority of the ruling class basis came first, and the religious issue came 
second, after the government’s priorities. Therefore the conflict between the 
governing authority and Shi’a became continuous between the two sides and did 
not terminate.  
This conflict would escalate at some times and calm down at others. For 
example, during the Umayyad era with Omar bin Abd Al-Aziz (682-720 C.E.), 
and during the Abbasid era with the Caliph Al-Mamun (786- 833 C.E.), the 
conflicts calmed down. While, during the Abbasid era with the Caliph Al-
Mutawakel (822- 861 C.E.) and during most of the Umayyad era, such as the 
Caliphs Marwan bin Al-Hakam (623- 685 C.E.) and Al-Waleed bin Abd Al-Malik 
(668-7 15 C.E.), the conflicts escalated. During this long conflict, rulers evolved 
approaches and methods against Shi’a and some approaches became clear in the 
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Islamic state at various times. On the other side, Shi’a came to represent the role 
of the opposition in the Islamic state, which is also what led them to develop their 
tactics in the confrontation and address in this conflict. Among the most important 
of these techniques invested and developed by the Shi’a in their struggle against 
successive Islamic governments since the Umayyad, is the advantage of the battle 
of Karbala and the martyrdom of Al-Hussein as one of the most important means 
of facing rejection and protesting the government. 
3.  Shi’a in Kufa and their Stand toward Karbala 
 The stands and attitudes of people in Kufa did not actually express the 
spiritual solidarity and awareness for which early Shi’a had always shown. Except 
for the few arrested by the governor police, and those who managed to join Al-
Hussein in Karbala, most of the supposed supporters and followers failed to 
express this support as well as falling short of showing the Shi’a solidarity in 
Kufa.  
 In light of these factors, it appears most of the supporters of Al-Hussein in 
Kufa were not actually supporting him for spiritual reason or were they similar to 
the early Shi’a as Salman the Persian, Abu Thur, Ammar bin Yasir, who 
supported Imam Ali for his role and position in Islam. The supporters of Al-
Hussein in Kufa were Shi’a for political reasons, motivated by their support of 
Ali’s policy against that of Muawiyah. However, these reasons were not 
sufficiently developed or strong enough to with stand the Umayyad polices of 
brutality. Thereby, they could not summon the stamina necessary to support Al-
Hussein in Karbala, leaving their Imam and his family to face their tragic destiny 
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alone. Moreover, the memory of Ali’s rule in Iraq “was always connected with 
the Shi’a cause, which made most of the Iraqis support Ali without being actually 
Shi’a as they thought that Iraq would be the leading place among others in the 
Islamic kingdom.”112 Chieftains of Arab supporters of Al-Hussein were bribed 
with fortune, while the stand of non-Arabs mawali was mixed with fear from the 
authority represented by the Arabs majority.  
 The background of Al-Hussein’s supporters, who were mostly people of Kufa 
since they were living in the Islamic capital city that was appointed by the Imam 
Ali (the father of Al-Hussein), especially the mawali, reveals the reasons behind 
the change in their attitudes toward their leader. On one side, they were searching 
for an opportunity to improve the standard of their lives, and they were not ready 
yet to achieve their goal. However, their positions started to be stronger after the 
battle of Karbala as they realized the necessity of changing their realities which 
became worse after Yazid took over power. He considered them as second rate 
citizens among Arabs. This led to the Tawaboon (Penitents) rebellion, which 
started four years after the battle of Karbala, as repentance for not supporting their 
Imam. Besides being a manifesto for a group which included those trying to 
achieve its political and social goals, Al-Hussein’s martyrdom was only coverage 
for these goals. Most of the members of this movement were the mawali 
demanding equality with their Arab peers as well as seeking a change in their 
social status.
113  
Until that time there was no real structure for Shi’a Islam, but the 
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movement of Tawaboon, led by Shi’a after Al-Hussein’s death, was like the spirit 
that gave life to the movement.
114
 
D. The Rise and Development of Mourning Rituals 
1. The Umayyad Era (661 C.E. - 750 C.E.) 
 It was claimed that there were a number of funerals organized for the 
martyrdom of Al-Hussein and his followers; among these early mourning rituals 
were those organized by the women in the house of Yazid after the female 
prisoners of Al-Hussein’s family reached Damascus. Al-Tabari mentions that the 
female members of Al-Hussein’s family were imprisoned, “left till they entered 
the house of Yazid and all the women in Muawiyah’s family welcomed them with 
crying and wailing for the loss of Al-Hussein; they mourned him three days.”115  
The participation of Muawiyah’s family in the rituals of mourning and funerals 
for Al-Hussein’s death was mainly motivated because one of Yazid’s wives, Hind 
bint Abdullah bin Aamir,
 
was well-connected with a good relationship with the 
family of Al-Hussein,
116
 as it was thought that she spent some years in Ali’s 
house when her father died, before marrying Yazid and living in Damascus.
117
 
 However, the earliest sign of organizing mourning rituals by the Shi’a as a 
group goes back to the commemoration done by Tawaboon in 685 C.E., four 
years after the battle of Karbala; these memorial services had a political 
atmosphere. Ibn Al-Atheer mentions that under the leadership of Sulyman bin 
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Sard Al-Khuzaee, Tawaboon marched by the thousands raising the banner  “Ya 
litharat Al-Hussein” (To Revenge Al-Hussein) and, “They ended at the grave of 
Al-Hussein; as they arrived there, they all shouted in unison with unprecedented 
number of mourners… They spent a day there in mourning for the killed Imam 
and his followers.”118 The rituals of mourning continued by the Tawaboon 
consisted of visiting the tomb of Al-Hussein to show their regret for the loss of 
their Imam by reciting elegies. These elegies distinguished the memorial services 
from others; they were mixed with feelings of rebellion and revolt against the 
ruling authority. Thus, some of these activities did not express sadness because of 
Al-Hussein’s martyrdom, as much as expressing the regret, sense of guilt, and a 
plea for forgiveness for their negative attitude about refraining from supporting 
their Imam in ‘Ashurā. These feelings established the annual ‘Ashurā rituals.119 
 Whether the rituals sprang from emotional or political grounds, they remained 
secretly practiced. They were of limited scope during the Umayyad era because of 
the severe consequences faced by whoever participated in them. Penalties were 
also inflicted on poets who led others to mourn Al-Hussein and his followers 
through their poems; this tactic was used by many poets to mention the event.
120
 
 
For example, some of the poets who wrote elegies for Al-Hussein in the Umayyad 
reign are Al-Sayyid Al-Himiary (723- 789 C.E. ), Al-Kumait Al-Asady (died 743 
C.E), Jaafer Bin Affan (d. 767 C.E.), and Abu Omara Al-Monshid.  121 Most of 
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their poems were recited secretly in mourning councils at Al-Hussein’s 
grandson’s house, the sixth Shi’a Imam Jaafer Al-Sadiq (702–765 C.E.). 
Moreover, the Umayyads tried to delete all references to Karbala from the books 
of history and literature so that the memory of Al-Hussein and the battle would 
sink into oblivion. Yet, the irony is that the more authorities led to stop these 
rituals, the more people were encouraged to organize these memorial services 
annually as well as to recite the happenings of the battle orally.
122
 
 Many Shi’a sources mention that the Imam succeeding Al-Hussein, like Ali 
bin Al-Hussein and Mohammad Al-Baqir, were persistent in referring to the battle 
and concentrated on its spiritual implication to show the tragedy that it involved. 
Mohammed Al-Baqir exerted great efforts to continue with the tradition like his 
father Ali bin Al-Hussein, by organizing the rituals of crying and reciting the 
events of the battle in his own house, to avoid conflicts with Umayyad authorities. 
He tried also to establish certain bases for these rituals of mourning, among these 
were to emphasize the visiting of Al-Hussein’s shrine on Ashurā, crying there, 
reciting elegies, and organizing memorial services with family members; besides 
which he considered ‘Ashurā a public mourning day for Shi’a in which no work 
was to be done if it was not related to the mourning of Karbala.
123
 
2. The Abbasid Era (750 C.E.- 1258 C.E.) 
 Opposite to what the Umayyad used to dictate, Shi’a during different periods 
of the Abbasid Caliphate encountered a more tolerant attitude toward the practice 
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of their mourning rituals. Abbasid used the battle of Karbala as a pretext to 
motivate resistance against the Umayyad dynasty, demanding revenge for the 
martyrs of Karbala from their killers, the Umayyad.
124 
With such propaganda, the 
Abbasid dynasty managed to overthrow the Umayyad. 
 In spite of the ebbs and flows in the relationship between the Abbasid 
Caliphate and Shi’a, the mourning rituals were practiced with greater freedom 
than was probable during the Umayyad era, especially during the time of Al-
Mamun’s rule (786-833 C.E.), during which many memorial services were held. 
These were known as wailing sessions in which melodist poems of elegy were 
recited to remember the memory of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in Karbala. The 
third century in the Islamic calendar witnessed the public appearance of the 
wailing bard’s name, who recited melodist poems in majlis; poets like Daabil Al-
Khuzaee (765-860 C.E.) and Al-Nashee Al-Asghar (884-975 C.E.) were the 
earliest poets who started the tradition of wailing over the martyrdom of Al-
Hussein.
125
 
 During the time of the seventh Twelver Imam Musa Al-Kadhum (745-799 
C.E.), when Al-Mamun was the caliph, the mourning rituals developed at the 
institutional structural level. At that time the rituals of mourning began to include 
several activities that over time became an essential part of mourning the death of 
Al-Hussein, like crying, remembering the particulars of the battle regularly, and 
remembering Al-Hussein when drinking water. In this period, traditions 
developed such as crying for Al-Hussein’s death in ‘Ashurā, holding memorial 
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services in private houses to celebrate his martyrdom, receiving condolences for 
the tragic death from each other, allowing latm as well as excessive panic, the 
visitation of Al-Hussein’s shrine, starting the month of Muharram with signs of 
sadness and mourning, abstaining from work in ‘Ashurā, imagining the battle or 
dramatizing it, dressing in mourning, and abstaining from drinking or eating from 
morning until sunset.
126
 Thus, after being limited in its scope and activities, 
practiced secretly in the houses of Al-Hussein’s followers with some spontaneity, 
the mourning rituals became more definite in terms of structure and procedures, 
developing over time become an essential part of the Shi’a identity. 
 The first appearance of the memorial services known as majlis with wailing 
sessions motivated writers and historians to write the story of Maqtal Al-Hussein 
which narrates the story of Al-Hussein’s death and the battle of Karbala in detail. 
These books of Maqtal appeared in a later period written by Ibn Tawoos (664-589 
C.E.) and Ibn Nama (d. 685 C.E.). The wailing sessions developed to be majlis of 
narration of the story of Maqtal, and along with this the name of the wailing bard 
or poet became qari (reader or reciter) and was used to describe those who 
celebrate in melodist poems or prose recitation of the story of Maqtal in Iraq until 
the present time.
127
 
3. The Buyid Era (934 C.E.- 1055 C.E.) 
 The most important development in the rituals of mourning happened during 
the Buyid era; after they conquered Iraq in 945 C.E., the Shi’a started practicing 
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their rituals of mourning on a formal level for the first time in the history of these 
rituals. Ibn Al-Jowzey, as well as Ibn Al-Atheer, both mentioned that in 302 A.H. 
(914 C.E.), the Buyid Sultan Muaizz Al-Dawla gave orders to hold memorial 
services of ‘Ashurā in Baghdad, and he closed markets, installing tents to host the 
wailing sessions, and sent wailing women crying and slapping their faces in grief 
over Al-Hussein’s death.128 These rituals began to be held annually, and for the 
first time ‘Ashurā became an official holiday to celebrate the event with mourning 
and wailing over the tragedy of Al-Hussein.
129 
That was the first time that the 
authorities of Iraq supported these rituals and their public practice, previously 
they were limited to Shi’a and close relatives of Al-Hussein and his supporters. 
The Abbasid Caliphate had now come under the control of the Buyid dynasty who 
were a Shi’a Imamate and descended from Zaidi Shi’a.130 The development of the 
mourning rituals during the era of the Buyid dynasty advanced the practices to 
another level which was to become deeply integrated within the traditions of Shi’a 
Islam. 
 Sunnis did not approve of the public practice of these rituals by Shi’a in 
Baghdad which motivated them to invent another practice to counter the rituals of 
Shi’a in ‘Ashurā. Sunnis changed the day of ‘Ashurā into a mourning the day for 
Musab bin Al-Zubair.
131
 The Sunni’s mourning over Musab’s death was 
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considered a means to confront the Shi’a mourning rituals; consequently it led to 
conflicts between Shi’a and Sunni in Baghdad in 353 A.H. (964 C.E.), resulting in 
destructive riots on markets with a number of causalities.
132 
This was perhaps the 
first time in which Sunnis held mourning rituals over an Islamic figure following 
the same pattern as the Shi’a following in their mourning of Al-Hussein. 
However, the recurrence of violence because of the Shi’a-Sunni conflicts forced 
authorities to interfere and issue orders to ban ‘Ashurā rituals in 393 A.H. (1002 
C.E.). The general of the Buyid army prohibited all kinds of mourning rituals 
whether they were held by Shi’a like the wailing over Al-Hussein, or these held 
by Sunnis to honor the memory of Musab bin Al-Zubair.
133
 
 These confrontations between the citizens of Baghdad over practicing 
mourning rituals reflects to a certain extent the influence of these rituals on the 
daily life of these people, which eventually made these citizens more aware of 
their communal identity as Shi’a or Sunni. While Shi’a were practicing their 
mourning rituals publically after centuries of banning, trying in the newly lived 
freedom to express the Karbala tragedy as an essential part of their intellectual 
development as a group and their identity as a religious denomination, Sunnis in 
Baghdad also tried to produce a symbol- Musab- to express their identity and 
background, a symbol that withstands the one presented by the Shi’a- Al-Hussein 
- as a means to balance the two denominations. Thus, the mourning rituals 
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practiced in Baghdad were not just an expression for the loss or tragedy inflicted 
on someone dear, but also the expression of collective identity within the social 
circles. 
 The memorial services and majlis held by Shi’a to mourn their killed Imam 
did not stop with the official prohibition issued by the Buyid authorities. During 
the last decade of their rule, the Turkish Sunni Saljoukid overtook the Caliphate in 
447 A.H. (1055 C.E.). In spite of the attempts of these new Caliphs to prohibit the 
‘Ashurā mourning rituals of Shi’a in Baghdad, these practices did not stop 
completely, but continued using any innovative means possible. In 458 A.H. 
(1065 C.E.), Shi’a in the Al-Karkh side of Baghdad closed their shops and 
brought women wailing to hold memorial service for Al-Hussein, while walking 
behind some funeral to distract the authorities.
134 
The mourning rituals of ‘Ashurā 
started to take different forms to survive against all attempts to stop them, it 
became strong enough to invent means for practice under whatever 
circumstances, even when the Sunni authorities of Saljokid rule banned them. 
4. The Safavid and Qajar Eras (1501 C.E.- 1925 C.E.) 
 The drastic change that happened in the Shi’a mourning rituals came with the 
Safavid who adopted the Twelver Shi’a Islam in 1501 C.E. The Safavid used the 
mourning rituals and memorial services of majlis as means to spread the Shi’a 
teachings in Iran and thereby they spread their own power. Shah Ismail, who had 
a Sufi background, introduced new rituals of mourning in Iran that reflected to 
certain extent this background in order to help in spread Shi’a teaching in Persia. 
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This appeared in the form of organizing memorial services in ‘Ashurā as well as 
introducing the third testimonial phrase: “I testify that Ali is Wali Allah” in the 
call to prayer (Al-Athan) and in Islamic testimonies.
135 
Such rituals found 
popularity in Persia where people were inclined toward spiritualism and Sufism as 
essential parts of their national identity. It was also known that Safavid kings and 
princes personally participated in the ‘Ashurā rituals, attending the memorial 
services held in the streets while wearing the mourning black garments. Some of 
them even insisted on holding a memorial service for Al-Hussein while they were 
in the battle -field, like Shah Abbas in 1011 A.H. (1602 C.E.) while he was 
fighting the Uzbek army.
136
 
 The adopting of Shi’a Islam by the Safavid dynasty and the initiations of Iraqi, 
Lebanese, and Bahraini Shi’a leaders to spread the Twelver Shi’a Islam in Persia 
explains the rise of the mourning rituals for Al-Hussein in Persia during the 
sixteenth century. The Persian mourning rituals were certainly influenced by 
those practiced in Iraq during the ninth century as publicly publically practiced 
during the Buyid dynasty in Baghdad, as well as near the shrine of Al-Hussein. 
The publicly held mourning rituals in Iraq helped export these rituals to other 
Islamic countries through the visitors and preachers who used to attend the holy 
shrines during the visitation seasons. Such visitations were further encouraged by 
the Safavid who emphasized the importance of visiting the holy shrines and 
practicing the mourning rituals. 
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 Persians contributed a great deal in developing the mourning rituals for the 
Al-Hussein tragedy, adding much of their cultural heritage to their content, as 
well as helping in taking these rituals to other countries like Azerbaijan, India, 
and Turkey.
137
 The new additions which the Persians brought to the mourning 
rituals are practices like tatbir, ta’ziyeh, the spread of the Imam’s pictures, 
lighting candles in majlis, and installing tents for memorial services so mourners 
could receive the heavenly bliss and have their wishes come true.
138 
This act of 
adding to the rituals shows the tendency of mourners to hope their practices are 
suitable to their social structure and shows that the living tradition that is 
consistently reproduced and newly created. 
5. The Ottoman Era (1299 C.E.- 1922 C.E.) 
 Iraq was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1532-1918 C.E. The 
Ottoman’s strictness concerning the practicing of these rituals of the anniversary 
of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom led the Shi’a to practice these rituals secretly in their 
houses as they used to do during the Umayyad and Abbasid eras. The Turkish 
governor of Baghdad, Dawood Pasha (1817-1831 C.E.), was the strictest Turkish 
governor concerning practicing the rituals of ‘Ashurā, and as a consequence Iraqis 
hosted these events in the basements of their houses, leaving a woman in the front 
yard of the house to move around a hand mill so its sound covered the sounds of 
wailing and other activities in the memorial services they held during ‘Ashurā.139 
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Even though this story tells us of a more religious inward group practice than an 
outward resistance one, it explains the tendency to practice ‘Ashurā rituals even 
under difficult circumstances. In spite of practicing the rituals in Najaf in 1821 by 
Sheikh Nasar Al-Absi, which was after the truce between Dawood Pasha and 
Persia, the prohibition continued in Baghdad until the city was conquered by Ali 
Riza Pasha who became the new governor. He allowed the practice of ‘Ashurā 
rituals, because Ali Riza was an adherent of the Bektashi Sufi order which was 
close in spirit to that of Shi’a. He attended personally one of these majlis in 
Baghdad on the 21
st
 of May 1832 when the memorial services started to be held 
publically again there.
140 
However, these rituals continued to be restricted or 
prohibited after the era of Ali Riza, according to the policy of the rulers. 
 In the nineteenth century, the mourning rituals over Al-Hussein witnessed 
drastic changes because of the newly introduced activities like tatbir, striking the 
chest, as well as using the iron chains by the participants to strike their own backs 
with them. Tatbir was introduced to the mourning rituals held in the Iraqi holy 
cities of Najaf, Karbala and Al-Kadhumya through the Turkish Shi’a who came to 
visit these cities; at the beginning this tatbir was limited in its practice to non-
Iraqis, who came from Turkey and Persia. 
 The first procession of chest beating (latm) appeared in Al-Kadhumya city 
under the patronage of Sheikh Baqir Asad Allah Al-Daizavoli (d. 1840 C.E.) and 
then it found its way throughout Iraq.
141 
Chest beating is one of the activities that 
became widespread in Iraq and is still practiced in present time, while lashing the 
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back with iron chains (zangeel) was introduced by the Indians who settled in 
Karbala and Al-Kadhumya.
142 
However some scholars mention that the use of 
zangeel was actually introduced in 1919 by the British governor of Najaf, who 
served as governor in Kermanshah, because he wanted to replace the use of 
swords and Qama in tatbir with chain-lashing.
143
 These new practices developed 
in Iraq mainly because of the increasing number of Shi’a coming from foreign 
countries to visit the shrine of Al-Hussein and other holy shrines in Najaf, Al-
Kadhumya and Samarra. In addition, some would settle near these cities because 
of the religious schools that taught Shi’a principles. This exposed these cities to 
other cultures, and affected the nature and content of the mourning rituals 
practiced there. 
6. The British Mandate and Hashemite Monarchy Era (1920 C.E. - 1958 
C.E.) 
 During the British occupation of Iraq and the Monarchy era, the practice of 
mourning rituals fluctuated between public freedom at some times and restriction 
or prohibition at others. Since the beginning of their occupation of Iraq, the 
British paid attention to these rituals, and this attention continued during the times 
of King Faisal. At the beginning of his reign, as he supported the processions of 
‘Ashurā financially, and attended personally a procession near the shrine of Al-
Kadhum in Baghdad in 1921.
144
 
 However, the Sunni dominance over the government motivated the restriction 
of practicing the ‘Ashurā rituals, as they became the means of highlighting the 
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grievances of the Shi’a due to the potential of these rituals to be turned into means 
of protests against the government by the Shi’a leaders.145 Thus, it became 
necessary to restrict the practice of these rituals to minimize the role they might 
play in the politics of Iraq. 
 The most important feature of this period was the attempt to restrict the role of 
readers and reciters of majlis, who might criticize the government and the social 
and economic realities of Iraq under the British mandate during their sermons. For 
example some of the British documents expressed concern over the sermons of 
Sayid Saleh Al-Halli (d.1940 C.E.) who was one of the most important preachers 
of ‘Ashurā’s platform. These documents prove that the British were watching him 
closely to prevent him from criticizing the government in the Al-Umara city, 
south of Iraq. This explains why the preacher was exiled twice during the 1920s 
with the accusation of political instigation.
146
 
 Excluding Shi’a from key governmental positions and jobs in the modern 
Iraqi state led to many Shi’a complains and increasing tension for the subsequent 
Sunni governments during the monarchy era.
147 
Such grievances led to a violent 
revolt in 1935 C.E. in the area of the Middle Euphrates and the Muntafeck region 
in southern Iraq, which prompted the Iraqi government to prohibit memorial 
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services and fundraising for these events as well as imposing central government 
control on the rituals and their political effects.
148
 
 The established rituals of Ashurā did not provoke controversies the way the 
new rituals, like tatbir and zanjeel and the use of using musical instruments like 
trumpets and drums (which were used widely during the first quarter of the 20
th
 
century) did. As these rituals put participants’ lives at risk, these rituals also 
opposed Shi’a Islamic teachings, as well. Some Shi’a scholar (Ulama) argued that 
these rituals were extremely harmful and thus led a reformative campaign against 
them. Sayid Mohammad Mahdi Al-Quzwini (d. 1939), one of the important Shi’a 
scholars in Iraq, issued a fatwa (religious edict) in 1926, to reform the mourning 
rituals of Al-Hussein and to exclude the wrong and harmful practices, especially 
tashabih and the prisoners caravan as they exposed Shi’a Islam to much ridicule 
by others.
149 
Coinciding with this tendency, there were other fatwas from the 
Shi’a Ulama in Sham (Syria), with Sayid Mohsen Al-Ameen (1866-1951), who 
forbid some of the new practices which inflict harm on the body like tatbir, as 
well as using the musical instruments, re-enactments, and referring to 
undocumented hadiths.
150 
In spite of the fact that these fatwas produced many 
controversies and similar fatwas on the same subject, the participants in the rituals 
were not influenced by these fatwas as they always found other clerics who 
encouraged these practices and their continuity. 
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7. The Republican Era (1958 C.E.- 1968 C.E.) 
 After the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic of Iraq in 
1958, many anti-religious ideas, like communism, were entertained by a wide 
range of Shi’a youth. The 1940s and 50s witnessed the rise of communism which 
found a home in the minds of underprivileged classes in Iraq, especially the young 
Shi’a, as they were trying to find a solution for the problems and social grievances 
caused by political systems that failed to represent their aspirations or secure the 
social justice they hoped for. Large numbers of the Iraqi Communist Party were 
Shi’a, and as the rituals always allowed for huge crowds attending the event, 
many Communists attended these Shi’a events like ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain to 
publicize their leftist ideologies.
151 
 
The mourning rituals continued to be held every year by the Shi’a, yet still 
there were attempts to prohibit them or at least to limit their political influences. 
Some restrictions were placed on practicing these rituals in some areas in addition 
to banning the procession of latm, or preventing these participants from passing 
through the center of Baghdad. These were the royal laws of prohibition enacted 
from 1936 until 1965.
152
 
 In the later years, these rituals were subject to some extreme security 
measures enacted by the Iraqi governments, especially when the participants in 
these rituals were raising slogans asking authorities for social justice, better living 
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standards, and more freedom.
153 
There were no major differences during the 
1960s as events continued to accelerate with continuous confrontations between 
authorities and mourners until the Baath Party overtook power in 1968. 
8. The Baath Era (1968 C.E. - 2003 C.E.) 
 The treatment the Baath showed toward the Shi’a rituals reflects the stand 
they had toward Shi’a people and their leaders. Since seizing power after the coup 
of Baath officers in 1968, the party led a campaign against the Iraqi Shi’a leaders 
and considered them a symbol of “backwardness” and a “great obstacle” to the 
progress of the Baath agenda.
154
 Thus they closed the Kufa theological university 
confiscating all its assets, and deported almost half a million Iraqi Shi’a with 
Persian origins; this deportation represented 6% of the Iraqi population at that 
time.
155
 This happened during the Al-Arb‘ain visitation of April 1969. These 
measures led to increasing tensions between the Iraqi government and Iran on the 
one hand, and the government and Iraqi Shi’a on the other. Shi’a leaders under the 
leadership of Ayatollah Mohsen Al-Hakim was to assert that Shi’a should be 
allowed to practice their rituals freely in the cities of Iraq, arguing that these were 
“infidel decisions” from the Baath regime aimed at spreading hatred and 
dissention between the Iraqi people.
156
 These tensions continued between the 
                                                 
153
 Al- Biyati 128-9. 
154
 Ali Moaamen, Sanawat Aljamr, (Beirut: Almarkaz Al-Islami Alma’sir, 2004) 109. 
155
 Moaamen 109-11. 
156
 That was majorly the content of Ayatollah Mohsen Al-Hakim’s speech in the conference of the 
28
th
 of Safar in 1969 in Najaf, several days after deporting the Iranian Shi’a. See Ali Moaamen, 
Sanawat Aljomar, 3
rd
 ed., (Beirut: Almarkaz Al-Islami Alma’sir, 2004) 553. 
75 
 
 
Baath leadership and Shi’a leaders, and developed into a bloody public conflict 
when the Baath authorities executed five of these leaders in 1974.
157
 
 This conflict had an effect on the practice of ‘Ashurā rituals during the Baath 
era. The concluding rituals to the mourning processions in Najaf witnessed violent 
confrontations between the police and the participants in 1969. Another 
confrontation happened between participants who were using swords and Qamas 
against security forces in 1975. Prohibition orders were renewed in 1976 and 
1977, with the recurrence of confrontations in different Shi’a events resulted in a 
number of causalities, killed and wounded, in addition to a great number of 
arrests.
158 
The practice of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain rituals continued to face 
pressures from authorities that were eager to prohibit them; thus practicing the 
rituals became a kind of confrontation and resistance against the Baath party. 
Authorities completely banned the practice of the rituals in 1981. Since the Baath 
regime feared the Iraqi Shi’a would support the Iranian revolution, they banned 
and controlled the Iraqi Shi’a so that they would not come to support the Iranian 
revolution.
159
 
 However, the several wars Iraq suffered during the Baath era and the 
consequences of its fall, motivated Iraqis to practice these rituals more widely for 
they had lost their loved ones on a large scale. The six wars Iraq had during and 
after the fall of the Baath regime included three domestic and three foreign. The 
first of the six wars was against the Kurds in 1974; the second war was fought 
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against Iran in the 1980s and lasted for 8 years; the third was the invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990; the fourth one was fought against the Shi’a in 1991 after the rise 
of 14 out of the 18 total Iraqi governorates; the fifth was the invasion by the U.S. 
in 2003, and the sixth from 2005-2006, which was a civil war between the Shi’a 
and Sunni. In the course of just one of these wars, the Iran-Iraq war, there were 
100,000 deaths and 300,000 casualties, not to mention the amount of money spent 
and amount of debt as the result of this war.
160
 
 These wars mainly affected the Shi’a citizens as they form the majority of the 
population in Iraq and make up the majority of the soldiers in the formal Iraqi 
army with the Shi’a in the army comprising at least 80% of the total army 
forces.
161 
These wars contributed to development of a kind of social structure 
toward practicing the mourning rituals as no Shi’a house is free from the tragedy 
of losing one of its members because of these wars, thus the surviving individuals 
helped in developing these mourning rituals. The color black was dominating in 
streets, schools, and workplace; it was the only color that women dressed, as they 
ended one mourning, they immediately start another. 
 Most of the mourning rituals practiced by the Shi’a for their lost beloveds 
usually entails or includes some rituals for the tragedy of Al-Hussein and his 
followers. In these rituals practiced for the loss of members of their families, 
Shi’a would include participate in mourning councils, referring to Karbala and the 
tragedy of Al-Hussein. If the rituals were for a soldier who died on the battle 
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field, the security forces would not dare to prevent their practice with respect to 
the “martyr.”162  
 Visitation of the holy shrines became increasing more popular during the war 
years as a growing number of coffins were seen carried on vehicles taking the 
remnants of soldiers for burial in Najaf (as many Iraqi Shi’a who bury in Wadi Al-
Salam cemetary, close to Imam Ali’s shrine). Most families prayed their Imams to 
have their beloved sons, husbands, brothers, and fathers who were on the battle 
field returned.
163
 At the same time, different vows were taken to insure the safety 
of their sons; among the main vows taken were the promises that one would 
undertake a journey to the holy shrines. A small group of on foot, especially 
women, did not attract the attention of the security forces then. 
 Most of the cities inhabited by the Shi’a entered a state of continuous 
mourning. Their rituals were a mixed expression for the lost beloved as well as 
the killed Imam, and individuals became accustomed to mourning as part of their 
daily life. Thus, for about four decades of the Baath regime rule of Iraqi Shi’a, 
individuals or groups lived in mourning so that it grew to become part of their 
daily routine. When it was time to mourn Al-Hussein in ‘Ashurā or Al-Arb‘ain, 
these individuals and groups practiced rituals that had become so commonplace 
for them of part  of their consciousness they were no longer just a way of 
expressing an identity, but a way of defining their existence. The mourning rituals 
practiced by the Iraqi Shi’a grieving over the tragedy of Al-Hussein in ‘Ashurā  
and Al-Arb‘ain are integrated in their consciousness, and developed to be closely 
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connected to their current familial mourning, as forced by the recurrent wars 
Iraqis lived during the last four decades. 
E. The Development of Al-Hussein’s Shrine Visitation 
 One of the most important segments practiced in the mourning rituals of 
‘Ashurā was the visitation of Al-Hussein’s shrine in Karbala. The visitation by the 
mourners and wailing near his grave were practiced immediately after his 
martyrdom. Though the group visitation was a ritual started by the Tawaboon, 
four years after the Karbala tragedy, it was not practiced widely because of the 
attacks visitors feared from Umayyad forces.  
 The visitation started, however, to be practiced without many restrictions 
during the Abbasid era, especially during the rules of Al-Mamun, Al-Muaatasem, 
and Al-Watheq, until Caliph Al-Mutawakel (822-861 C.E.) destroyed the shrine 
of Al-Hussein in 210 C.E. The historian Ibn Al-Atheer (1160-1233 C.E ) 
mentions that after giving his orders to destroy Al-Hussein’s shrine and the 
houses nearby, Al-Mutawakel also gave orders to damage the entire area, to 
remove all signs leading to the former shrine and to seed the whole site so that it 
would become overgrown, and people would not recognize the place anymore. 
Moreover, he also gave orders to imprison and to inflict the hardest punishment 
on the observant putting them in a prison called “Al-Mutbak” (The Locked).164  
 After the death of Al-Mutawakel, his son, Al-Munatasar, became the Caliph; 
he allowed people to visit the shrine of Al-Hussein and showed tolerance toward 
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the Shi’a and Ali's followers, unlike his father who hated Ali and his sons.165 This 
proved that Abbasid Caliphs did not totally prohibit the practice of the rituals, but 
their decision alternated between tolerance and prohibition according to the 
orientations of the particular caliph. 
 The rituals of visiting the shrine of Al-Hussein remained in practice on the 
part of Shi’a, growing and developing gradually under the Abbasid. The visitation 
of the shrine was not restricted to the actual visitation; it included some other 
mourning rituals, as well. Among these were wailing and crying, as Shi’a 
appeared to practice these activities near the shrine of in (908 C.E.).
166
 
 The prohibition of rituals and the destruction of the shrine by Al-Mutawakel 
prove that the rituals somehow were practiced on a large scale that drew the 
attention of the Caliph, provoking his hatred of Ali, his sons and Shi’a. He might 
have also developed a concern against the growth of Karbala as a spiritual center 
for Shi’a, which could make the city a threat to the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate in 
the future. The fear over the possibility of rising power that could rival the 
Abbasids on the political level had been always the Caliphs’ nightmare, and likely 
it was that fear that led the eighteenth Caliph Al-Muqatader (282-320 A.H., 908-
932 C. E.) to destroy the Buratha Mosque which was located on the Al-Kharkh 
side of Baghdad, as it used to be the place where Shi’a practice their rituals. 167 
 The visitation of Al-Hussein’s shrine developed especially in the Abbasid Era; 
this meant that the rituals at that time were of a strong enough structure and base 
that they were able to grow. The factors that helped in this development were that 
                                                 
165
 Ibn Al- Atheer 6: 449. 
166
 Ibn Al- Atheer 6: 449. 
167
 Al- Haydari 11. 
80 
 
 
the shrine of Al-Hussein began to be a place where people from everywhere 
gathered. In turn, the visitors enhanced economic and demographic factors that 
created a suitable environment to promote the growth of the shrine to a small 
village, and later a city.
168 
The kind of development which Karbala witnessed 
because of the visitation ritual made it a city of economic and political 
significance. This also trigged off the rivalry between Karbala and other Shi’a 
holy shrines on one side, and with other Islamic cities on the other. 
 The visitation of the shrine of Al-Hussein developed over time and began to 
have its own associated rituals. Most of the books of Shi’a explain the details of 
the visitation, and
 
devoted long chapters on the visitation of this shrine. For 
example, the books of Sheikh Al-Kulainy (864-941C.E.), especially his book 
Kitab Al-Kafi, one of the fourth important books of hadith for Shi’a; also, a 
complete book for visitations by Jaafar bin Quleweh Al- Qomi (d 978 C.E) one of 
the famous Shi’a scholars, Kamil Alziyarat, and Sheikh Al-Tusi’s book (995-1067 
C.E.), Tahtheeb Al-Alahkam, one of the fourth most important Shi’a books by one 
of the prominent scholars of the Twelver Shi’a. All this documentation and 
research made Karbala play the role of a holy city of Shi’a, attracting visitors 
from every place during fixed times of the year like ‘Ashurā  and Al-Arb‘ain, 
besides regular visitations throughout the year; this made the city a political and 
economic rival for the Islamic city of Mecca. 
 The economic and political significance of the Shi’a holy shrines in Karbala 
as well as Najaf, where the shrine of Ali is located, are source of rivalry with 
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other Islamic centers as well as making them a target for many of the attacks and 
raids done by the Wahhabis who controlled Mecca, which is the spiritual and 
economic center of Islam.
169
 Mecca was a holy city for many of the pagans, 
before Islam, because their gods and idols were in that temple. After Islam, Mecca 
still kept its position as a holy place for Muslims. In both cases, it remained an 
economic center, which is one of the important positions for holy cities in general. 
In 1802, Karbala was attacked by Wahhabis who aimed at destroying the city, 
killing everyone there nearby the shrine besides looting all its treasures; in this 
attack Wahhabis burned the shrine of Al-Hussein until it was completely 
ruined.
170 
Such raids were frequent on the Shrine of Ali as well in 1804 and 
Karbala again in 1807 showing the violent reaction Wahhabis had against the 
rising importance of the Shi’a holy cities, which became a threat to the Wahhabis 
ideologies and the rise of these cities as rivals in politics and economy to the 
importance of Mecca. 
 Moreover, the religious conflict cannot account solely for the Shi’a-Sunni 
opposition; there are also political and economic factors behind this antagonism: 
on one side there is the rivalry between Sunni and Shi’a holy cities, and among 
Shi’a cities on the other. The significance gained by the Shi’a holy cities, 
attracting visitors from around the world especially Persia, made Reza Shah in 
1928 forbid his citizens from visiting holy shrines in Iraq, and in addition, 
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prohibiting funerals from being carried out in  the largest Shi’a cemetery, Wadi 
Al-Salam (Valley of Peace) in Najaf.
171
 
 To achieve his purpose, Reza Shah went to Qom asking for the Shi’a leaders 
there to help him in restricting the role of Holy Shrines in Iraq while stressing the 
importance of the shrines in Persia. Through threats, arrests, and torturing to death 
two leaders, he managed to secure the issue of a fatwa by the rest of the leaders to 
prohibit the visitation of the holy shrines.
172
 
 This attempt on the part of Reza Shah aimed at achieving dual goals with 
political and economic implications. The first, by prohibiting the Persians visitors 
from entering Iraq, the country would lose significant revenue from these 
visitations done by the Persians. Such economic loss would be an effective 
pressure against the Sunni Iraqi government, which was eager to get rid of 
Persian’s dominance over the Iraqi Shi’a; in turn, this increased the tension 
between Iraq and Persia during the rule of Reza Shah. The second achievement 
the Shah of Persia wanted was to transform the Persian Shi’a cities in Qom and 
Mashhad to centers attracting the attention of Shi’a visitors instead of their 
counterparts in Iraq. 
 This was not the sole aim of Reza Shah alone, as it reflected to a certain extent 
the wish of many of Persian Shi’a clerics and people with strong nationalist 
tendencies to make Persia the center of Shi’a intellectual studies, equal or even 
better to those institutions in Najaf, Iraq.
173 
Such goals led Persians to focus on 
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building religious centers competing with those outside Persia. Qom, which 
contained the shrine of Fatima Al-Maasooma, the daughter of Imam Ali bin Musa 
Al-Ridha, became one of the most important Shi’a centers in the world, and such 
became the state of Mashhad which contained the shrine of the eighth of the 
Twelver Shi’a Imams, Imam Ali bin Musa Al-Ridha (148-203 A.H.-765-818 
C.E.) as the Shi’a of Persia started to have their mourning rituals during ‘Ashurā  
and Al-Arb‘ain near these two cities instead of following them of Iraq. 
F. Conclusion 
 The historical development of ritual studies practiced in ‘Ashurā and Al-
Arb‘ain by the Shi’a of Iraq went through different stages, starting early in the 
martyrdom of Al-Hussein and his family in the tragic Battle of Karbala. Many 
factors contributed the establishment of these rituals and practices, most of them 
were of ideological, political, economic, social and intellectual nature. These 
rituals played a major part in the evolvement and development of the Shi’a Islam, 
which began with a small a group of people supporting Ali bin Abi Talib and his 
sons. Since their early formulation, these rituals implied defiance and 
confrontation; thus they became weapons held by Shi’a against their enemies in 
the frequent conflicts they lived through over the course of fourteen centuries. 
These rituals also helped to establish cities and important Shi’a centers like the 
city of Karbala which became a city of spiritual, political and economic powers. 
Such power made the city of great significance to Shi’a competing with other 
Islamic powerful cities like Mecca. The practice of mourning rituals in ‘Ashurā 
and Al-Arb‘ain reinforces the identity of Shi’a in their societies where they face 
84 
 
 
increasing conflicts with other Islamic groups. Thus, the rituals contributed to 
enhancing the Shi’a identity. These rituals provided social and political support as 
they advanced change in the participants, motivating them to overcome the 
difficulties and challenges they faced on personal and social levels. 
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Chapter 3 
MOURNING: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Introduction  
This chapter provides an exposition on mourning rituals in relation to Imam 
Al-Hussein’s martyrdom and the impact they leave on individuals’ and groups’ 
lives. The importance of mourning lies in its nature as a normal reaction attached 
to human beings, because it is deeply rooted in them and constitutes a natural 
component of their psychological structure. Mourning results from sadness 
triggered by loss, either physical or spiritual, of persons or objects, with which an 
individual has distinctive attachment. Therefore, loss is the main element that 
generates mourning and without this loss, mourning would not exist. The process 
of mourning provides a means to be lessen the impact of loss and its potential 
dominance. Furthermore, mourning serves as means to adapt to loss and return to 
the previous normal status prior to loss as individuals and as communities. This 
return comprises a long complicated process of mourning rituals which would 
eventually be a positive factor to rid the implications of loss. After mourning, an 
individual will not return to his ordinary life before the loss. Mourning might also 
seem connected to psychology and psycho-analysis, and it has its roots in socio-
political necessities. In some situations, mourning is an actual product of socio-
political circumstances in certain societies. 
Practicing mourning rituals of the martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein is central 
to the Shi’a Muslims and has played a major role in establishing and crystallizing 
Shi’a religious beliefs and concepts. Later, it has consolidated their position in 
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defying and resisting their foes. These rituals have developed, with time, to 
acquire significances other than the psychological ones, to be practices of 
ideological, dogmatic and social nature that have played a significant role in 
producing the Shi’a identity, in general. 
B. Mourning: Psychological Perspective 
The rituals of mourning and grief have existed since early times, and they 
result from loss of a close person or any of those whose absence leaves a wide 
vacuum, either emotional or spiritual, and are practiced in many cases. That is 
what Sigmund Freud (1856-1939 C.E.) has studied in his work “Mourning and 
Melancholia,” published in 1917. Freud defines mourning as “commonly the 
reaction to the loss of a beloved person or an abstraction taking the place of the 
person, such as fatherland, freedom, an ideal and so on.”174  
Loss is usually accompanied by grief the intensity of which depends on the 
status of the person lost and the psychological preparedness of the grieving 
person. Because of a loss, whether caused by death or absence, a person would 
suffer pain triggered by deprivation and longing. This occurs, according to Freud, 
by pulling away the libido connected to the loved subject which faces resistance 
in the beginning because the grieving person would not like to let go of the libido 
even with the presence of an alternative. Therefore, the grieving person would 
develop a strong urge to abandon reality and hold on to the missed object through 
a mental hallucinational disorder, which means mourning changed from a normal 
state to be pathological (melancholic). But mourning plays a decisive role during 
                                                 
174
 Sigmund Freud, On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, Trans. Shaun Whiteside, (London: 
Penguin Classics, 2000) 203. 
87 
 
 
this stage in bringing the grieving person back to her or his previous reality, 
because the ego becomes free and unsuppressed.
175
 The process of mourning, 
according to Freud, can entail a healthy ritual that results from numerous stages of 
emotional reaction and the purpose of these rituals is in organizing and practicing 
the stages of mourning. 
 If the world, according to Freud, becomes “poor and empty”176, people will 
seek to satiate this poor condition and fill the emptiness resulting from their loss 
which has led to this emptiness. The attempt to compensate must eventually be 
completed, even symbolically. This is the case, because the ultimate goal of the 
mourning process is to fulfill the necessary stages of the painful reality and to 
return to reality with less pain depending on the individuals and their 
circumstances. A person would emancipate himself from suppression and reach 
the free ego, and distance himself from any factors leading to alienation from 
reality and the inability to practice daily routines. Otherwise, mental disorder and 
illness would be inevitable. 
 Wars provide abundant reasons for mourning by the simple fact that they 
cause many losses, and those losses lead to mourning. For that reason, mourning 
rituals are widely practiced during war times. Mourning remains within its social 
domain during peace time, except in natural disasters. War could possibly be the 
reason that encouraged Freud to study mourning. After his study Thoughts for the 
Times on War and Death, 1915, Freud presented his research Mourning and 
Melancholia in 1917. Three years into World War I, the war had already caused 
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enough deaths and devastation that can lead to particular transformations in 
mourning and the place of mourning in a society. These practices are the ones that 
led Freud to reflect on them and write his influential work Mourning and 
Melancholia. That attracted Freud’s attention and gave reasons to provide us with 
an understanding of mourning and its psychological reactions and impacts. Freud 
followed Karl Abraham (1877-1925), who was one of the first and important 
German psychoanalysts and also studied Mourning and Melancholia. Freud 
considered Abraham’s work in this subject as a starting point.177 
 If Freud has presented to us a distinguished and early contribution on the 
analysis of mourning phenomena, his views, in his domain, remained restricted to 
the structure and concepts of psychoanalysis only. Even though Freud discussed 
the war, he did not emphasize the social elements of the mourning. We cannot 
talk about mourning while disregarding other circumstances that envelope 
mourning. Furthermore, mourning practices differ from one person to another and 
from one society to another. This has led to more research studies after Freud. 
 Freud discussed the “economical characterization of pain,” which is a part of 
economy of mourning. He claims that “reality testing has revealed that the 
beloved object no longer exists, and demands that the libido as a whole sever its 
bonds with that object.”178 According to Freud’s economy of mourning, the 
mourning ritual of ‘Ashurā would be against this economy of mourning because 
there is no logical reasoning to mourn someone after so many years. But in the 
‘Ashurā case, mourning is not related only to a beloved person, but to an 
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abstraction that takes the place of the person, as Freud mentions in his definition 
of mourning. Imam Al-Hussein is one of the essential symbols of the Shi’a, and 
most of them believe that he sacrificed himself to protect them against injustice. 
Imam Al-Hussein is a very significant symbol for many Shi’a, and they love him 
as a hero who has spiritual influences.  
 Erich Lindemann (1900-1974), a psychiatrist who specialized in bereavement, 
has studied the impact of mourning and grief on socieies in reaction to losses 
caused by war. He has affirmed that mourning is not a medical or psychological 
disorder, but a normal reaction to painful situations.
179
 Like Freud, Lindemann 
stresses that mourning might suddenly fully stop social interactions and 
consequently cause traumatic disorders. The stoppage of social reaction during 
the mourning process is the most important change because it leads to a stage of 
isolation from reality and the entry to another world. 
 John Bowlby (1907-1990), known for his important theory of attachment, has 
argued that mourning is the manifestation of a psychological development. He 
explains how the need for attachment starts early in childhood, especially with the 
mother, which explains the human need for others since birth. Bowlby argues that 
the loss of a beloved person is the most painful experience for a human being, and 
that those who suffer loss would be in more pain because of feeling helpless.
180
 It 
is the individual who suffers the loss, reacts to it, and has to overcome the pain. 
The reaction to loss might basically be individual, because it involves the process 
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of mourning an individual suffers to pass and overcome the stage of intense pain.  
In spite of that, loss could have an impact on other individuals in the grieving 
person’s social environment. Responses to loss should occur in one way or 
another, but differ depending on how close one is to the person lost. 
Bowlby claims that people respond to the loss of a beloved person in four 
stages of mourning: (a) Numbness, (b) Yearning and Searching, (c) 
Disorganization and Despair, (d) Reorganization.
181
 These phases differ in time 
and the impact on mourners. Psychological preparedness, adaptability and other 
circumstances, such as means of loss or degree of kinship, decide the 
responsiveness to mourning. The phase of numbness may last hours to weeks, 
while yearning and searching may take a few months for some, but years for 
others. 
Therese Rando, a clinical psychologist, thanatologist, and traumatologist who 
published many works on grief, declares that mourning is not only about 
expressing reaction to loss, it is also an attempt to adapt to loss by following three 
important conscious and unconscious operations: (a) break up of psychological 
and social relation with the person or thing lost, (b) assisting survivors to adapt 
with loss, and (c) assisting comforters to live soundly.
182
 The function of 
mourning, according to Rando, is not limited to the psychological domain with 
which Freud deals, but overtakes psychological reactions to adopt new concepts, 
thoughts, and goals, which eventually will lead to adopting a new world, an after-
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loss world. Moving to a new world does not mean everything is fixed and loss has 
been overcome and life will be back to usual, as it was before the loss. The most 
important outcome of the mourning process and its different reactions is the 
mourner reaches the conclusion that the loss has actually happened and has to live 
within new psychological and altered circumstances. 
Coming to terms with the loss is the most important outcome of mourning, but 
it could be difficult and complicated if important changes are involved. Vamik 
Volkan (b. 1932), is a psychiatrist, who built an argument to demonstrate that 
when change is immense, like war or natural disasters, mourning might not follow 
the usual path. It rather becomes complicated and might never finish; 
psychological loss might not become psychological gain.
183
 War or disasters yield 
massive loss which differs from everyday life loss. War causes death to large 
numbers of people. And loss may mean that people sometimes lose their whole 
family or a big section of a city may be destroyed. Furthermore, the means of loss 
is shocking and unusual, especially when bodies are incinerated or deformed or 
no remains are left of a lost person to identify them. Consequently, mourning 
takes another path because corpses would not be buried, which in many cultures 
generates different reactions by mourners. This highly impacts the process and 
outcomes of mourning. 
Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), a philosopher and historian of religion, declares 
that death would not be actual unless burial ceremonies are complete. The 
beginning of the body’s functional death marks the initiation of a series of rituals 
                                                 
183 Vamik D. Volkan, “Mourning and Adaptation After a War,” American Journal of 
Psychotherapy 31.4 (1977): 567. 
92 
 
 
that aim at creating a new identity for the deceased.
184
 Non-completion of burial 
ceremonies is considered a complex situation where mourning would diverge 
from the usual course because the disappearance or lack of a complete burial 
would potentially lead to state of denial to that loss and adaptation to a new 
reality. In addition, mourning would not finish when it should; in fact, it may 
continue for years or forever. This neither means that an individual would mourn 
all the time, nor that the reality and the impact of loss could not be fully 
comprehended in early stages, but this means it is the natural process of living 
with the major loss.
185
 In such cases, mourning would not help in shifting from 
the painful reality of loss to living a new reality adapted with loss, but what 
usually occurs is a repetition of mourning stages without shifting to a new reality. 
The reason is that mourners would not be certain of losing an individual, and the 
loss might not have actually been recognized. Consequently, there would be no 
motive for mourners to adopt new psychological and social variables compared 
with a usual case of loss. This makes mourning rituals continuous as if they have 
no foreseeable end. 
C. Mourning: Anthropological and Sociological Perspectives 
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) builds an argument to claim that mourning is 
not an expression of an individual’s case, but it is a response to traditions imposed 
by society. Thus mourning is not a natural motion of personal feeling toward the 
extreme missing or loss of someone, but it is a duty imposed by a group. Someone 
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does not cry because they are sad, but because they have to cry; it is the stand of 
rituals to adopt to the choice of customs which are largely independent from 
personal feelings.
186
 Durkheim has always tried to attribute the essential 
importance of the force to a social factor, not to the individual one. The theme of 
society, for Durkheim, is central to all aspects of the world, for example, religion 
is “social” or “something collective” and society is able to answer variant 
important questions in our world.
187
 
Mourning, according to Durkheim, is one ritual out of many others that aims 
at vitalizing the society. This is especially in the case of mourning, where loss of a 
group member becomes an influential issue that contributes to bringing 
individuals together. It strengthens their relations and connects them in an 
emotional and thoughtful phase, which assists in liberating their feelings and 
achieving a kind of compensation and reward for the person they lost.
188
 
According to this view, the factor that triggers mourning is social more than 
psychological. Collective mourning rituals become a source of strength for the 
group, because they provide the strength and cohesion of the group in the face of 
challenges: loss of a member in this case. Emotional communication is vital for 
rebuilding of society, and expresses, at the same time, that the individual is no 
more than a member of society that shares in mourning to overcome loss. 
Clifford Geertz (1926-2006), an anthropologist, searches suffering to 
emphasize how people cope and live with it, and consequently making the pain 
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and suffering of the loss bearable.
189
 Though Geertz's view seems as if it is 
centered on dealing with suffering as a “religious problem,” it provides us with 
good thoughts on how to handle pain, loss, and defeat in life too. Consequently, 
mourning could result from losing values and thoughts, as well. Suffering, pain, 
loss and defeat, mentioned by Geertz are faced by humanity in different stages of 
development, and have not silenced them. While puzzled by death, people have 
continued to wrestle it out of their usual world. That is why people have paid 
great attention to explaining death and severe sadness. Religions have provided in 
early stages answers through symbols of death rituals to reach an experience that 
could help us understand and explain mourning. Geertz does not mention specific 
ideas about mourning, but about the suffering and pain that it face and how to deal 
with it to make it more acceptable. Therefore his ideas are also relevant to support 
the idea of mourning and how it is dealt with by people. 
Van Gennep (1873-1957), an ethnographer and folklorist, has offered an 
important contribution in his theory on rites of passage, in which he studies 
shifting from one life phase to another through three phases: separation, 
transitional and incorporation. He mentions, “I propose to call the rites of 
separation from a previous world preliminal rite, those executed during the 
transitional stage liminal (or threshold) rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation 
into the new world post-liminal rites.”190 Gennep has tried to confirm that these 
rites are crucial and well established in the society structure. That is why he has 
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studied the changes that occur to an individual’s social state, in occasions of birth, 
childhood, maturity, marriage, death, and other rites of passage.  
Gennep claims that rites of funeral help in uniting with the other world and 
organizing the process of mourning for the survivors. Mourning is a transitional 
phase for the survivors where they enter it through separation rites and emerge 
through reintegration in a form of society.
191
 The function of mourning, for 
Gennep, is incorporation and reintegration of society which occurs through 
practices of mourning rituals. Physical participation in rituals of burials and the 
stoppage of usual social life during the mourning times state that society is 
affected by life and death equally. These rites are an attempt at maintaining 
identity against the dangers of resulting changes, which contributes eventually to 
forming and supporting the collective identity of participants in mourning rituals. 
Victor Turner (1920-1983) is an anthropologist was well known for his 
contribution with symbol, ritual, and rites of passage. After Gennep, he presents 
us with a three phases passage: (a) separation of participant from the usual role in 
their social structure, (b) marginalization; a transitional stage where participants’ 
social status would be ambiguous and perplexing, (c) aggregation; where 
participants would return with a new identity.
192
 This sample enables us to study 
the rituals in an acceptable way, especially when most rituals go through these 
three stages of transition in a way or another. Mourning rituals are a kind of 
passage ritual from one stage to another and leaves an impact and considerable 
effect on participants as individuals or groups. 
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Turner presents rituals as a process of entering and leaving time and social 
structure; therefore, it helps in changing the social status of its participants. The 
same could be said about practicing mourning rituals, because they help the 
mourner to run through the various stages that lead to separation from reality then 
entering a series of psychological and social processes, before reaching the stage 
of reorganizing in order to adapt with new reality and free the person from hurdles 
that had curbed it. Rituals, in general, provide a new social situation for its 
participants to integrate with the new reality, as is the case with mourning rituals. 
Turner’s idea on the rite of passage is a good entry point for the study of 
rituals that especially make a transition in the state of the participant in general, 
and ‘Ashurā rituals practiced by the Iraqi Shi’a in particular. Turner’s passage 
phases provide appropriate models to study ‘Ashurā rituals in order to analyze and 
know significant dimensions of these rituals. 
 Memory is an important factor required by collective mourning rituals, for it 
is one of the influencing factors of the social construction of any community. 
Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a philosopher and sociologist, demonstrates that 
memory, even on an individual level, is not related only to an individual, but also 
belongs to a social system due to its interaction with social environment in 
society, people get their memories in a normal way and they can remember, 
differentiate and specify their memories.
193
 Although, memory is centered in the 
individual and they perform the remembering, the group the individual belongs to 
restructures and forms this memory anew. The groups also encourage the 
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individual to remember and forget certain things, consequently, its collective 
memory plays a pivotal role in structuring and forming the identity of societies 
through collective remembering, which most of the time focuses on joint links 
amongst the group itself. Practicing mourning rituals could be a factor that 
validates collective memory because they include active symbols able to pass 
through the collective memory and the social statuses of practitioners. 
D. Mourning in Sunni Islam  
Mourning in Islam as well as other practices, follows traditional customs that 
come from the Quran, hadith, and religious scholars. But sometimes, mourning is 
affected by the social, cultural and ideological backgrounds. In this section, I will 
focus mainly on mourning in Sunni Islam, according to the Quran, hadith, and 
significant religious scholars’ thoughts. 
 Al-Ghazali (1058-1111C.E) was a Persian Muslim theologian, jurist, 
philosopher, and is one of the prominent Sunni Muslim scholars who researches 
death and mourning. He has a very significant notion of living in the presence of 
death, and why we have to remember the dead. To live a more ethical life aware 
of the presence of death allows one to be a better person or member of the 
community and a more pious Muslim. He authored a whole book on that and 
titled it The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife (Thekir Al-Mwat wama 
baadah).  
 Al-Ghazali builds an argument to demonstrate that death is a change in status 
of human beings and it is traveling or having a head start before others to a final 
homeland. Because of this, humans should not grieve for the loss of their loved 
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ones because they will catch up with them soon, and that participation in funerals 
and consolation ceremonies should focus on pondering death itself and preparing 
oneself to talk humbly in front of it.
194
 Mourning rituals in Islam focus directly on 
the idea that grief over a loved one should be short, and last in cases no more than 
the three days spent by comforters on praying, asking for mercy for the soul of the 
lost person, and without weeping or showing intense grief. Mourning in Islam 
seems to create a situation that supports the social structure of the Islamic 
community (Ummah) through the participation of Muslims as one community in 
mourning rituals, cortege, prayers and burial. 
 Wives and husbands, in Islam, mourn differently. While the Quran does not 
specify the rituals of mourning for men, it mentions specific mourning rituals for 
women. A wife should mourn for four months and ten days as stated in the Quran 
“If any of you die and leave widows behind, they shall wait concerning 
themselves four months and ten days: when they have fulfilled their term, there is 
no blame on you if they dispose of themselves in a just and reasonable manner. 
And Allah is well acquainted with what you do.”195 But a pregnant woman who 
loses a husband should remain in mourning till giving birth “and for those who 
have no courses (it is the same): for those who carry (life within their wombs), 
their period is until they deliver their burdens.”196 Additionally, the Quran does 
not require a woman to mourn for anyone more than three days except for her 
husband. The Prophet Mohammed said, “It is not permissible for a woman who 
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believes in Allah and the latter day to mourn a dead person more than three days, 
but four months and ten days over her husband.”197 Islamic teachings prohibit 
excessive mourning and forbid some types of mourning rituals that were followed 
in pre-Islamic times like “cheek bashing and clothes tearing.”198 Neither the state 
nor their religious authorities find it acceptable for men or women to engage in 
such practices. 
 When women are in mourning situations, they should avoid wearing make-up, 
jewelry, fragrances, and whatever might attract others to her. She also cannot 
remarry, in addition to staying in her late husband’s home for the four months and 
ten days of the mourning period, leaving it only when necessary. Imam Malik 
(711-795 C.E.) is one of the most important Sunni scholars in jurisprudence (fiqh) 
and hadith (prophetic sayings). He was born and died in Medina. He is the 
founder of the Maliki denomination– one of the four Muslim Sunni 
Denominations. In his famous book, Al- Muwatta, a collection of Prophetic 
sayings hadith, in the chapter on divorce, relates many sayings regarding the 
mourning prohibitions on women from using make-up like Kohl, perfumes, 
jewelry, and some types of clothes and limiting that to rough black clothes.
199
 
 Visiting graves is a common practice for Muslims, especially Mohammed’s 
and his good followers’ graves.200 Mohammed prohibited visiting graves in the 
beginning then allowed it. For example, Ahmed bin Hanbel (780-855 C.E.), one 
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of the four important Sunni scholars in Islamic jurisprudence, was born in Basra 
and died in Baghdad and is the founder of the Hanbeli denomination in the 
Islamic Sunni School. He relates in his collection of hadith that are called Al-
Musnad that Ali bin Abi Talib heard Mohammed saying, “Earlier, I prohibited 
you from visiting graves, visit them to learn lessons.”201 Mohammed left many 
sayings encouraging Muslims to visit graves, especially the prophet’s grave and 
his good followers for remembering, blessings and lessons.
202
 Visiting graves and 
obtaining the intercession of the righteous buried in them play an influential role 
in practicing mourning for Muslims in general, as one of the hadiths related to the 
Prophet Mohammed who said, “He who visits my grave shall win my 
intercession.”203 
Wahhabism, derived from its founder’s name Mohammed Bin Abdil Wahhab 
(1703- 1787 C.E.), emerged in the Arabian Peninsula and rejects most mourning 
rituals classifying them as non Islamic practices. Mohammed bin Abdil Wahhab 
convinced the tribal leader Mohammed bin Saud to follow the Wahhabi doctrine, 
and he became one of its main supporters. Bin Saud took the responsibility of 
spreading the Wahhabi call in the Nejd area in middle of the Arabian Peninsula, 
through his raids on other Arabic tribes in what is currently Saudi Arabia. 
Wahhabism is known for the adoption of Salafist methodology and called for the 
getting ride of all habits and practices they think are against Islamic principles. 
That’s why Wahhabis consider praying to the Prophet and the Prophet’s family 
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and asking for blessing at their graves is forbidden (haram). The practices of 
mourning rituals were prohibited because they fell into the category of heresies 
that make their participants go astray and turn into infidel.
204
 Because of this, 
Wahhabis, after controlling Mecca and Medina, destroyed and ruined most of the 
shrines linked to Muslims’ Hajj.205 
 What mostly distinguishes mourning rituals in Sunni Islam is the attempt to 
direct them completely to consolidate the religion’s structural concepts that relate 
to the Quran and hadith. They encourage people to conform to these concepts, 
especially these related to faith, piety and austerity. Death in Islam is the move 
into another world the change of the deceased’s state “transformed” that enables 
him to reach his new world. Therefore, mourners do not have to show grave 
sorrow when this transformation and change happens. The focus of mourning 
rituals is on the further end of the journey of the deceased who will be rid of the 
burdens of further tests in his life and who is going to live immortally in his or her 
after life. That is why comforters hope to participate in easing the traveler’s 
journey to his new homeland by praying and asking for forgiveness for him and 
by reciting Quran. 
E. Mourning in Shi’a Islam  
There seemed to be no serious difference in the mourning practices of Sunni 
or Shi’a Muslims before Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in the Karbala battle (680 
C.E.). But differences started to manifest gradually after the catastrophic battle of 
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Karbala. It is related that Imam Jaafar Al-Sadiq (702–765 C.E.) said, “Crying and 
intense distress is disapproved for a worshipper unless it is for Al-Hussein bin Ali 
(peace be upon them), then it is rewarded.”206 This saying and others are related 
from Jaafar Al- Sadiq (702-765 C.E.), the sixth Imam for Twelver and Ismailite 
Shi’a and the founder of the Jaafari theology school who born and died in 
Medina. He treated the treated the mourning rituals over Al-Hussein as an 
exceptional case, different from other rituals of mourning. While mourning rituals 
in Islam are restricted generally and weeping and intense distress are disapproved, 
and Muslims are discouraged from practicing them, the case is different with Al-
Hussein in showing the sign of mourning. People are rewarded for that. Related 
sayings of Shi’a Imams urge Shi’a to perform mourning rituals in different times 
during the year and not only during ‘Ashurā. Additionally poets and elegy writers 
have composed works to actuate listeners’ sadness, and encourage families’ 
participation in mourning rituals.
207
 Manifestations of grieving over the 
martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein have been passionate practices to political 
conflict, but it has become a practice that relies on the religious foundation that 
includes these rituals as an essential active element in consolidating its structure. 
Poetry is an important means of expression in mourning rituals in general and 
in Shi’a mourning rituals specifically. Poetry plays an influential role in the 
expression of the feelings of sadness that are difficult to express in other ways. 
Poetry also acts as a recording of those special moments or feelings. The poetry 
becomes like taking a clear picture of the feelings of mourning, but it is not a 
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photograph as much as a picture drawn by words expressing those feelings. 
William Watkin, a professor of Contemporary Literature and Philosophy at 
Brunel University-London, builds an argument that claims: 
“The very essence of poetry, and of poetics, is this wanting to say 
the unsayable. The poem is made up of what is left over after all 
other discursive practices have satisfied their own requirements 
and moved on to the next problem. If language did not exist in this 
way, then there would be no presence and therefore we would all 
have nothing to lose. To speak is to fail to say. Poetry is what is 
made up from exactly this failure. This is why poetry and loss are 
still so important for us. Language is marked by a sense of loss, by 
what it tried but could not say. At the moment when this is realized 
and accepted, the poem is born.”208  
Watkin gives us an important answer regarding the secret link between loss 
and poetry. This link has not been affected by various changes and transformation 
of mourning rituals and its manifest icons. A poem, since the first epic, 
Gilgamesh, until now is an existing means of expression that is tightly linked with 
feelings of loss and expresses it magnificently and accurately. 
Language in daily life appears unable to express or describe deep feelings 
because it is generic conversational and lacking in creativity. Contrary to this, 
poetry is specific and able to penetrate into the depth of human feelings; thus, it 
enjoys higher qualities for communicating and describing feelings that daily 
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language would fail to express. The highly poetic spirit of a poet, is a tool to 
overcome loss and eventually express that emotion in poetry, and renders poetry 
as a suitable means for expressing loss. Therefore, poetry and loss have been 
strongly linked such that both are still tightly connected until nowadays. This 
explains the historic link between poetry and mourning rituals in the 
commemoration of Imam Al-Hussein since from the beginning poetry has been an 
essential pillar of these rituals. 
F. Literature Review  
The main source books of history and of the death of Al-Hussein are the 
references that provide historic information on the Karbala battle and what 
happened to Al-Hussein and his companions and the events after his martyrdom. 
Some of these books, Maqtal Al-Hussein (Death of Al- Hussein) by Abu Makhnuf 
(d. 773-74 C.E.), Tareekh Al- Tabari: Tareekh Alrasool Wa Almalook (The 
History of Prophets and Kings) by Ibn Jareer Al-Tabari (838-923 C.E.), Tareekh 
Al-Yaaqubi (History of Al-Yaaqubi) by Ahmad bin Abi Yaaqub Al- Yaaqubi (d. 
897-98 C.E.), Alkamil Fi Altareekh (The Complete in History) by Ibn Al-Atheer 
(1160-1233 C.E.), and Almalhoof Ala Katla Al-Tofoof (Yearning to the Martyrs of 
Karbala) by Ibn Tawoos (1193-1246 C.E.).  
These books have become essential references relied on in Majilis Al-‘Aza. 
They are used mainly as ongoing references to narrate Al-Hussein’s, his family’s 
and companions’ stories. These books have played an important historical role in 
keeping Al-Hussein’s story alive in the memory and consciousness of Shi’a 
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Muslims.
209
 The story is reread annually from these books, especially Abu 
Makhnuff and Ibn Tawoos’ books. They not only talk about historic events but 
also emphasize on projecting the emotional aspect of the Karbala battle. The 
reaction of listeners and readers is emotionally strong and effective. The 
recitations of Al-Hussein’s story every year, based on these books for many 
centuries, have made these books the most important history references on Al-
Hussein’s death and are most accepted by Shi’a, especially with many indications 
that confirm that the Umayyad, after Al-Hussein’s death, sought to ban and 
destroy all writings or narratives of the Karbala battle. That was an attempt to 
reduce the negative impact and Muslims’ anger after the murder of the Prophet’s 
grandson. These surviving references rendered the Umayyad’s effort useless and 
Al-Hussein’s death story is read in annual mourning rituals at homes and 
nowadays it is reread from the same books mentioned here either in Iraq or other 
Shi’a places all over the world. 
Gary Ebersole, a professor in religion, who specializes in the comparative-
historical study of religion, demonstrates that weeping rituals as practiced by the 
Shi’a in Muharram to commemorate Al-Hussein and his family are a clear 
example of collective expression of recreating a collective identity for a minority 
within a massive religious tradition.
210
 Activities practiced by the Shi’a like 
mourning, weeping, elegies, and others are essential pillars of developing the 
Shi’a Islam, and creating a distinctive socio-cultural identity. The Shi’a mourning 
                                                 
209
 Not all these books are written by Shi’a scholars, but are also by Sunni such as Al-Tabari and 
Ibn Al-Atheer. 
210
 Gary L. Ebersole, “The Function of Ritual Weeping Revisited: Affective Expression and Moral 
Discourse,” Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretation, Ed. John Corrigan, (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2004) 212. 
106 
 
 
rituals have not been religious social rituals isolated from various circumstances 
and challenges faced by the Shi’a society. These rituals, being deeply rooted in 
popular Shi’a passions and collective memory, are able to absorb the political and 
historical changes the Shi’a have faced. These rituals play a major role in 
presenting and crystallizing Shi’a identity throughout history and an effective tool 
to tackle the challenges faced by structural religious establishment. 
Ebersole takes lamenting as an element of emotion clearly apparent in some 
rituals like Shi’a mourning rituals over Al-Hussein. Tears resulting from 
lamenting is nothing but “ethical economy” able to bring about change to 
minorities’ lives. Crying, according to Ebersole, is not an emotion but also means 
to attain other end and goals. Crying for Shi’a is one of the practices most Shi’a 
books encourage Shi’a to do. This could be seen in Shi’a mourning rituals where 
crying is an element in an implied address to bring about change in status of 
social, politics, religion, and purification. That’s why tears in ‘Ashurā rituals help 
Shi’a build a special social synthesis different from the social framework of others 
in Iraqi society. 
 Heinz Halm (1942- ), who is a professor of Islamic history, claims that 
collective sadness and weeping practiced by the early 685 C.E. Shi’a Tawaboon 
(Penitents) are not to express sadness over Al-Hussein’s death, but basically over 
themselves for what sins they have committed.
211
 This early collective practice 
seems, to Halm, the crucial root of the complex combination of mourning rituals, 
atonement and asking forgiveness for committing the sin of dereliction of 
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assisting Al-Hussein in ‘Ashurā. Halm considers that a historical introduction to 
consolidate annual ‘Ashurā rituals. Halm’s view confirms, in a way or another, 
that one function of ‘Ashurā rituals, other mourning over Al-Hussein, are 
purification rituals that aim at changing the psychological state of the participants 
and getting rid of guilty feelings towards their beloved lost person. 
 Halm’s idea gives us an aspect of the functions of Shi’a mourning rituals in 
their early beginnings, though it is limited. The feeling of guilt of the Tawaboon 
has become a motif for them to practice such a ritual, it is not certainly the 
essential motif for them. What made the Tawaboon practice lamenting at Al-
Husein’s grave is a motif of two edges basically. First, it is dogmatic loyalty to 
Al-Hussein being the most prominent symbol for them at the time because he is 
the prophets’ grandson and their leader’s son, Imam Ali. The Tawaboon consider 
Ali as the Muslims’ caliph and as a distinctive religious personality as well. 
Second, it was a political motif the Tawaboon have to demand revenge for Al-
Hussein’s blood because he was killed according to orders from the caliph Yazid. 
Most of the Tawaboon were Mawali (non-Arab Muslims) who belonged to a 
lower social class than the Arab Muslims.
212
 Amongst them were a large number 
of non-Arab Muslims who were taken as inferior in the Arabic community in 
Kufa. The Tawaboon in Kufa lost hope after Al-Hussein’s martyrdom of having 
another leader as important as Al-Hussein who was revered and respected by 
Arabs. Consequently, their hopes of change and social reform and improving their 
status went with the wind after Al-Hussein’s martyrdom. Therefore, the crucial 
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motif for them to have mourning rituals over Al-Hussein cannot be the outcome 
of their endeavor to attain atonement of their guilt for not advocating for Al-
Hussein. It was as Halm claimed, the Tawaboon would have found it sufficient to 
practice mourning and lamenting on Al-Hussein’s grave in order to atone for their 
feelings of guilt. They could have done that after his death but instead they waited 
until 685 C.E. (after 4 years to Al-Hussein’s martyrdom). The Tawaboon rebelled 
against the authority of the Umayyad caliphate using Al-Hussein as a pretext that 
could provide them with a legitimate cover for their demands. 
 Yitzhak Nakash, an associate professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies 
at Brandeis University, in his work The Shi’is of Iraq 1994, studied the Iraqi Shi’a 
since the mid-eighteenth century until the falling of the Iraqi Monarchy in 1958. 
Nakash builds an argument to claim that the cultural and ethical values of Iraqi 
and Iranian Shi’a community have been deeply rooted in their religious rituals and 
practices.
213
 Even though the relation between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’a has been 
close and integrated in so many aspects, their background distinguishes both of 
them even in ‘Ashurā rituals. Therefore one could find the individuality of each 
community expressed in their different mourning rituals for Imam Al-Hussein. 
 Nakash argues that, the Iraqi Shi’a have become Shi’a in a modern era, and 
that Shi’a was a result of a development of an event that occurred during 
nineteenth century when most nomadic Iraqi tribes settled and took to 
agriculture.
214
 Although Nakash mentions a wide wave of Shi’a in Iraq began 
with the rise of Karbala and Najaf as the most important religious centers in the 
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mid-eighteenth century
215
, but he does not give a clear perspective on Shi’a status 
before that date. He does not tell us whether Shi’a were a minority or majority in 
Iraq before that time. Nakash emphasized the migration of many Arabic Sunni 
tribes from the Arabian Peninsula to settle in Iraq in that time. They converted to 
Shi’a rapidly at the end of the eighteenth century and through to the nineteenth 
century. He presented Iraq before the mid-eighteenth century as if it was not 
inhabited by Arabic Shi’a tribes and that Shi’a before that date were not of any 
importance in Iraq, while Najaf and Karbala have been the main center of Shi’a 
due to their sacred status for Shi’a, and Najaf is the ground for the shrine of the 
Shi’a first Imam Ali and the most prominent religious school. This school later on 
moved from a previous site in Baghdad to Najaf due to a gory conflict between 
Sunni Saljoukid and Shi’a Buyid in Baghdad.216 
 After Saljoukid Al-Salajeka controlled Baghdad in 1055 C.E., the Shi’a were 
targeted and amongst them were the Shi’a Sheikh, Al- Tusi, whose house was 
ransacked and his books burnt. Afterwards, he moved to Najaf in 1057 C.E.- 449 
A.H., where he was followed by his students and a number of Shi’a.217 As for 
Karbala, it became a distinguished city that expanded with time because it was a 
place to visit the sacred shrines and it provided economic opportunities to its 
inhabitants who serviced visitors of Al-Hussein’s shrine. Consequently, Najaf and 
Karbala have played spiritual, ideological roles since almost the eleventh
  
century. 
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Shi’a and their rituals have never been missing in Iraq, and even in rough times 
they secretly practiced their rituals away from their foes’ surveillance.  
 Yitzhak Nakash builds an argument to claim that: 
 “There exists at the core of Shi’ism in Iraq a society whose strong 
Arab tribal value system was encapsulated by Shi’i religion, not 
permeated by it [and]…the Iraqi Shi’is on the whole have been 
distinguished by their Arab tribal attributes and moral values, 
which were evident in their rituals and endured long after the 
establishment of modern Iraq.”218 
 The Arabic tribal values apparent in Iraqi mourning rituals can be traced back 
to the tribal background of Iraqi Shi’a who have resided in Iraq for a long time 
especially after building the two cities of Kufa (622 C.E.) and Basra (636 C.E.). 
Imam Ali took Kufa as his caliphate capital in 656 C.E., and many Yemenite 
tribes moved with him to it. Accordingly, the Arabic background of Iraqi tribes 
can be established before the late migration to Iraq in about the eighteenth century 
which Nakash mentions as so influential on the Arabic tribal background of Iraqi 
Shi’a. Thus, the Arabic tribes in Iraq were powerful for many centuries before the 
time mentioned by Nakash. 
 The tribal Arabic values of the Iraqi Shi’a community play an essential role 
for the participants in mourning rituals. The activity of hosa in which poems are 
read and dances are performed in Iraq is not known at all to the Persian Shi’a, 
because it is part of the Arabic values that shape the Iraqi Shi’a mood and 
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expresses its Arabic tribal values.
219
 On the other hand, the Persian mourning 
theater (Ta’ziyeh) which was established and highly developed during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflects an important aspect of the structure 
and mood of the Persian personality and its interaction with this art. It is believed 
that Ta’ziyeh in Persia developed from Zoroastrians practice in commemoration 
of Siyavush. The Zoroastrian myth claims that Siyavush sacrificed himself to 
generate life. So that, many Zoroastrians went to the same place that he was killed 
and weep.
220
 
 The successive governments and upper class in Iran have supported this 
theater activity, while in Iraq; it has been limited to expressive means and 
improvised scenes most of the time. Mourning rituals that are practiced, though 
similar in most of the Shi’a communities, reflect cultural social folklore aspects of 
each of these communities. 
 Ali Al- Wardi (1913-1995), is one of the main pioneers of Iraqi sociology. In 
his book Lamahat Ijtimaiyya min Tareekh Al-Iraq Al-Hadith (1971), he focused 
on the nature of the emergence and structure of modern Iraqi society since the 
Ottoman era until the end of the twentieth century. Al- Wardi builds an argument 
to demonstrate that the beating celebration (Majalis Al-Latm) and the processions 
of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseinyya) in Iraq during the nineteenth century 
onward appeared for the first time in Al- Kadhumya city and were organized by 
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Sheikh Baqir Asadullah Al-Dizafooly (d. 1840). They spread all around Iraq 
because they have been taken as a sign of high social status. Any person with 
some wealth could have been inclined to organize a majlis in his house to raise his 
social standing. These processions and majalis have a symbol of high status “a 
man, who resides a procession or walks in front of it or lament in it, feels some 
sort of highness and elevation due to masses surrounding him.”221 The function of 
mourning rituals has not been limited to political emotional aspects only but also 
become socio-political “symbols” in a society where some members seek the 
means of changing their status to a socially distinctive one. These changes in 
understanding mourning rituals have proven the strength and influence of these 
rituals and their deep roots in the Shi’a compassion, in addition to their ability to 
develop and increase their participants. Mourning rituals over Al-Hussein’s death 
contribute, just like other mourning rituals, to bringing change to the social status 
of their participants, which revitalizes the new reality of the rituals’ participants. 
 Ali Al-Wardi studied mourning rituals practiced by Shi’a in Baghdad in the 
mid-nineteenth century from the psychological and sociological perspectives. He 
focused on prominent social changes that the Iraqi society was subjected to due to 
urban transformation and the conflict between Bedouin values and the 
requirements of new shifts toward urbanism. Though he did not elaborate on 
mourning rituals widely, he emphasized an aspect of these rituals as being part of 
the sociological background of Iraqi individuals. These individuals have sought to 
pursue urban development from one side, and stick to their cultural values and 
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background on the other. Al-Wardi in his argument tries to study mourning 
rituals, especially Majilis Al-‘Aza, as ones that help participants bring obvious 
change to their social status. Practicing these rituals also help the participants 
reveal some of their past values and traits which witnessed a conflict between the 
past and present. Thus, these rituals provide the opportunity for their participants 
to symbolically move between two past social backgrounds and their wish to 
pursue new changes in their lives. 
 Although Robert Fernea’s Shaykh and Effendi (1970) is a field study in the 
south of Iraq between 1956-1958 on relation between irrigation and politics 
power, he presents to us important aspects that could help us develop awareness 
of differences of mourning rituals between small cities’ inhabitants and the Arabic 
tribes who lived on the outskirts. Some of these differences, mentioned by Fernea, 
are related to ‘Ashurā rituals. 
 Mourning rituals of the martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein have been in practice 
for centuries in a way consistent with Iraqi culture and its tribal identity. The 
rituals usually include weeping, reciting elegies, reciting the story of Al-Hussein’s 
death and beating the chest (latm). The bedouin Arabic background, known for 
strength and courage in hard times, plays an important role in shaping these rituals 
and how to practice them. It is so difficult for an Arab to practice self-flagellation 
and beating on his chest because they contradict social and psychological 
structure of his character. This point is clearer in the Iraqis’ stand regarding head 
laceration tatbir, back lashing zangeel, and chest beating latm, which have been 
practiced in the sacred shrines and was only practiced by non-Arabs in the 
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beginning of these rituals. Robert Fernea gives an account of ‘Ashurā mourning 
rituals in Daghara village, 13 km from Diwaniyah, in the south of Iraq in the late 
1950s. He mentions that tribal men in this village do not participate in the 
mourning procession mawakib in their village or even the ones sent to Karbala 
because they are inconsistent with their tribal ethical values.
222
 Therefore, tatbir 
and zangeel have remained widely unpopular amongst Arab Shi’a, and are limited 
to Persian, Turk and Indian Shi’a. These practices have been condemned by Shi’a 
scholars and triggered a wide debate between supports and opponents. Still, the 
issue has not been settled until now. 
Ibrahim Al-Haydari, (1936- ), an ethnographical scholar, in his social 
anthropology study Trajidiya Karbala: Susyulujiya Al-Khitab Al-Shi‘i (1999), 
searches ‘Ashurā mourning in the socio- political dimensions and folklore in Iraq 
until 1969. Al-Haydari demonstrates that Shi’a mourning rituals that are practiced 
during ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain have a function that exceeds the religious 
dogmatic level to include social and psychological one because these rituals. He 
claims these rituals are:  
“Not necessarily connected with religious belief, but some have 
elevated it to belief level because of social and psychological 
reasons and motifs related to self protection, identity, purification 
from sins and guilts, eradicating guilt complex, compensating for 
inability when weak and humbled, reconnecting the socio- cultural 
links destroyed by modern socio- political and economic 
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structures, and finally rebuilding the human being, gaining respect, 
and identity.” 223 
Mourning rituals appear here, in addition to  supporting religious thoughts, as 
a social and psychological reaction parallel to the painful reality that have been 
imposed on them by severe socio-political and economic circumstances. In this 
view, Shi’a would not have been able to endure without these mourning rituals. 
Although, the face value of these mourning rituals seems superficial, as a negative 
reaction towards the challenges of reality and the inevitable confrontation, these 
rituals have given expression to many aspects of confrontation, where they have 
been used as a political tool in the face of these challenges. Apart from that, these 
rituals have been used to raise the revolutionary morals which are enhanced by 
remembering the battle of Karbala and Al-Hussein’s martyrdom. The strength 
these rituals provide lies in the fact that participants gain some of what they seek 
as solutions to facing challenges and overcoming difficulties and perils on their 
path; whether psychological, or social or dogmatic solutions. 
Ibrahim Al-Haydary, in his study gives us an important sociological study on 
the calamity in Karbala and the practices of the mourning rituals in Iraq. He 
mentioned various essential aspects of these rituals from the point of view of 
sociology, anthropology, politics, history, literture and psychology. He mainly 
relied in this study on the ethnography of rituals in Al-Kadhumya, Baghdad in 
1968 and Lebanon in 1975. The book was written in Arabic and published in 
1999 and is considered one of the most important references for the study of 
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mourning rituals of Iraqi Shi’a, though it is limited to the study these rituals as 
they were in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
In The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq (2003), Faleh A. Jabar, (1946- ), a 
sociological scholar, provides a significant chapter on Iraqi Shi’a rituals as 
popular culture that seeks to develop mourning politically. He argues that “Both 
the clerical class with its canonical-textual culture and the urban Shi’ite middle 
classes with their modern ideologies and structures may utilize these rituals as 
conduits of mass politics.”224 The most active participants in ‘Ashurā and Al-
Arb‘ain rituals have practiced political roles according to each one's vision and 
direction. For example, the reciter’s function shifts to conveying not only social 
injustices but also political ones, too. In addition to that, these rituals reflect the 
hegemony of individuals or groups over another, such as the role of a tribe’s 
sheikh and his attempt to consolidate his authority over others by playing the role 
of reciter in Majilis Al-‘Aza. Thus, these rituals have developed a strong element 
of fear for the Iraqi government due to the strength the rituals give to their Shi’a 
participants. That led the government to impose restrictions on the participants in 
early years of the 1970s which escalated to the gory confrontation between the 
government and participants in 1977. Afterwards, the rituals were banned 
officially in the early 1980s and after the break out of the Iraq-Iran war. Jabar 
relies in his study on Robert Fernea’s observations and thoughts on rituals of 
‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain as practiced by the Shi’a in the late 1950s at the same 
place where Fernea authored his book Shaykh and Effendi.  
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 Most of the previous studies that dealt with mourning rituals practiced by Iraqi 
Shi’a on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in are very limited and do not represent a good 
opportunity to comprehend these rituals. These studies, mentioned here, remained 
within two frameworks. First, they have been conducted tens of years ago, and 
though they shed light on some important aspects to study these rituals, they with 
time, became limited only to providing a historical background for the rituals. For 
example, the information we could get from Nakash, Fernea, or Al-Wardi is 
limited to times before the 1950s if not earlier. There’s a time gap that separates 
us from the time of writing these books, while we could see many important 
changes in the rituals including decisive socio-political changes that occurred to 
the participants of these rituals and their local and regional surroundings. In 
addition, Shi’a mourning rituals have been freely practiced in Iraq since 2003, and 
the practice of these rituals has been accompanied with major changes in the 
structure of the Iraqi society before and after that time. Secondly, these studies are 
lateral and do not give a comprehensive view of mourning rituals. For example, 
Faleh A. Jabar’s study remained limited to the political aspect of the rituals 
especially when he dedicated only one of 17 chapters to the Shi’a movement in 
Iraq and their role in framing and redesigning the Iraqi political pattern. As for 
Ibrahim Al-Haydari’s study, though it is dedicated to mourning rituals, it does not 
study developments that occurred to the rituals in the recent years, in addition to 
the fact that it offered little help to Western researchers as it is only published in 
Arabic. 
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 In this study, I endeavored to research the mourning rituals of Iraqi Shi’a to 
contribute to the knowledge of these rituals, and their impact and role in 
producing and reproducing the Iraqi Shi’a community. I have done my best to 
give a study that is useful and valuable to meet the need in academic studies 
targeting this topic. My background, Arabic speaking and having lived in Iraq for 
more than 30 years until 1999, has helped me deal with the Arabic references 
along with recent changes to the rituals and their participants. Because of my 
desire to present a serious study on this subject, I went back to Iraq again by the 
end of 2011 to conduct a field study. 
 According to the information available to me from the main historic 
references on ‘Ashurā rituals, in addition to what I acquired from my field study 
in their setting in Iraq, I found rites of passage that were studied first by Van 
Gennep, and developed later by his follower Victor Turner are the appropriate 
framework for study mourning rituals in this research. The three basic levels of 
Turner in rites of passage which are separation, marginality, and re-aggregation 
are important levels and a part of the rituals practiced in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain. I 
will elaborate more on the link between Turner’s model and mourning rituals of 
Iraqi Shi’a in the two chapters on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain. 
Just like other passage rituals, ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain offer their 
participants the opportunity to bring about some change resulting from practicing 
their rituals. I could claim that one of the significant aims of practicing mourning 
rituals by Iraqi Shi’a on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain is their desire to have some 
change in social, political, economic, psychological, and spiritual status. The 
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mourning rituals they practice on Al-Hussein’s martyrdom occasion are meant to 
help them transform in term of place and time and return to their roots which they 
think have taken shape by the moment of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in Karbala. 
Thus, by their return to their essential symbols, Shi’a can maintain their future 
and existence. 
G. Conclusion  
Mourning and sadness rituals practiced by individuals and groups, result from 
loss of a close person or an influential figure in people’s lives. Mostly, mourning 
rituals originate as a psychological reaction to loss, and the individual who 
practice mourning rituals passes through many complex psychological stages to 
overcome his or her loss by changing the psychological relation between loss 
adaptation and finally accepting the new reality. Mourning rituals are usually 
accompanied by sharp changes in the mourner’s psychological state which is 
reflected in their social state and relation to social surroundings. If, mourning, 
from psychological perspective, is normal healthy state, as long as the mourner’s 
state does not develop into sickness, then it bears important social significances, 
especially the positive outcomes of collective weeping on the participants. Some 
scholars have overstated matters by claiming mourning rituals resulting basically 
from social needs to express the dominance of collective spirit in the community 
and that they are the base for actions and different behaviors. 
 Mourning, as a rite of passage, helps participants change their social state, too. 
The stages the mourners pass through, separation, transition, and reaggregation, 
help in reintegration and harmony in the community. This, in its turn, helps in 
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building the society’s identity and maintaining it against the perils of change. As a 
result, the aims of practicing mourning rituals may turn, due to historic 
circumstances and political contradictions, into means of resistance and 
compensation of inability, weaknesses in the desire for confrontation. Therefore, 
the significance of mourning varies to include psychological, social, faith, and 
political aspects. Mourning rituals have the ability to meet the needs of their 
participants and help them change their psychological and social state. Mourning 
rituals are effective means to resist grave dangers. 
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Chapter 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF ‘ASHURĀ RITUALS 
A. Introduction 
This chapter gives an exposition and analysis of the data and outcomes of the 
fieldwork I conducted during the ‘Ashurā225 rituals of Muharram 1433 AH. - 
November 27
th
 to December 6
th
, 2011 C.E. During this time field study I collected 
significant amount of information on mourning rituals through attending various 
ceremonies in their actual settings, like memorial services, processions of the 
martyrdom of Al-Hussein, reciting Al-Hussein’s death story, the Tweareej Run, 
tent burnings, and theatrical scenes among others. I also conducted interviews 
with active participants in these rituals, and with Shi’a scholars in addition to 
obtaining invaluable documents that shed light on ‘Ashurā mourning rituals. 
 ‘Ashurā rituals practiced in the first ten days of Muharram every year have a 
great significance for the Iraqi Shi’a community. These rituals and their 
reoccurring practices contribute to building the Shi’a community by reproducing 
the religious experience and rendering it a distinct socio-cultural framework 
within the generic Iraqi society. Religious concepts based on faith and traditional 
Shi’a resources encourage and motivate people to adopt and practice mourning 
rituals and assure their periodic repetition which leads to the firm adoption of 
these rituals. 
These rituals express other experiences not only for religious reasons but 
because they also directly influence the participants’ daily lives. These symbols 
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are also sought by individuals for material purposes as they believe that the 
symbols are capable of increasing their income and material resources, healing 
their diseases, extending their lives, and protecting them from various perils. For 
the participants of these rituals, these symbols seem to play a magical role and 
sacred role, and consequently help them maintain their relation with the sacred, 
and which in turn invigorates their practices of these rituals. 
 Turner’s model of the rite of passage is a suitable one to apply to mourning 
rituals of Iraqi Shi’a as a passage because they create a communitas or non- 
structuralized society.
226
 I will argue in this chapter, that the Shi’a community in 
Iraq is holding a position similar to Turner’s notion of communitas as a kind of 
phenomena. What I mean by this, is that communitas is not relatively distinct and 
seeks to survive and grow to create balance with society's structure through 
practicing rituals to bring change to participants' social status.
227
 These rituals 
help them to change this status even if momentarily, hence their reputation.  Each 
time they make a show of a different solidarity and different relation of power 
drawing from these historical events, and sacred and spiritual symbols which are 
used to convey a sense of righteousness and marginality. Iraqi Shi’a also are 
living within a society, that is a Muslim society and yet even though they are a 
larger population of the society, they still become marginalized by the Sunni 
population socially, economically, and politically. They seem in that sense 
                                                 
226
 In his book Religious Performance in Contemporary Islam: Shii Devotional Rituals in South 
Asia (University of South Carolina Press, 1993), Vernon James Schubel used Turner’s model to 
study the role of Shi’a rituals in religious piety in South Asia. 
227
 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, (New York: Gruyter Inc., 
1969) 96. 
123 
 
 
something that is within this structure, and yet by practicing their own rituals, 
they create a different space for themselves.  
 Turner found that ritual processes consist of three phases, separation phase, 
margin or limen phase, and re-aggregation or reincorporation phase: 
First: The separation phase, according to Turner, is the separation of 
participants from their social structure and expresses participant's symbolic 
embodied practices through their separation from a given past point in their social 
structure or from certain social circumstances, or both.
228
 This phase can be seen 
clearly during the preparation or early beginning of practicing the rituals where 
participants seek to prepare themselves spiritually and materially, either by 
wearing certain ritual costumes or preparing their bodies or hearts to start 
separating from their usual reality. 
In ‘Ashurā rituals, one can see the separation phase occurring through the 
raising of Husseinite flags and pictures before the beginning of Muharram. 
Raising flags and pictures provides many symbolic meanings to the participants 
that prepare them to participate in the ‘Ashurā rituals. Also, during mourning 
councils (Majalis Al-‘Aza), verbal communication is one of the means of 
separation where participants utter certain phrases that declare their preparedness 
to enter stage of separation. The reciter asks the participants to repeat phrases as 
“bless those who pray for Mohammed and his family” (Aflaha man salaa ala 
Mohammed wa ali Mohammed). Then the reciter reads elegies that help the 
participants separate from their present reality to enter the next stage of rituals. 
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The focus on the story and events of the Karbala battle create an atmosphere of 
recollection of the event and participants embark on a historical journey where all 
experience and feel the depth of this tragedy. 
Second: The margin or limen phase, according to Turner, is a transitional 
phase where participants' social status is perplexing and ambiguous and 
consequently marginalized. Ambiguity, the participants’ state in this stage, occurs 
because of passing through a cultural domain that lacks the stability of both the 
past and the future.
229
 The marginal phase sits between the prior status of the 
participants and the one they expect to have after completing all the rituals. Being 
a transitional phase, the participants express themselves using various rich 
symbols in order to be able to handle new variables that do not belong in their 
usual reality, which requires, in turn, similar treatment outside the familiar 
contexts. 
In ‘Ashurā rituals, the marginal phase happens through the body movements 
include chest beating, head laceration, burning tents, and the Tweareej Run. To 
enhance the ritual activities, participants use numerous images and drawings and 
symbols to accelerate the harmony between themselves and the phase of ritual. 
Individually they are hoping to change their social status, while collectively they 
are trying to recreate their collective identity and maintain their future existence. 
There is no result in this stage because it is like a “threshold” to the change that 
could happen at the end of the rituals. This stage is very ambiguous because the 
participants are between the marginal phase and the rite of passage. Thus, the 
                                                 
229
 Turner 94. 
125 
 
 
participants cannot recognize their reality and their future until they pass through 
the next phase. 
Third: The re-aggregation or reincorporation phase, where through this 
passage the participants acquire particular rights and duties clear and known to 
them, which imposes on them certain ethical responsibilities toward the others.
230
 
The shift of the status would be achieved after the completion of this stage. 
After practicing ‘Ashurā rituals, the participants achieve the status of 
Husseinite (Husseiny) or Al-Hussein’s slave (Khadem Al-Hussein), which is a 
title that signifies their individuality and importance. The title refers to piety and 
righteousness and hard work for Al-Hussein, and it ensures the bearer distinctive 
status within the Shi’a community. A Husseiny would enjoy some preferences and 
moral and psychological influence on those surrounding him, and consequently he 
is encouraged to sacrifice more in the upcoming years.  Thus, ‘Ashurā rituals 
support Shi’a individually and collectively to gain a change. This change can 
occur either in one’s social status or through a spiritual manner. 
B. Reception Ceremonies of ‘Ashurā  
1. Early Preparedness to Reception of ‘Ashurā  
The separation phase can be seen among the participants in the beginning of 
Muharram. This phase helps prepare the participants and the environment around 
them to be ready to separate from their current structure. During Muharram, Iraqi 
Shi’a cities give a show of mourning and sadness on this occasion. The most 
important features are raising flags, clothing public places in black, putting tents 
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up in squares to prepare for ‘Ashurā ceremonies and provision services for the 
participants. 
Shi’a buy numerous colorful flags and Husseinite images and install them on 
roofs and facades to receive ‘Ashurā. It is rare to find any Iraqi Shi’a house 
without these green, red and black flags which symbolize different meanings in 
‘Ashurā rituals. Many private vehicles also raise these flags to clearly declare 
themselves as mourners of Imam Al-Hussein. Many images are hung on the 
facades of houses, shops, and even government offices. These images represent 
imagined pictures of Al-Hussein and some of his family members who were 
martyred with him in the Karbala battle. These images and flags remain hanging 
for the duration of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain as a power that will be transmitted 
from these symbols. 
Tents are erected in public squares and streets and are used as centers for 
public gathering processions of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseiniyya) where 
basic services are provided like food, drinks, rest, and sleep. These tents substitute 
homes and sometimes mosques and Husseiniyat, plural of Husseiniya which is a 
place for Shi’a religious rituals and celebrations, which are not sufficient to serve 
the huge numbers of participant's coming from remote places. Some tents are put 
up specifically for services and sound systems are set up for chants and latmiyat. 
Other tents are used for services and mourning councils (Majlis Al-‘Aza) where 
quraya live recitations and latmiyat (plural of latmiya) are given. Not far away, 
youth groups could be seen wearing clothes that are historically known as those of 
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the troops of Imam Al-Hussein and Yazid’s armies, and rehearsing for tashabih 
theatre to be performed on Muharram 10
th
.
231
 
During this time, temporary shops provide seasonal products used exclusively 
in ‘Ashurā rituals, for example, shops selling audio CDs of chants and elegies 
niyahah and latmiyat. The best selling reciters are Basim Al-Karbalaee, Sayid 
Hassan Al-Karbalaee, and Mulla Jalil Al-Karbalaee. CDs of mourning elegies 
(niyaha), which are tragic chants mourning Al-Hussein and his family, are sold 
and listened to everywhere. The business of selling Husseinite flags, images and 
posters made of cloth or paper is of high demand. Another example of seasonal 
business are the shops selling tools of tatbir, zangeel and kitchen utensils, all of 
which are much more expensive than CDs and flags. One can also rent tents, 
amplifiers, bulbs and other products used in mourning councils. The rituals 
generate certain types of businesses a few weeks before Muharram to finish off 
after Al-Arb‘ain. 
The separation of the participants appears clearly through refraining from 
practicing many of their usual everyday life activities. These include abstaining 
from marriage, weddings and celebrations during Muharram and Safar. Non 
participants of Shi’a also follow these traditions. Another tradition is wearing 
black clothes to signify mourning for two months mostly by women which is 
similar to what people do when they mourn the loss of a loved one in the family. 
As the separation phase in ‘Ashurā rituals, flags play a special role as they are 
important symbols that signify passing from one stage to another. A flag is the 
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sign that refers or signifies something, and it is the place for fighters to meet at 
times of war.
232
 A flag could also reflect its bearer's characteristics and traits. That 
is why flags are widely used during Muharram and ‘Ashurā rituals to indicate the 
beginning of the main rituals of the historic battle of Karbala. The bearers of flags 
or those standing by them are not only participants in the rituals but also actual 
advocates of Al-Hussein and these flags are symbolic means to take them to past 
time (the actual time of the Karbala battle to participate in it and defend Al-
Hussein and his family). The more flags there are, the bigger the force wishing to 
participate and a surer indication of its victory. 
Flags used in Iraqi Shi’a mourning rituals reflect the participants' identity and 
background. Most individuals and groups participating in the rituals come from 
different tribal groupings (A’shira)233 that still play a structural and influential 
role in the persona of their members up to this day. Each tribe is still represented 
by color coded flags called bairagh.
234
 A distinguished tribe member carries the 
flag during battles against other tribes. 
Flags are still in use in countryside and towns in our days and they are raised 
during funeral services for tribe members. That is also done during hosa which is 
a dance conducted in a circular motion and accompanied by poetry and is usually 
performed at a tribe member's death and other occasions. This dance is usually 
enthusiastic and reflects the tribes and its members’ merits. Though bairagh is not 
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 Al-Khalil bin Ahmad Al- Faraheedy, Kitab Al-Ain, Ed. Abdulhameed Hindawi, Vol. 3, (Beirut: 
Alkutub Alaalmiya, 2003) 222.   
233
 Even though, I am aware of the problematic usage of the term tribe in anthropology and social 
sciences, the fact is in Iraq this term is used, and it translates to the word “tribe.”  
234
 The bairagh is the specific flag of a tribe (A’shira). In Iraq, each A’shira has its own specific 
flag that symbolizes that tribe.  
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used anymore in tribal conflicts due to normal civilizational changes in general, 
but tribe members still see it as a symbol that represents past and future of the 
tribe and uses a means for them to be moved to a past filled with glory and victory 
achieved by forefathers in battles against their enemies. As a result, raising 
Husseinite flags of various colors is symbolic expression of its ability to mobilize 
a group and direct it to a certain direction. This also reveals the tribal background 
and identities the participants in ‘Ashurā rituals and reflects remains of this tribal 
spirit that is still alive and active up to this moment. 
Flags used in ‘Ashurā rituals differ in color; some are green others are red or 
black and some other colors. Green is the color of Islam in general and is not a 
mourning specific color because green flags could be raised during joyful 
religious ceremonies like Shi’a Imams’ birthdays and other ceremonies. Red flags 
refer to martyrdom, sacrifice, and blood where red is central to these rituals; it is 
the color of the event (Karbala) and the loss (Al-Hussein). Black flags refer to 
mourning and loss which is the state of the participants in the rituals of Al-
Hussein himself. It is a symbol of the participants that reflects their mourning 
over Al-Hussein’s bloodshed in Karbala. Other colors, for instance, white and 
yellow, are not as commonly seen. They are secondary and not that significantly 
important to the rituals, and are more peripheral and may have even been 
introduced by the tribes.
235
 
                                                 
235
 Ala’ Hameed mentioned that the color of the Shi’a icons depended on three main colors; red, 
green, and black. The other colors as yellow and white appear more peripheral. The reason for 
that, according to him, is because the reference of colors in the Shi’a icon has a symbolic moral 
dimension, so that we can not interpret the colors according to its visible direct appearance but to 
its interpretation according to the Shi’a index. See Ala’ Hameed, “Icon in the Sub Culture Pattern: 
A Field Study in Baghdad City,” MA thesis, University of Baghdad, 2010. 115. 
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2. Ceremony Flag Changing: A New Phenomenon 
The night before the first day of Muharram, crowds in front of Al-
Hussein’s shrine were chanting Lebayk ya Hussein…Lebayk ya Hussein (Hussein 
at your service…Hussein at your service) when a person from processions of Al-
Hussein in Karbala changed the red flag on Al-Hussein’s shrine dome, with the 
mourning black one. Enthusiasm went up and participants 
chanted (Hussein...Hussein) for a few minutes. Then they started latmiya on the 
rhythms of an old Iraqi chant recited by Hamzeh Al-Sagheer from amplifiers 
around Al-Hussein’s shrine square (Al- Sahan). This chant is special for the 
agonizing beginning of Muharram. It says: 
Oh ‘Ashurā month, second to no other 
During you, Sajjad’s father’s [Al-Hussein] heart was broken 
Oh ‘Ashurā month, you triggered sorrow 
 During you, Al- Mustafa’s son’s [Al-Hussein] throat was blooded. 
Then, the red flag was taken down on the drum beats of the processions of Al-
Hussein band and handed to the Al-Hussein shrine in Karbala. Changing the red 
flag with the black one on the first night of Muharram is the declaration of the 
beginning of ‘Ashurā rituals. This change of scene reminds us of the scene of 
flying a flag and igniting the Olympic torch, where both kindle the crowd's 
emotions and signaling the beginning of a recurrent ritual that everyone would 
live some of its aspects. 
In Al-Abbas’ shrine, 400 meters from his brother Al-Hussein’s, another 
ceremony of flag change is happening. Al-Abbas’ flag is red with “ya qamar Beni 
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Hashim” (Moon of Prophet Family) inscribed on it to signify Al-Abbas’ 
importance. It was taken down from Al-Abbas’ dome and replaced with a black 
one which reads “You are the water giver to the thirsty at Karbala” which 
signifies his role in providing water for Al-Hussein’s family in Karbala. During 
the flag change, crowds chant “At your service Hussein...At your service Abbas.” 
Others start latmiya on their heads while repeating “Oh Fadhil’s father (the 
nickname for Al-Abbas), stand up for us, they burned tents over us” as they are 
running in a small circle. 
Changing flags is a relatively new event, since it is not referred to in scholarly 
references and is not mentioned as part of the mourning rituals. I, personally, had 
not heard of any reference for it before leaving Iraq in 1998. In fact I came to 
know, during my field study and from multiple references, that this ritual was 
introduced for the first time in an organized manner in 2006. It used to be 
performed prior to 2006 but without a ceremony, unlike the case I witnessed 
during 2011. Changing the flag of Imam Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas appears as the 
particular flags of the Shi’a community. Changing flags could have many 
different implications. Since the pressure of the Baath regime is lifted, Iraqi Shi’a 
now perform it. It could be that there is a relationship between changing flags of 
Imam Al-Hussein and the occupation. Raising the flags that represent Imam Al-
Hussein and the fact that these flags are not the ones that are being put as the flags 
of the country, may also be seen as a reaction of the Shi’a community. It is a 
different kind of solidarity and implication from the flag that is imposed on them. 
In addition to that, changing flags in this particular way appears as a main and 
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clear point to the separation of the participants from their actual structure and 
their everyday lives. Changing the flags in a certain place (shrine of Al-Hussein) 
and at a certain time (one night before the first day of Muharram) allowed this 
action to be as an actual separation phase to the participants from their current 
reality, and allowed them to transition to the next phase.  
Here are some of my notes from that period on that: 
First,  the general trustee of Al-Hussein shrine gifted, for the first time, a black 
flag with ‘Oh Hussein’ inscribed on it to all the shrines, Husseiniyat, and Shi’a 
mosques, in addition to Fatima Al-Maasooma’s shrine in Iran and other Shi’a 
sacred shrines.
 236 
This indicates the success of the initiation of this new 
experience and that it has gained approval from others for being an element of 
excitation to the participants. There are many interesting shifts that are happening. 
More and more of these rituals become inter-connected between nations, 
becoming transnational. They influence one another, but yet are selectively drawn 
by different groups according to how it speaks to them. 
Second, flag change occurs in all places at the same time after sunset and 
dinner prayers on the night before Muaharram 1st. This indicates the unified 
collective conduct of Shi’a at the exact moment as if they are making a special 
Husseinite time. They launch the ceremonies of flag change at the same exact 
moment in hundreds of Shi’a cities and towns all around Iraq in addition to 
thousands of Husseiniyat in Iraq and all over the world. 
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 Haider Al-Salamy, Private interview, 3 Dec. 2012. 
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Third, flag change makes Karbala the destination of another compass as being 
the capital for Shi’a in ‘Ashurā. All hearts head in Karbala’s direction, all flags 
rise in memory of its martyr who is eternally present in it through rituals and 
practices. It is the flag that waves over Shi’a heads wherever they are. 
Fourth, the spiritual role played by the sacred shrines in Iraqi lives makes 
them established institutions capable of control, change and practicing authority 
within the Shi’a community. Consequently, the institutions are active in 
producing and supporting the Shi’a identity in Iraq and other Shi’a regions all 
over the world. 
Al-Hussein’s red flag on the top of his dome for ten months conveys the 
message that martyrdom's blood keeps waving as a witness. It is the martyr's 
blood unavenged, yet exactly as in the symbols of Arabic tribes where the family 
of the killed would not mourn him nor wear black till the killer is killed. Here too, 
the red flag is a declaration that its bearer is being back stabbed and is still 
unavenged. It instigates revenge as if the bleeding of the killed would never stop 
nor dry. 
Al-Hussein’s flag bears other significance. In the future, this flag will be 
carried by his great grandson, the twelfth Imam Mohammad bin Al-Hassan, the 
Waited Mahdi (Al-Muntazar) who has miraculously disappeared, to appear again 
in an uncertain time to once again raise Al-Hussein’s flag. Who having 
miraculously disappeared, would appear again in an unknown future, but on an 
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even year, maybe on Muharram 10
th
, to carry the flag.  237  It is then Al-Hussein’s 
flag that he would raise to claim justice and take revenge for Imam Al-Hussein. 
The actual killers of Al-Hussein were killed later by the Tawaboon (Penitents) 
movement led by Al-Mukhtar Al-Thiqafy. Al-Thiqafy killed Omar bin Saad, 
Obeidillah bin Ziyad, and Bin Thiljawshen. But it seems that taking revenge for 
Al-Hussein and inflicting judgment on his killer means something else which 
might be an infliction of punishment on the unjust in extension to the actual 
killers, to accomplish social justice that Al-Hussein called for. 
Flags are usually taken by the people as a way of acquiring sacredness and 
blessing of Al-Hussein, because they think these flags are symbols that carry the 
sacredness of Imam Al-Hussein, bringing blessings to their lives, especially in 
situations when life is not satisfactory. Those who have the flag would keep it in 
their houses for few days for blessing then pass it over. There are many people 
who are eager to touch and be blessed by it. Therefore, flags would be kept in 
many places by many people for its sacred capabilities. The act of flag changing 
is a clear sign of the separation phase. Thus, the next day (Muharram first) is one 
of the first days that the actual practice of ‘Ashurā rituals, which can be seen in 
their attendance of Majlis Al-‘Aza. 
C. Mourning Councils (Majalis Al-‘Aza) 
Majlis Al-‘Aza represents the core of the matrix of mourning rituals performed 
in ‘Ashurā. Majlis Al-‘Aza is the liminal phase in the ‘Ashurā rituals. First majlis 
starts on the first day of ‘Ashurā and that is usually after sunset and dinner 
                                                 
237 Heinz Halm, Shiism, Trans. Janet Watson and Marian Hill, (New York: Columbia UP, 2004) 
37. 
135 
 
 
prayers. An exception to that is the small majalis held by individuals in their 
places or earlier during the day before dinner prayers because the reciter has 
commitments to a bigger majlis.
 238
Majlis Al-‘Aza may take the name majlis 
Husseini because they are held for Al-Hussein as they are called in the Iraqi 
dialect Majalis Al-Qraya (reading councils), and the person who presents this 
ritual is called Al-Qari (the reciter or reader). 
The word majlis (singular for majalis) is derived from sitting which is a place 
where people meet while sitting for some reason, a ritual for example, or a 
discussion. These majalis are usually held at homes, mosques, Husseiniyat, and 
public spaces especially when a majlis requires a bigger space. There are two 
types of majalis: public supervised by men and could be attended by women and 
women majalis run by women and attended without men. 
1. Public Majalis 
Majlis Al-‘Aza or Majlis Al-Qraya comprises three main components: sponsor 
of majlis, reciter, and an audience. In some majalis, another factor is added, 
radood, whose function is to lead the participants in the rituals of latmiya and 
rhythmic elegies and usually takes his turn after the recitation. 
The sponsor of the majlis provides a place and organizes the whole event, and 
pays all expenses of food and drinks, and of clothing the place with different 
flags, images and posters. The most important job of the sponsor is the selection 
of a distinguished reciter and radood to attract more participants to this event. The 
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 A Husseinite majlis in Baladiyat, Baghdad. It was held in a big tent erected in front of the 
sponsor's house (Ala’s Father). The majlis started at 5:00 PM and last for 45 minutes and ended a 
while before sunset prayers. Then participants, around 30, moved to the nearby Husseiniyah place 
for sunset and dinner prayers and to attend Majlis Al-‘Aza for an hour and a half. 
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richer the sponsor is the more chances he may organize a successful ritual and 
consequently acquires increased fame and prominent social status. 
The reciter is a person who reads a Husseinite- religious sermon interposed 
with rhythmic lamentation poetry (niyahah). One of the things a reciter needs is to 
trigger the emotions of the participants and dramatically supercharge their 
passions with images from the Karbala catastrophe. This requires an effective 
voice and the ability to connect stories and linking them with the participants' 
daily life. There exists a school specialized in teaching reciters oratory, 
performance, and presenting in majalis. A reciter does not have to be one of a 
high ranking clergymen (Ulama), but most of them complete some level of 
religious education that entitle them to be qualified persuasive orators. 
The audience of majlis is from different socioeconomic statuses too. 
Usually, high ranking people like Sayyids
239
, leaders, famous peoples, tribal 
leaders, prominent figures, and the elderly sit next to the reciter. The rest of the 
audiences take different spots of the majlis. Most participants come from the same 
neighborhood or adjacent ones. Some figures attend the majlis on special 
invitations by the sponsor, the reciter or radood. The function of the participants 
is to listen to the lecture, cry, and participate in latmiya in some majalis. 
Additionally, some participants may donate money that is special for ‘Ashurā to 
Al-Hussein’s Sondoq (box), which is usually put in a visible place as an open 
invitation for donations to develop the majlis. 
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 Descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, and they are much respected among the Shi’a.They 
are distinguished by wearing green or black head cover.  
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2. Performance of Majalis 
During my fieldwork in Iraq, I attended the first majlis which was held in a 
Husseiniyah place in Al-Baladiyat quarter, Baghdad, on Muharram 1st (Sunday, 
November 27, 2011). Before the majlis, participants started coming from around 
the neighborhood or other places. The number of participants reaches 60 in the 
hall whose capacity is far more than that. The event sponsor greeted participants 
and ordered them tea which is brought in a big tray by a young man. On the 
prominent side of the place sits the minbar which is a big chair reachable by small 
stairs and is usually covered completely with black cloth. The reciter and some 
elderly sit close to the minbar while the audiences are facing it. At 7:00 PM sharp, 
the reciter stands up, others sitting next to him also stand up as a sign of respect. 
He kisses an arm of the minbar, takes the small stairs then seats himself on it. 
Now everyone could see him (see photograph 1).  
The reciter Al-Qari asks the audience to pray three times for Mohammed and 
his family. He then greets the prophet and his grandson, Al- Hussein, and states 
his wish to having been able to participate in the Karbala battle and be martyred 
with Al-Hussein in a very sad rhythmic manner. Then, he recites a few lines of 
elegy. His voice is remorseful now and influences the audience, whose heads are 
down. He covers his face with his hands to hide his tears. This introduction takes 
five minutes. It is the step of separating the participants from their environment 
and reality. 
The reciter gives a moral brief on Al-Hussein’s traits and effective values in 
his persona and some historic stories supporting that. He seeks to urge 
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participants to focus on maintaining the relationship with the prophet and his 
family as they are the main symbols for Shi’a. Then, he stresses on some daily life 
events, criticizes them, and compares them with historical examples drawn from 
Mohammad’s, Imams’ and companions’ lives being considered the role models 
for Shi’a Muslims. This section of the lecture resembles religious preaching. It 
takes 30 minutes. 
 
Photograph 1: A majlis in Al-Baladiyat quarter, Baghdad, on ‘Ashurā 1st. 
Then, the reciter moves into linking events with Al-Hussein’s departure from 
his homeland (Medina) and his reasons for refusing Yazid’s caliphate, which is 
the theme of the night. In the same way of his introduction, the reciter reads lines 
of niyahah which emotionally affect the audience. The audience starts crying 
which could be heard all around the hall. A person in the audience interacts more 
139 
 
 
with the sad images presented by the reciter, and starts raising his hand and 
beating his chest and forehead. This part is the last item in the Majlis Al-Qraya. It 
is the most important emotional part in the majlis. It lasts about 10 minutes. 
After the Majlis Al-Qraya, majlis of latm immediately starts. It is a process of 
hitting the chest with one or both hands. The radood leads participants by 
chanting rhythmic poems that end with hitting the chest. Participants are usually 
organized in circles. 
During the first three days, latm was less enthusiastic compared with the later 
days. In the beginning, the latm majlis started with what is known as Al-Qaadiya 
which is a kind of latmiya practiced only in the beginning of Muharram, when 
sitting and considered as a warm up into usual latmiya. During the last days of 
Muharram however, latmiya was practiced more enthusiastically and people no 
longer sat during this practice but performed latmiya while standing. Most of the 
participant’s are young men. Islamic leaders do not participate effectively in 
latmiya. They practice latmiya symbolically and find it enough to stand behind 
the lines of latmiya participants. Severe latmiya or body harm activities like self 
flagellation are not ethically sanctioned for some of the high ranking clergymen 
(Ulama). 
Majalis Al-‘Aza shed light on figures that died in the Karbala battle according 
to the date of martyrdom. On the second night, the theme was Al-Hussein’s 
reaching Karbala grounds. The next five days, the focus was on Muslim bin 
Aqeel, Al-Hussein’s ambassador to Kufa, Habeeb bin Mudhaher, Burair, and Al-
Hurr. 
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The participation in the last days of ‘Ashurā almost doubled. Visual effects 
were used as a catalyst in majalis. On the 6
th
 day, assigned to Al-Hussein’s 
nephew Al-Qasim bin Al-Hassan (see photograph 2), a young man acted like him 
while preparing for his wedding during the battle and walked through the hall. 
Many other young men participated in this activity wearing the historical green 
costume and carrying candles and trays of desserts to express their happiness for 
Al- Qasim’s wedding which in fact did not occur because of the war and his 
subsequent death.
240
 Al- Qasim’s wedding, a mere folklore Shi’a story, reflects an 
aspect of Karbala’s catastrophe. It reveals the deep tragedy of the mother and her 
hope in her son’s wedding and her stolen hope due to his death. 
 
Photograph 2: A young man acting like Al-Qasim bin Al-Hassan on his  
horse on Muharram 7
th
, at night in front of Al-Hussein’s gate (Bab Al Qibleh). 
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 According to historical records, there was actually no wedding for Al-Qasim.  
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On the 7
th
 day, assigned to Al-Abbas’ story, a participant carries a tray in 
which there are two plastic hands, walks through lines of participants to represent 
Al-Abbas’ hands that were severed in Karbala battle while he was on his way to 
fetch water for Al-Hussein and his family. The 8
th
 day is assigned to Ali (Al-
Akber) bin Al-Hussein who is presented as the obedient son to his father and 
sacrificed himself in defense of his family and religion. The 9
th
 day is assigned to 
Abdullah, the infant son of Al-Hussein, who was also killed in the battle of 
Karbala.  
The 10
th
 day is the pinnacle of the majlis which is held two times, the first one 
in the morning, in which the story of the Karbala battle Maqtal Al-Hussein was 
recited and the second one was in the evening at 7:00 PM, as usual. The majlis 
continued until Muharram 13. The extra three days were for the funeral of Al-
Hussein and those who died with him in the Karbala battle. It is customary in 
Iraqi society to organize a three day funeral for any person who has died. 
Among many rituals of ‘Ashurā, Majalis Al-‘Aza is one of the most important 
ones through which the structure of religious authority is consolidated. This 
occurs by influencing the crowds of participants within the boundaries put 
together by the religious institution represented by high ranking leaders. The 
reciter plays the role of a mediator between the participants, who represent most 
ranks of Iraqi society, in the rituals and the directions of the religious institution. 
Majlis becomes a means of communication with the thoughts of prominent 
religious leaders presented to listeners through their discussions with the 
participants in the majlis. Most of the time, the reciter becomes a conduit for the 
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participants' problems and concerns to reach religious leaders who would study 
them and give proper opinion fatwa about them. This helps leaders be up to date 
with what happens with the Shi’a community. 
Majalis Al-‘Aza play an important role in gathering and mobilizing 
participants, and preparing them psychologically and socially to be part of 
‘Ashurā rituals. It also helps in maintaining the unity of the participants and 
linking them with each other within one social entity by keeping them in daily 
contact during the days of majlis. Majlis is a good channel to get to know others 
and consolidate social linkage amongst them. 
Majlis Al-‘Aza assists participants to enjoy a distinctive social status and 
maintain the three prominent people in it; the sponsor, the reciter and the 
participants. The sponsor’s status becomes more distinguished than before 
because of his ability to run the annual Majlis Al-‘Aza, and put the money and 
effort to serve the participants in the majlis. The participants call the sponsor as 
Khadim Al-Hussein (Al-Hussein’s slave) which is a distinguished status amongst 
others. He becomes widely accepted, more successful in his work and other social 
life aspects. 
As for the reciter of the majlis, his major role in the majlis helps him 
consolidate his social and religious status. He becomes more famous amongst the 
participants and powerful amongst leaders. The more famous the reciter is the 
more important role he plays in mediating between participants and leaders. His 
success and popularity helps him perform in bigger majalis of wider participation 
that pay more compared with the small ones in popular areas of poor classes. 
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Major majalis are usually sponsored by the well off like religious institutions, 
political parties, merchants, and other prominent figures.
241
 
Participants seek to improve their psychological and social status. Practicing 
mourning rituals provides participants with the opportunity to change their social 
status because every person returns, after the completion of majlis, with a 
different status which enhances this person's standing. Any individual, by 
participating in majalis, declares his affiliation with the framework of the Shi’a 
community which enhances his standing amongst other participants and his social 
environment in general. This change brings about a positive aspect to the 
participant's psychological state, which will positively affect his family and many 
different aspects of daily life. Individuals make new friends that assist them in 
changing their personal mood and develop their social networking resulting in 
more success in their businesses. 
3. Female Majalis242 
Women’s participation in public Majalis Al-‘Aza in the mosques and 
Husseiniyat, is rare or at least limited compared to men’s participation. Women 
attend only the major majlis held in main city streets or public squares.
243
  
Nonetheless, their participation is very restricted and they are not fully free to 
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 The majlis organized by Haj Firas, a Baghdad merchant, in Jamila, east of Baghdad, on 
‘Ashurā. It was a big majlis, with lines of big tents for men and women. Ahmed Al Ibrahimy was 
a very famous reciter. The majlis was broadcast alive to many TV stations. It was attended by state 
officials and members of parliament. 
242
 This women majlis was in Nasr Quarter, East of Baghdad. I was able to gather information 
about this majlis after I reached an agreement with one of the women who lived nearby as she was 
the sponsor of the majlis. She supervised all the ten Majalis in this quarter. I had many meetings 
with her to learn what happened in the majalis during the ‘Ashurā of 2011. 
243
 In the majlis organized by the Sadr Martyr Bureau in Sadr City Thursday Muharram 5th, (Jan 
12 2012), and the majlis organized by Abu Firas in the Jamila Quarter. The two majalis were held 
in the ‘Ashurā days of 2011.  
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attend some rituals. Female participants are required to be in secluded areas away 
from men. They should also take notice of traditional norms such as decency, 
hijab, and being restricted as to expressing their emotions. But it is different when 
they attend female majalis where they are free to participate and express their 
feelings. 
Female majalis are an activity associated with mourning rituals held by 
women at their homes during ‘Ashurā and are usually attended by women only 
and their little children. There are often more than one majlis in a neighborhood, 
so women need to move from one to the other. 
Women’s Majlis Al-‘Aza are, just like men's, run by three people parties; the 
sponsor, Al- Mullaya, and the female participants. The function of these three 
distinct spheres, is the same as in the men’s majlis. The only difference is that 
they are women. The majlis is led by the mullaya, a religious word derived from 
the masculine word mulla. She recites latmiyat from her book of elegies. A 
mullaya is not required to have attained any level of religious education; she just 
has to be literate. She must be able to run the majlis, recite poems and niyahah 
which are a kind of lamenting common amongst Iraqi women where they sadly 
lament in unison repeated couplets. The fact that mullaya is literate and can recite, 
gives her a higher prestige. 
The mullaya starts the ten majalis in the geographical area of my field study at 
1:00 PM.
244
 The timing is suitable for most women in the neighborhood. By then, 
they should have finished their chores like preparing food, cleaning, and 
                                                 
244 The mullaya recited in ten majlis in this area. And there was another Mullaya reciting in 
another majlis in the same quarter. 
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shopping. They meet up at the sponsor's house before the mullaya comes in. In 
addition to the main reason of the majlis being for religious and spiritual 
interactions, it is also used as social exchanges between the women. They talk 
about different topics related to their families and daily life. When the mullaya 
comes in, food and drinks are offered to the participants. Food would differ from 
one house to another depending on a sponsor's financial ability. Some traditional 
drinks are usually offered including black tea, cinnamon and lemon tea. The 
mullaya signals the beginning of the majlis by saying (stand for Al-Hussein’s 
mourning) and women stand up to start latmiya. 
 The role of female Majlis Al-‘Aza and mullaya differs from that of the reciter 
and public Majalis Al-‘Aza. The reciter plays the role of a mediator between 
religious authority and individuals, while the mullaya is restricted to performing 
the function of rituals only. This is mainly due to the huge difference between 
men's and women’s roles in the religious institution. Influential religious posts are 
only for men, while women are given only a minor role. That is why female 
Majalis Al-‘Aza provide a great opportunity for the female participants to express 
themselves outside the usual contexts and prove their ability to run these local 
events. Women have complete authority over the female majlis. That includes 
management, leading, and participation. 
 During my observation period, on the first day the majlis focused on a Al-
Hussein’s martyrdom story, practicing latmiya, and elegies. During the next six 
days, it dealt with the stories of Al-Hussein’s companions. The sixth day attracts a 
wider audience. It is different from the other days. It is an exceptional one. It is 
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assigned to commemorate Al-Abbas and stresses his relationship with his sister 
Zainab and his pledge to protect her from the enemies in the Karbala battle. The 
brotherhood between Al-Abbas and Zainab reflects some concepts and life values 
for women and the participants’ social background. On Al-Abbas’ day, cake is 
offered as well as tea, which is called Chai Al-Abbas (Al-Abbas’ tea). Khubz Al- 
Abbas, bread stuffed with basil, is also offered as a vow by women. Al-Abbas’ 
persona for them is a distinctive one and enjoys special traits to distinguish him 
from others. 
 The days designated for Al-Abbas and Al-Qasim, the 6
th
 and 7
th
 day, for 
female majalis become really important days. Many women participate during 
these days. One of the things that can be seen during this day is fulfilling the vow 
made by these women to get their desire, such as getting married or having 
children, by bringing food, drinks, and sweets. Some have made a vow previously 
and when their wish is fulfilledthey want to comply with that vow, while others 
have just asked for their desire, but have already fulfilling the vow they have 
made. 
 Female majalis were held for 9 days because on the 10th day most women 
would be busy preparing food that is special for ‘Ashurā like harisa, a kind of 
grain soup, and qima, which is chick peas mixed with minced meat. They also 
would distribute food to neighbors and listen at home to the story of the 
martyrdom recited on radio or satellite TV by Abdilzahra Al Kaaby (1909- 1974), 
one of the famous reciters of the story of Al-Hussein’s death (Al-Maqtal). 
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 At the end of the female majalis, the sponsors give money to the mullaya for 
her effort in the majlis. I observed that no one would call that sum of money given 
to mullaya or reciter or radood as fees, but as a gift because they think their effort 
in the majalis is sacred and could not be valued by money terms. What is paid is a 
gift that helps its payer to have Al-Hussein’s blessing. A mullaya would not 
request a certain sum of money, but most sponsors paid 25,000–30,000 Iraqi 
Dinars, in the poorer neighborhood, as a gift to the mullaya for reciting during the 
9 days of this year, an equivalent of almost 25 U.S dollars. 
 Female majalis are a vital component of ‘Ashurā rituals. These majalis 
provide a chance for women to practice their rituals freely and have authority over 
the whole process of the rituals. In addition to that, these majalis give children an 
opportunity to prepare themselves to become important participants in these 
rituals. Most women bring their children to the majalis to get them accustomed to 
the rituals and to prepare them to participate in the future. That is why female 
Majalis Al-‘Aza help make ‘Ashurā rituals a social value established, embodied, 
and followed up by the Iraqi Shi’a community. 
 Female Majalis Al-‘Aza play an important social role in Iraqi Shi’a women’s 
life. They help provide a meeting context for neighborhood women. Women use 
the time before the start of the majlis to discuss various issues they face in their 
daily lives, which is a chance to exchange information and experiences. 
Additionally, these majalis are considered a way of socializing amid the high 
pressure women have due to lack of other social and cultural opportunities and 
due to unsafe security conditions especially in the last few years. They are also, of 
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course, significant for their spiritual and religious aspect. The restriction on social 
networking makes female Majalis Al-‘Aza paramount for them and bring about 
some entertainment in spite of the sad occasion. 
Majlis Al-‘Aza is the transitional phase, which Turner names the margin phase 
which means “threshold” in Latin.245 As the participants enter this phase, they 
have waived from their previous structure and their state is unstable. On one side, 
they transitioned from their previous structure and their cultural domain, and on 
the other their state is still in the formation process. Their state will not be clear 
until the last phase from the ritual.  
D. Processions of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseiniyya) 
Processions of Al-Hussein refers to a group of people practicing a mourning 
ritual during ‘Ashurā days and Al-Arb‘ain and each is called mourning 
processions (Mawakib Al-‘Aza). It also refers to a group of people providing 
services to participants in these rituals and are called processions of services 
(Mawakib Al-Khidmah). Most neighborhoods, cities, religious institutions, and 
some political parties form a mawkib that carries their names and performs rituals 
and provides services in their local areas. These mawakib are not allowed to 
perform their rituals in Karbala, except the services mawakib because only 
mawakib of Karbala are allowed to practice their rituals in Karbala. But the case 
is different on Al-Arb‘ain where every mawkib is allowed to enter Karbala and 
perform their rituals for four days close to Al-Hussein’s shrine. 
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 The head of a mawkib is called Al-Kafeel or sponsor, which is an inherited 
position from fathers and grand- fathers. Sons usually make sure they continue 
taking care of these mawakib and meeting their financial needs.
246
 Mawakib need 
to have special permits in their local cities from a directorate called directorate of 
rituals, the Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and 
Islamic world. A sponsor would obtain a permit to lead his mawkib in a place he 
should specify. He should also specify the type of mawkib, whether service or 
mourning, in addition to submitting a list of his assistants. Though mawakib could 
play many roles, we could categorize them according to their function; the 
mourning mawakib or service mawakib. In one case, a mawkib could perform 
both functions. 
 The processions of Al-Hussein show the power and role of influential social 
establishments in the Iraqi Shi’a community that care for and organize the rituals 
of ‘Ashurā and visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. These institutions have a distinguished 
role for the Shi’a community and those belonging to them enjoy respect and high 
social status amongst others. Owners and members of Al-Mawakib Al- Husseiniya 
usually make sure they remain connected with each other to maintain their social 
status and develop these rituals further. The processions of Al-Hussein, being 
socio- religious institutions, contribute to rebuilding social relations and solidify 
the Shi’a identity within their local areas. These mawakib are initiated by 
individuals living in the same neighborhood or city or those doing the same 
profession. Tribes give their names to the mawkib they initiate. And a mawkib in 
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its turn maintains the tribal framework by focusing on the main values like 
generosity, offering food to the hungry, hosting guests, amongst others that 
distinguish the tribe from others. 
1. Processions of Service (Mawakib Al-Khidmah)  
A procession of service refers to a group of people offering various necessary 
and free services to participants in different Shi’a rituals. Examples of that are 
food provision, bedding, rest means, and other participants' needs in ‘Ashurā and 
Al-Arb‘ain. These mawakib differ according to their finance, sponsors, and the 
needs of participants and the place. They are much needed during Al-Arb‘ain, 
where I will discuss later. 
There are service mawakib that can be observed in certain places like takiyyat 
that provide services to visitors and participant's in ‘Ashurā only and are in 
Karbala exclusively. Husseinite takiyyat, plural of takiyya, are places to host 
visitors to Al-Hussein’s shrine during ‘Ashurā days and provide them 
with services near Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas’ shrines. Takiyya is similar to 
Persian takiyya that was used originally for mourning ceremonies, until the 
nineteenth century when it became used mainly for housing Ta’ziyeh dramas.247 
Karbala takiyyat are registered under individual names from Karbala. Mawakib 
from outside Karbala are not allowed to have takiyyat in the city. There have been 
almost 140 takiyya that offer food, drinks and bedding, and use colorful lights to 
attract attention starting on the second day of Muharram. Karbala dwellers 
believe Al-Hussein’s choice of stopping at their desert city is similar to these 
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beautiful colorful lights from their takiyyat.
248
 Though, they switch the colorful 
lights on the 9th of Muharram except the red ones, to signify Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom and his blood shedding. 
2. Processions of Mourning (Mawakib Al-‘Aza)  
There are groups of people from the same neighborhood or city practicing 
latm, zangeel, tatbir, and tashabih. They are organized the same way as other 
mawakib. A founder of a mawkib provides necessary requirements and tools used 
in rituals like chains, drums, and clothes. These mawakib practice their rituals in 
their cities but they do so in Karbala during Al-Arb‘ain. These mawakib organize 
parades in their neighborhoods at certain times decided by the organizers. Most of 
these mawakib start their rituals on the last five days of ‘Ashurā, but some might 
start earlier like in the city of Al-Kadhumya Baghdad.
249
 
a.  Processions of Back Chain-Lashing (Mawakib Al-Zangeel) 
Zanjeel is derived from the Persian word zanjeer meaning chain. It is a group 
of chains at certain lengths that end with a wooden handle and is used by 
participants to hit their backs. The size of the zanjeel depends on what the 
participant chooses. The more chains, the heavier the zanjeel becomes, and the 
more pain it inflicts. Zanjeel mawakib starts largely after the 5
th
 day of Muharram 
(see photograph 3). 
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   Photograph 3: Procession of back chain-lashing in Karbala on Muharram 9
th
.   
A placard or flag with the mawkib’s name comes in the front, while the head 
of the mawkib practices zanjeel amid the mawkib. Mawakib Al-Zangeel differs 
from others because its participants need more space to move freely. That’s why 
the mawkib comes in two opposite lines with a good amount of space between 
them. And because these mawakib are usually practiced on the streets, the 
participants take the two sides of the road while the radood is in the middle 
walking next to a vehicle carrying loud speakers, a power generator, and night 
lights. The users of zanjeel need rhythm in harmony with their moves of zanjeel 
from one side to another and with the rhythm of the poem recited by the radood. 
The participants in performing zanjeel need to practice to learn to harmonize their 
moves. Children are usually seen with their parents, carrying a small zanjeel and 
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beating their backs gently. Some participants perform these rituals while smiling 
and talking, most of the time indifferent to the remorse and guilt of the emotional 
event. There are occasional expressions of sadness, but since it has become part of 
their everyday life people adapt to it. 
b. Processions of Head Lacerating (Mawakib Al- Tatbir) 
 Tatbir means hitting the head with a sharp tool similar to a short sword called 
qama in Iraqi dialect. The ritual of tatbir was unknown to Iraqi society until the 
mid 19
th
 century. It is the most dangerous ritual practiced in ‘Ashurā because it 
involves injuring the head and bleeding. The organizers of this mawkib are 
usually found in the middle with some elders to supervise the mawkib and the 
process of tatbir. They specifically help beginners to prevent them from 
exaggerating the practice of using the qama, and this moderation is vital in order 
to avoid serious injuries to the head. Tatbir is usually practiced on Muharram 10
th 
(‘Ashurā day). I will elaborate more in the 10th day section on tatbir rituals 
practiced in Al-Hussein’s shrine in 2011. 
c.  Processions of Chest Beating (Mawakib Al- Latm)  
 This procession is comprised of groups of men who hit their chests either with 
one hand or both while repeating some couplets called (raddah) and they are 
called lattamah. A group in a procession repeats a couplet then the next group 
does the next and so on. All raddah start and finish with line poetry called (Al-
Mustahel) which is repeated by all the groups in the procession. The contents of 
poems and raddah differ from one procession to another, but their essence is 
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about revitalizing images from the Karbala battle and how it relates to the 
participants’ reality. 
 Some processions of latm seek to showcase socio-political criticism. The most 
prominent one in this regard is the mass procession of Taraf Al-Abbasiyeh. 
Members of this procession explain why their procession adopts political raddah 
and harsh criticism to successive Iraqi governments, “Hussein’s revolution is 
originally against oppression and for the poor, the destitute, and the oppressed.”250 
The inhabitants of this impoverished neighborhood (Taraf Al-Abbasiyyeh) take 
their place as the poorest and most damaged. That is why during the procession of 
2011, they recited political poems while walking Karbala streets close to the 
shrines of Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas, where massive crowds participate with them 
in these political raddah. This type of event shifts mourning ritual to a semi 
political demonstration. 
 Processions of latm seek, by wide participation of participants and visitors, to 
express their demands and to attempt to change their reality. The raddah, they 
chant to improve their living standards and criticize their daily matters, expresses 
a type of social resistance practiced by Iraqi Shi’a by participation in ‘Ashurā 
rituals. 
E. Performing Passion Plays (Tashabih)  
Tashabih is a popular play staged on Muharram 10
th
, which reincarnates the 
historic Karbala battle and is performed by amateur actors. It is usually staged in 
public squares or near sacred shrines. Often, these amateur actors of one 
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neighborhood or city rehearse in their place before performing. There is no 
director for tashabih but the sponsor of the procession usually does the director’s 
job and trains the actors. The actors and participants in tashabih are not paid. The 
sponsor pays for tools, clothes and the stage. 
 Tashabih in Iraq, similar to the Persian equivalent, played an important role in 
popular Husseinite mourning rituals since the beginning of ta’ziya during the 
Safavid reign in the sixteenth century, though, Iraqi tashabih is not as developed 
as the Persian ta’ziya. The Persian ta’ziya has developed, moving from streets and 
public squares to parks and backyards of markets and private homes. It reached its 
pinnacle in the 19th century with the establishment of a Ta’ziya Theater, takiyya, 
where religious and general performances were staged.
251
 It remains restricted to 
‘Ashurā days and stage performances in public squares and nearby sacred shrines 
and lacks its own place and staging techniques. The state and the upper class in 
Iran have contributed a lot to the development of ta’ziya while in Iraq tashabih 
has been underdeveloped because of continuous bans and a long history of 
restrictions. 
 Tashabih staged in Iraq in Muharram 1433 A. H.-2011 C.E. could be divided 
into two types of performances. The first presents shows in city streets for 
example about the arrival of Hussein's enemy army to Karbala in addition to few 
short performances that focus on one character like Al-Qasim or Ali Al-Akber. 
The second type performs the whole historic Karbala battle in a certain place and 
it takes hours. 
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1. Passion Plays on the Tenth Day of ‘Ashurā  
In Sadr City Baghdad, tashabih were staged on Muharram 10
th
 and lasted 
almost three hours in a big public square. The audience formed a big circle. They 
are made up of different ages and gender; men, women and children who struggle 
to raise their heads to see the tashabih. The scenes were silent and body language 
and signs were used as an expression of the scene in tashabih. A reciter or radood 
related the story of the Karbala battle in a very emotional voice in the classic 
Arabic language. They usually use loudspeakers. The story telling coincided with 
the scenes staged and was accompanied by actors' moves. 
During some emotional scenes, the interaction of the audience would increase 
and one could hear them shouting, crying, and sobbing. Every time one of 
Hussein's companions is killed, the reciter shifts to dialectal Iraqi and reads some 
elegies. Sometimes, another reciter does that then the main reciter continues his 
storytelling. During fencing scenes, the radood recites a short latmiya in which 
the audience participates in. 
Colors are widely used in tashabih. Each signifies a meaning. Hussein’s camp 
could easily be recognized from his enemies’ by the colors of their clothes. Omer 
Bin Saad’s army wears red and yellow, while Al-Hussein’s companions wear full 
white clothes. Al-Hussein’s family wears white clothes with green turbans. Al-
Hussein is distinguished by his black clothes with green turban. 
Warm colors are widely used by Al-Hussein’s enemy. Red and yellow are the 
source for blood and fire, which were strongly present in Al-Hussein’s enemy 
army that shed his blood and his family’s and companions’ on Karbala ground. 
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Then they burned the women’s tents and those alive inside, too. Red and yellow, 
Al-Hussein’s enemy colors, signify blood, fire, savagery and the bloodthirstiness 
of the soldiers who committed the gory Karbala massacre. 
Cool colors are widely used in Al-Hussein’s camp. White and green are signs 
of purity and hope which are the traits of Al-Hussein and his companions. Al-
Hussein’s dress was white which signifies his lack of evilness and his purity from 
sins and readiness for martyrdom. Green is the color of hope and goodness in 
Islam. Tashabih is not merely scenes presented by amateur actors, but actually are 
the chains of scenes wrought by multiple symbols and used in tashabih to express 
many meanings inside this ritual. 
2. Short Tashabih and Symbols  
They are scenes performed in a very few minutes during the parade of a 
procession or sometime they could be presented separately. One could watch a lot 
of these short scenes during the ten days of ‘Ashurā. On the first days of ‘Ashurā, 
the scenes of the arrival of Omar bin Saad’s army to Karbala in their red and 
yellow clothes and armed with long spears. Close to them is Al-Hussein’s army 
headed by Al-Abbas carrying a green pennant and repeating the scene where he 
attacks on his horse Bin Saad’s army which flees in front of him. 
 These scenes attempt to present some active and influential symbols during 
‘Ashurā and emphasize them to help become clear and reach the audience’s mind. 
Amongst these various ymbols, each carrying unique meanings, is the bed of 
Alhussein’s thirsy child, Abdullah, who was died on ‘Ashurā day. His bed 
appears in many places covered with green and white cloth and in it there is a doll 
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representing the child Abdullah whose neck got pierced by an arrow, while 
his blood spreads on his bed and white clothes to bear witness to the savagery of 
his killers. 
 Another symbol displayed in Karbala is a frame of metal ship that ends with a 
dragon head and is ornamented with colorful lights. A person carries this huge 
frame and orbits the place with it many times. For Shi’a, this ship signifies Al-
Hussein as the light of guidance and survival ship (Safeenato Alnajat) that would 
take them to the coast of safety. Although Arabic and Iraqi Islamic culture does 
not refer to dragons, the ship ends with head of a dragon. Dragon imagery might 
have come from India Muslims who came to visit Karbala to practice mourning 
rituals. ‘Ashurā rituals reach their climax on the tenth day of Muharram. These 
rituals focus on the reoccurrence of the Karbala tragedy in the same place and at 
the same time.  
F. The Tenth Day (‘Ashurā Day)  
The tenth day of Muharram (Yawm‘Ashurā) is the saddest day for Shi’a all 
over the world. It is on this day the tenth of Muharram 61 A.H., October 10
th
 680 
C.E., that Al-Hussein was martyred in the Karbala battle. Also, Iraqis call this day 
as “Yawm Al-Tabog” which means the day of full collision of sky and earth 
because of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom. Shi’a literature refers to many strange stories 
that appended during ‘Ashurā like “sky and earth cry for Al-Hussein’s killing”, 252 
and other stories. On the ‘Ashurā day, the rituals reach the climax of the 
transitional phase. The rituals on this day are embedded with the battle of 
                                                 
252
 Jaafar bin Quluweh Al- Qomi, Kamil Alziyarat, (Beirut: Muassasat Al Fikr Al-  
Islami, 2012) 108. 
159 
 
 
Karbala. The actual time and place cease to continue, and instead are replaced by 
the time and place of the historical Karbala battle.  
Since 1921, ‘Ashurā has been a public holiday in Iraq and this tradition 
continues to the present day. Not government in Iraq’s history ever dared to 
cancel the holiday. During Saddam’s reign, Iraqi media broadcast related the story 
of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom by Abdilzahra Al-Kaaby (the most famous story teller 
of Al-Hussein’s tragedy) and changed its daily broadcast to add many religious 
items and chants. Shi’a prefer not to do any daily business on ‘Ashurā and reduce 
their activities to practicing mourning rituals only. 
On ‘Ashurā day Shi’a make sure to attend Majalis Al-‘Aza in which Maqtal 
Al-Hussein, the story of the battle, is recited beginning at 9:00 AM and continuing 
until midday. Signs of sadness are on every face. After that, latm poems are 
recited. Then all rituals are halted at the call for noon prayers. And that is when 
they perform noon prayers and have special meals for the day such as hareesa and 
qeema. Some like to attend the tashabih where Al-Hussein’s death is performed. 
Others visit Karbala to see Al-Hussein’s shrine and perform the rituals of ‘Ashurā 
visitation. Those who cannot go to Karbala could read a piece of writing called 
Ziyarat Al-Hussein on ‘Ashurā day to visit and greet Al-Hussein remotely in line 
with methods referred to in Shi’a books.253 
According to the ritual process of Turner, the participants will re-aggregate 
after the completion of the ritual and the passage. They will return with a shift in 
their status. The ritual of Maqtal Al-Hussein in ‘Ashurā appears as the end of the 
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rituals. Then the Shi’a participants reincorporate and acquire their change that 
occurred during the practicing of ‘Ashurā rituals. Like most rituals, at the end of 
its practicing there comes a feast. Even in some Islamic rituals, a celebration 
occurs at the end. In Ramadan, a feast follows the end of the fasting ritual (Eid Al-
Fitr), or for Hajj another feast follows the pilgrimage to Mecca ritual (Eid Al-
Adha). These celebrations show that the participants have completed the rites of 
passage. 
The feast during ‘Ashurā is not as clear as the other events, since it is is an 
emotional one. We can also see the festival when the participants stay up all night 
without sleeping and as the older and younger men and women celebrating during 
this night, by making sure to participate in the preparation of his feast as a social 
reality.  It is an ‘Aza (mourning) and yet a reality of survival. It is a way of 
sustaining the community. Imam Al-Hussein, in a way is the head of the 
community, and they are losing him, but yet are still surviving through it. They 
believed that Imam Al-Hussein sacrificed himself for him and for the community 
in order for them to receive social justice. Hence, Imam Al-Hussein became a 
heroic symbol that allowed the community to survive. 
1. Ashurā Visitation (Ziyarat ‘Ashurā)  
‘Ashurā visitation is one of the most important activities practiced on ‘Ashurā 
day. The Iraqi Shi’a, head to Karbala to visit Al-Hussein and his brother, Al-
Abbas. Shi’a references emphasize this visitation and elaborate on the way it 
should be done. 
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Al-Hussein’s visitors make sure to approach and seize the window that 
surrounds Al-Hussein’s grave. The inside green lights are lit. They usually cry 
and show submissiveness. They implore Al-Hussein by his status to ask Allah to 
forgive their sins and be merciful upon them. Then each visitor asks as they need 
and wish. A visitor would read the text of Al-Hussein’s special visit hung close to 
Al-Hussein’s shrine, in addition to those who were martyred with him in the 
Karbala battle and are buried next to him. Men do the visitation separately from 
women. There are barriers to prevent mixing at times of visitation and prayers 
inside the shrine. After this, they head to visit Abbas whose visitation is 
performed in way similar to that of Al-Hussein’s. 
 Al-Abbas’ shrine is crowded with visitors. Men and women throw green 
patches of clothes on his shrine as vows to meet their needs and wishes. Throwing 
a green patch on sacred shrines is a means of communicating with the Imams and 
engages high-profile figures as mediators between people and Allah. Some resort 
to writing on these green patches of cloths even if it is symbolic as in the passing 
of thumbs over it. Some wish silently. 
 Iraqis think Al-Abbas is not infallible like other Shi’a Imams. That makes him 
more capable of revenge, distraction and hurting others especially those who do 
not honor his oath. Swearing by Al-Abbas is the strongest oath especially for 
Shi’a in southern Iraq where Arabic Shi’a tribes are spread there and take Al-
Abbas as an example that reflects their social Arabic Bedouin nature. Ali Al- 
Wardi thinks that these people describe Al-Abbas as the one whose head is hot 
and mean by this that he is hot tempered, easily angered, and his power to inflict 
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harm is immediate. People might dare to commit perjury on the prophet’s or 
minor Imams’ oaths, but they would not dare do the same with Al-Abbas.254 Al-
Abbas’ name is still widely used by Arabic Shi’a tribes, even their members who 
live in big cities like Baghdad and Basra. They use “Al-Abbas’ pennant” as an 
expression of an agreement respected by the two tribes and cannot be breached 
under any circumstances. The stories of death and Shi’a literature focus on Al-
Abbas’ persona that reflects courage, strength, heroism, gallantry, loyalty, 
commitment to vows, altruism, protection of honor, knighthood, and nobility. 
These traits are highly appreciated by Arabic individuals in general and form a 
part of Arabic tribal persona of a large number of Iraqi Shi’a. 
2. Processions of Head Lacerating (Mawakib Al- Tatbir)  
Processions get prepared to perform tatbir rituals in Karbala in the early 
morning of Muharram 10
th
. But there is a stage of parading and preparation prior 
to knifing the head with qama which is called Al-Mashq, or the speed of stabbing 
and hitting in Arabic.
255
 The process of Al-Mashq starts on Muharram 9
th
 after 
midnight. A procession leaves with all its members wearing the white shroud 
(cafan)
256
 that are always put on a deceased before burial, carrying their qamas, 
daggers and swords, waving them in the air in a show of power similar to that 
before waging a battle to amuse the fighters and frighten the enemies’ hearts. All 
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members who lacerate their heads the next morning join the procession. The flags 
usually come in the fore of the procession. The participants are in two lines across 
the road accompanied by drums, trumpets, cymbals and a radood. All bend with 
their swords without lacerating their heads while chanting “Hayder…Hayder” 
who is Imam Ali, Al-Hussein’s father, with music and drumming and poems 
recited by the radood in loud speakers. This show starts from midnight till dawn. 
 In the dawn of Muharram 10
th
, processions of head lacerating participants 
begin performing this ritual. Hundreds of these processions pass through Karbala 
while participants knife their shaved heads. Their white shrouds become red. 
They parade on roads leading to Al-Hussein’s shrine on the sounds of trumpets 
and drums while chanting “Hayder…Hayder.” Crowds of men and women are 
lined up alongside the roads watching the head lacerators passing in front of them 
(see photograph 4). 
 Every procession stops at Bab Al-Qibleh which is one of the gates of Al-
Hussein’s shrine. A group of head lacerators wave their qamas and swords to a 
noise as if they are engaged in a real historical battle. Then they enter the shrine 
and lacerate their heads and keep waving their arms in the air inside Al-Hussein’s 
shrine as a sign of renewing their allegiance to Imam Al-Hussein and their sincere 
wish to be his advocates. Their blood, being shed from their heads, is the most 
tangible evidence of their love for Al-Hussein and their strong belief in his 
principles, and also reflects their sorrow and bitterness for losing him, and also 
their compensation for the betrayal which they seem to identify as their own. 
From the inside of the shrine, processions diverged right to exit from another gate 
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and continued parading to Al-Abbas’ shrine. There, they repeated the same 
rituals. When they left Al-Abbas’ shrine, the procession of head lacerating 
diminishes until it comes to an end. 
 
Photograph 4: Head lacerators near Imam Al-Hussein’s shrine on ‘Ashurā day.  
 Head laceration is a significant ritual in which appears the peak of the ‘Ashurā 
rituals. During this ritual, we can see the collapse of time and place, and the 
participants outside their reality, and imagining themselves in the battle with 
Imam Al-Hussein. In the marginal phase, that Victor Turner mentioned, through 
the ritual process the time and social status are ambiguous. It is the moment 
passing through history, between the past and the present. They use one of the 
rich symbols (blood) to be able to handle changes that do not belong in their 
normative reality. 
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 The process of head lacerating started after 5:00 AM and finished by the time 
of noon prayers at 12:00 PM. The number of parading processions reached 225. 
Most of these parades came from Karbala only. Head lacerating processions from 
outside Karbala were not allowed to enter the city. They performed their 
lacerating rituals in their individual cities. 
 Non-Iraqi processions are exempted from the ban. There were Iranian, Indian, 
and Pakistani parades of head lacerating that were performed in Karbala. The 
biggest one of them was the Iranian, because head lacerating was banned in Iran 
by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Also, the Iranian ministry 
of interior banned all forms of head lacerating in Iran since 1994.
257
 
Traffic, licensing and timing were tightly organized by the Department of 
Husseinite Rituals, Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and Islamic World, stationed 
in Abbas’ shrine. A day before tatbir, the committees in charge, the General Trust 
of Al-Hussein’s and Al-Abbas’ shrines, prepared an entry for the head lacerators 
into the shrines. They covered these entrances with nylon to protect them from 
blood, and spread sand on the grounds close to the gate to facilitate the entry of 
participants. 
3. Reciting Al-Hussein’s Death Story (Al- Maqtal)  
The rituals started at the shrine at 9:00 AM on ‘Ashurā day. The story of Al-
Hussein’s death was read by a reciter who excelled in this area. The position 
requires a recite who possesses special characteristics like a strong voice, impact, 
and the ability to read for hours. 
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Thousands of attendees sat, chin down, and listened to the events of the killing 
through loudspeakers only overpowered by sounds of trumpets, swords and 
chants of “Hayder…Hayder” that came from outside the shrine and from 
processions that paraded inside it, too. Hundreds of thousands of mourners stood 
outside the shrine watching qamas and swords covered with participants’ blood as 
if they were an endless army fighting Al-Hussein’s enemies. The chants of 
“Hayder…Hayder” frighten even the hearts of mourners who stand still because it 
is difficult to move because of fear of the scene and its impact on them. 
Attendees hold their breaths when the story reaches the death of Al-Hussein’s 
son and his family members. As the end of the story nears, the noise level drops, 
and the reciter becomes increasingly worried and nervous. Before this, the reciter 
would be reciting with ease. Then the story comes to the point where Shimr bin 
Thil-Jawshan stabs Al-Hussein many times and cuts his head. All sounds and 
voices stop. For a few moments, one could only hear “Ahhh...Ahhh...” the 
expression of people’s emotional pain, then they started to cry and wail, as if 
riding in a time machine, going back to the moment of painful tragedy of fourteen 
centuries ago and mourning the event in the Karbala battle (680 C.E.) as if it had 
just happened. 
The end of Al-Maqtal does not mark the end of ‘Ashurā rituals in Karbala. 
Soon after that, a big number of organizers from the shrine’s management 
committee come with ropes to prepare a path for crowds of runners to Al-
Hussein’s shrine participating in a ritual called Tweareej Run. 
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4. Tweareej Run (Rakdhat Tweareej)  
It is a ritual performed by groups of mourners on ‘Ashurā day. It involves 
running a distance of five km from Qantarat Al- Salam to Bab Al Qibleh of Al-
Hussein’s shrine. It was given this name because the first person who did the run 
was from the town of Tweareej, Karbala city, away from Al-Hussein’s shrine by 
nearly 25 km. 
 Tweareej Run is (Rakdhat Tweareej) a Shi’a ritual that dates back to 1878 and 
is established by Mirza Saleh Al-Qizwiny (died 1882). Tweareej, annexed to 
Karbala city, has special mourning processions. They usually leave the town 
walking on Muharram 9
th
 heading to Al-Husseins shrine for visitation and 
mourning rituals. These processions walk for 25 km, then stop at Qantarat Al-
Salam (5 km away from Al-Hussein’s shrine) to pray and reorganize under the 
leadership of a Sayid member of the Al-Qizwiny family.
258
 The Sayid rides his 
horse and gives the signal to run towards Al-Hussein’s shrine. The participants 
start running or trotting while hitting their heads and chanting “Ya Hussein… Ya 
Hussein” (Oh Hussein… Oh Hussein). The member of Al-Qizwiny family leads 
this procession each year. No one else is allowed to do so. 
 On Muharram 10th 1433 (January 12, 2011), Sayid Thamir Al-Qizwiny led 
the Tweareej Run and gave the start signal. He was riding a white horse and black 
turban inherited from his forefathers, who had been leaders for more than 100 
years. Huge torrents of people rushed after the noon call for prayers heading to 
Al-Hussein’s shrine and hitting their heads and chanting “Ya Hussein… Ya 
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Hussein” (Oh Hussein… Oh Hussein). After they entered the shrine from Bab Al 
Qibleh, they left to Al-Abbas’ shrine then to a square near the Husseinite camp to 
participate in the tent burning ritual. 
 This ritual is an attempt to reflect on the participants’ desire to take leave of 
their actual time and to return to the past to reach Karbala to prevent of Shimr bin 
Thil-Jawshan from beheading Al-Hussein. Participants start running midday to 
coincide with the time of Al-Hussein’s slaughter on ‘Ashurā day, as if they are 
expecting to overcome the distance of their time and place to reach and help 
Imam Al-Hussein at a suitable moment. The Tweareej Run ritual contributes in 
consolidating mourning rituals and sadness by reenacting the liminal moment and 
the attempt to enter into it and participate in its making. The symbolic call for the 
rush for help is an ever failing reality. The reputation of this mourning may also 
be seen as the fact that each time they cannot actually reach it, that it always 
happens, and they always have to come and continue to try and reach it.  In 
fighting the injustice of that time, they are also trying to remember to fight the 
injustice of their time, as is seen with the injustice of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
Which resulted in the execution of those fighting for their justice, but even then, 
the civilians continued to fight for their justice. One of the main aspects of 
repetition here is to confirm their desire to make the changes they wish to seek. 
 One prominent aspect of Tweareej Run is that it expresses the tribal 
background of the participants and reproduces their societal values by practicing 
this ritual which resembles a tribal one called fazaah, which is rushing without 
delay to a relative or a friend for help and support in emergencies. This could 
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include help in a battle and participating in it or offer assistance in pressing 
circumstances. People often go out supporting someone as soon as they hear news 
without taking time to know the details or extra information as to what is 
happening, because they want to just be there at the site of the event before it is 
too late. And running is the easiest and handiest way. Tweareej Run seems as a 
Shi’a fazaah to support their Imam and offering the right help even if it is 
symbolic to deepen their feeling of participation in defending Al-Hussein and be 
on his side as much as they can. 
5. Tent Burning  
Participants in ‘Ashurā rituals headed to the site of Husseinite camp, 200 m 
away from Al-Hussein’s shrine. It is also called Khiyemgah which is Persian for 
camp. Most of the people believe it is the same camp Al-Hussein started in the 
historic Karbala battle. Other historians think the current site is nothing but a 
building erected by the alderman Ottoman governor (Wali) Midhat Basha to host 
Sultan Nasser Addeen Shah and his army and entourage when he visited Karbala 
in 1868 C.E.
259
 
Amid the square of celebration, there stands a big white tent sprayed with 
flammable materials and words on one of its poles read Assalaam alaika ya 
ghareeb Karbala (Peace be upon you…You stranger in Karbala) to indicate that it 
is Al-Hussein’s tent. Al-Hussein is referred to as stranger or the stranger of 
Karbala because he was killed far away from his homeland. Some participants 
tied pieces of cloth to the tent as messages to Imam Al-Hussein, messages that 
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contain their spiritual and material demands, hopes, and the desire that he helps 
them have what they want. 
In another side of the square, not far away from Al-Hussein’s tent, there were 
small green, blue, pink, purple, and red tents symbolizing Al-Hussein’s family 
tents. One pole of a green tent read Assalaam alaika ya hamee alkhyam (Peace be 
upon you... You tent protector), referring to Al-Abbas. People usually describe 
Al-Abbas as the protector of tents and of the family of Al-Hussein on ‘Ashurā 
day. 
Prisoners of war from Al-Hussein’s family moved around the tents. They were 
wearing green clothes and guarded by soldiers in yellow, red and purple clothes 
and carried sword and spears. This meant Al-Hussein’s family was taken as 
prisoners of war after the battle. When children pass through the crowd, people 
try to caress their heads for blessings. When more people rush toward the 
children, the soldiers intervene to protect them and keep the crowd at a distance. 
From a high place outside the square, a person stood and recited some Husseinite 
poems and gave comments on what was happening in the square. Then he gave a 
detailed account of what would happening later and stressed safety measures 
when the tent burning would start. 
In a surprising moment, a horse entered the square. It had red spots, signifying 
Al-Hussein’s martyrdom and the fall from his horse. Huge turbulence occurred 
when the horse came into the square. Many people tried to wipe the horse's back 
and then their faces for blessings. Then more turbulence occurred at the tents, and 
in a few seconds, the tents were plundered by those standing by them. Many 
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people competed to have a small piece from the tents which were torn into small 
pieces. 
After a few seconds, knights in red clothes appeared carrying torches and 
headed toward Al-Hussein’s tent. They walked around it a few times and tried to 
remove the crowds from the tent. The crowd tried to fight them. Then the knights 
burned Al-Hussein’s tent, and people responded by chanting “Ya Hussein… Ya 
Hussein” (Oh Hussein… Oh Hussein). Fire devoured the tent in a few seconds. 
Few people tried to save it but in vain. The tent disappeared as well as the knights 
in red clothes. In emotional moments like these, they could become a target for 
the crowd that could hurt them. 
The audience plays the role of the enemies and of mourning Imam Al-
Hussein. The response of the audience bears double roles; first, their participation 
as actual actors by plundering Al-Hussein’s camp comes to confirm what really 
happened in Karbala battle. The audience in the passion play seems to have 
broken the imaginary “fourth wall” in theater. It seems to have an actor who is an 
audience simultaneously and that becomes an essential component in the staging. 
Second, the participants made sure they would have remains from the tents to 
keep, because they believe these pieces have some distinguished sacred power 
and are able to assist them in achieving some of their long waited wishes. 
Tent burning rebuilds and strengthens the main concepts of the Karbala battle. 
It is the conflict between the good camp represented by Al-Hussein who died 
defending his values, and the evil camp lead by the Umayyad leader, Omar bin 
Saad. This ritual relates the historic events in a live visual way which makes the 
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Karbala battle deep- rooted in the participants’ memory and passion. Additionally, 
this ritual provides participants with a chance to return to the original time of the 
Karbala battle events and be part of them, especially for women who find it an 
opportunity to participate and they come early to book a suitable place. 
After burning the tents, visitors start returning to their homes. Karbala 
residents continue with some other celebrations like candle procession in the night 
of estrangement, which is held on Muharram 10
th
 to commemorate Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom and his family’s captivity. Men, women and children participate in 
this procession carrying candles and repeating chants of passionate elegies. The 
procession starts from the Husseinite camp and passes through the Karbala roads 
and some historic site of the battle like Altil Al Zainabi (Zainabite Hill) which is 
the place where Zainab, Al-Husssein’s sister, stood during the Karbala battle, the 
sacred place of the (two cut hands) where Al-Abbas’ hands were cut in the battle, 
Al-Hussein’s Shrine, and Abbas’ shrine. 
G. Burial Day (Yawm Al-Dafn) 
On Muharram 13th, some Iraqi tribes organized a procession for the occasion 
of the third day since Al-Hussein’s death or what is locally called Yawm Al-Dafn. 
It refers to the day Al-Hussein’s body was buried after three days from his 
death.
260
 According to a few historic references, women from Karbala’s tribe of 
Beni Asad found the bodies of Al-Hussein and his family members in the battle 
field and returned to their tribe and insisted that their tribe bury the bodies. Their 
tribe was reluctant to do the burial for fear of the Umayyad punishment. The 
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women in this ritual represent their role that they play in the burial. It is a way for 
women to really claim the reality of humanity. The women did not think about the 
dangers that they faced from the enemy, as much as focusing on the burial that 
reflects compassion towards other human beings. 
Thousands of the Beni Asad women along with other women from Karbala 
participated in the procession to commemorate the burial of Karbala martyrs. 
Other processions joined Beni Asaad women like Beni Asaad men and other 
tribes to practice mourning rituals and latm in city streets. Passing through the 
Qibleh Street, which leads them to Al-Hussein’s shrine, and then follow to Al-
Abbas’ shrine. The rituals of burial mark the end of ‘Ashurā rituals in Muharram. 
On Safar 20th, Al-Arb‘ain visitation is scheduled to take place 40 days after Al-
Hussein and his family’s death in the Karbala battle. 
H. Conclusion  
‘Ashurā rituals are practiced by Iraq Shi’a every year. They are a distinctive 
feature of the Shi’a Iraqi community. They help mourners to bring change to their 
social status. After the rituals, each individual would enjoy a distinctive social 
status. These changes in the status, as I mentioned before, vary from spiritual, 
economic, and social. These rituals contribute to reinvigorate the main sacred 
symbols of the Shi’a Islam represented by the prophet and his family, strengthens 
the relationship between the participants of the rituals and these symbols, and 
renews pledge and loyalty. By practicing these rituals, the religious experience is 
reproduced and rendered into a socio-cultural framework that contributes to 
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establishing social identity within the general and broader context of the Iraqi 
identity. 
 The Shi’a sacred shrines, especially in Karbala, play a significant role in 
producing and supporting the social identity in addition to granting the religious 
authorities the capacity to have an impact on social, political, and economic 
aspects of the society. ‘Ashurā rituals are general for most Iraqi Shi’a. They 
provide an opportunity to study the community through analyzing various 
spiritual or material symbols abundant in these rituals. Some of these rituals 
function as a link between participants and the hypothetical time in which they 
participate to symbolically reformulate an alternative history. This creates a 
feeling of satisfaction, psychological relief, serenity and strength due to being 
close to their main sacred religious symbols that, they believe, have the power to 
protect them and help them to realize their desires. 
 The symbols used in ‘Ashurā are the most important medium through which 
one could comprehend the different messages these rituals try to pass on to others. 
The mourning rituals in ‘Ashurā  like lamenting, latm, zangeel, lacerating, passion 
play, and Tweareej Run are not daily activities for the participants and 
consequently cannot be understood without knowing the symbols used in them 
and out of their broader context. Rituals in general, and especially in ‘Ashurā, use 
the language of symbols outside the usual linguistic contexts to express the 
essence of the ritual, which is usually another event outside the familiar reality of 
Iraqi Shi’a. 
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Chapter 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF VISITATION OF AL-ARB‘AIN 
(ZIYRAT AL-ARB‘AIN) 
A. Introduction  
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain indicates the visit to Al-Hussein’s shrine on Safar 20 
A.H. every Islamic year, 40 days after the anniversary of Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom. Iraqi Shi’a also call Al-Arb‘ain “the Return of the Head” (Maradd Al-
Ras), because they believe Al-Hussein’s head was returned to Karbala on this day 
and buried with the body 40 days after his martyrdom. This visitation is second 
only to ‘Ashurā rituals, but attracts more participants. A large number of Iraqi 
Shi’a walk to Al-Hussein’s shrine for visiting and blessing on the occasion in a 
journey that lasts days or weeks and includes some special rituals. In addition to 
that, during visitation rituals, Al-Hussein’s shrine becomes a center that attracts 
visitors from all over Iraq and other countries. 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain is a kind of pilgrimage to a sacred place (Karbala) to 
express piety and loyalty to one of their main religious symbols (Al-Hussein). Al-
Arb‘ain is not considered Hajj because Hajj refers to a pilgrimage performed by 
Muslims to Mecca only during Thu Al-Hujja, the twelfth month in the Islamic 
calendar. Hajj is the fifth pillar of Sunni Islam, and the fifth branch (Furuaa Al-
Deen) of ritual practice (Ibadat) of Shi’a Islam.261 Hajj should be performed by 
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Muslims at least once in their life time, if they can physically and financially 
afford it. As for ziyara for Shi’a, it means a journey to a sacred or important 
shrine like the graves of prophets, imams and companions. There is a clear 
distinction that draws the Shi’a when deciding between performing Hajj or 
ziyara. An individual who visits Mecca and performs Hajj rituals is called Hajje 
for a male and Hajjeyah for a female, while the one who visits the Prophet’s and 
Imams’ shrine is Zayer for a male and Zayerah for a female.262 Each enjoys 
relevant social status in his social surroundings. 
The significant relation between structuralism and communitas could provide 
us with an important and useful approach to study the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. 
Social relations and links play an important role for Shi’a in the Visitation of Al-
Arb‘ain as a reflection between their social status as an undefined communitas 
and the general structure of Iraqi society. During Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain, as is 
the case with any pilgrimage, the style of collective expression practiced by 
participants surfaces as the most important factor that this ritual manifests 
through. Externally, ziyara reflects the unity of individuals and cohesion within 
the Shi’a community, while internally it focuses on the formation of Shi’a groups 
and their ability to be different and capable of practicing authority and control. 
Nonetheless, Victor Turner distinguishes three levels of communitas so 
decisive in creating social links in pilgrimage. These levels can be seen in the 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain and form an important feature in these rituals. These 
suggested levels of communitas are appropriate to study the Visitation of Al-
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Arb‘ain because the three levels that Turner studied can also be seen through Al- 
Arb‘ain. The three levels of communitas are: 
First, the existential or spontaneous communitas: In this level, total direct 
confrontation of human identities occurs. This generates in its subject an 
inclination that humanity is homogenous, unorganized (unstructured) and make 
up of free groups that express themselves in a social style which manifests their 
solidarity through feelings of unity and harmony within them.
263
 In the Visitation 
of Al-Arb‘ain, solidarity and joint feelings of belonging are some of the most 
important characteristics reflected by the crowds of participants in rituals of 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. The participants, being from all over Iraq, assist in 
producing and supporting Shi’a existence. Additionally, local and geographic 
boundaries disappear amongst various Shi’a groups especially those performing 
walking the long journey together and facing the same difficulties. They 
rediscover their space jointly, as well. 
Second, the normative communitas: They are the ones that need mobilization 
and organization of resources to keep their participants alive and flourishing. 
They seek social dominance amongst members to succeed in their collective 
goals.
264
 These social groups express their existence by founding a kind of social 
link amongst them during the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain to crystallize their power 
of social presence to activate their social dominance and members' status. During 
the processions of Al-Hussein (Al-Mawakib Al-Husseiniyya), many of these 
groups seek to establish their relationship with the visitors and to maintain the 
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relationship by periodically offering assistance and services to them, like food, 
drink, bedding, and health care. 
Third, the ideological communitas: It could apply to various utopian groups of 
those faithful who in their authors to find the best circumstances for the 
communitas.
265
 The most important individuals in this group are the religious 
leaders whose teachings and recommendations are binding and inevitable for 
group members. This group becomes noticeable during Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain 
through the teachings and constructions that spread along roads and are printed in 
the form of small booklets distributed by their agents and followers to participants 
in the journey of the visitation. Some of these groups seek to spread their 
thoughts and ideological concepts as the most capable of achieving the successful 
solutions for Shi’a and that their religious leaders’ thoughts should reach the 
largest number of participants possible to make wide use of them. 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain reflects many important aspects of Iraqi Shi’a. It 
reveals the system of social unity amongst the many Shi’a and consequently helps 
show this group’s strength and helps the group to maintain its own identity 
amongst others. Collective spirit, prevalent during rituals, plays a decisive role in 
consolidating participants’ social organization and crystallizing their social 
values. Additionally, individual participants hope to make important changes to 
their status by participating in the pilgrimage especially the through the esteemed 
spiritual and materialistic purification believed to take place in the process. 
Walking to Karbala is considered in the Al-Arb‘ain visitation as a journey of 
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exploring the self and others, and an attempt to know the place and the 
individuals outside the participants’ local environment. The visit also reflects the 
spiritual importance of Karbala for participants and also the role played by the 
religious institution when directing and controlling the events, being considered 
as a center for all ritual activities and Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. 
B. Walking to Karbala  
Walking is what distinguishes the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain from other Shi’a 
visits in Iraq. Although the visitation date is Safar 20
th
 (the second month in the 
Islamic calendar), groups of walkers (Mashaya) to Karbala set off weeks ahead of 
time. They take into consideration any possible delays like tense traffic jam or 
stampeding, that could prevent them from reaching their common goal; Karbala. 
Because of the small size of Karbala, a city which could not host the millions of 
visitors at once, those who arrive before the 40
th
 day perform the rituals of the 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain early and return back to their home city to make room for 
others. The city receives millions of visitors, arriving and leaving, within two 
weeks before the 40
th
 day. Thus, the number of pilgrims attending the Visitation 
of Al-Arb‘ain in 1433 A.H.-2012 C.E. reached more than 17.5 million Iraqis 
(about 56% out of the current population of 31 million in Iraq), and 300,000 
visitors from other countries; which is the number of participants in the Visitation 
of Al-Arb‘ain for two weeks until the 40th day.266 As for the numbers that actually 
participate on the 40
th
 day in Karbala, it is less than that because the city could not 
accommodate more than two million visitors at a given time. 
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1. The First Day: Safar 15, 1433 A.H (January 9, 2012 C.E.)  
We set out from Al- Baladiyat quarter Baghdad. I, with my two assistants, 
took the bus to join the walking visitors from Imam Ali’s Shrine in Najaf. The 
reason I chose Najaf is the diverse backgrounds of walkers who usually take this 
route to Karbala. Visitors who use this route are from Najaf, Samawa, Basra, 
Nasiriya, and Umara (all in southern Iraq), North Iraqi cities, and foreign visitors. 
They all use the Najaf-Karbala road which makes it very crowded during the 
Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. In spite of the fact that there are three main roads visitors 
take to walk; Najaf -Karbala, Hilla-Karbala, and Baghdad-Karbala (see table 1). 
The Najaf-Karbala road is especially meaningful because of the historic depth it 
offers for walkers- I will mention more about this later on in this chapter- in 
addition to the symbolic dimension achieved by visiting the first Imam of the 
Shi’a and Al-Hussein’s father, Ali bin Abi Talib and making it a point of 
departure to Karbala. 
The passengers on our bus were all Shi’a going to visit Imam Ali’s shrine 
traveling from Baghdad to Najaf (160 km south of Baghdad). It is the same road 
leading to Karbala but they diverge midway. On both sides of the road, there were 
huge numbers of walkers heading to Karbala on the Baghdad-Karbala route. 
Some carried Husseinite flags; other wore white shrouds as a sign indicating their 
readiness to die on such a journey. Women wore traditional black cloaks and put 
green bands on their heads and some of them carried green flags as well. At a 
military check- point with many vehicles and a few soldiers, the raid was blocked 
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to give space for walkers. Our bus took a side road in Dawra City (south west of 
Baghdad), which suffered from security problems. 
Table 1: The Distance between Karbala (in km) and Other Cities that Visitors 
Walk From. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: This table was made by the author.  
The bus took a route through an agricultural area in Howr Rijeb, inhabited by 
a Sunni majority and witnessed violence in the last few years as my assistants 
mentioned. A great number of soldiers and policemen were spread on both sides 
of the road accompanied by armed local civilians called Abna Al- Sahawat 
(revival people). The city seemed different from other areas in Baghdad; no 
Husseinite flags or posters, no processions, no loudspeakers. There were no tents 
or processions of Al-Hussein. It was a city with no signs of Shi’a mourning 
rituals. Sunnis do not celebrate ‘Ashurā nor the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain and if it 
happens, it is a matter of courtesy and expression of political mobilization. For 
City  Distance to Karbala (km) 
Hilla  11 
Najaf  23 
Baghdad  503 
Diwaniyah  521 
Wasit  533 
Al Anbar  511 
Diyala  510 
Samawa  251 
Samarra  235 
Nasiriya  351 
Umara  311 
Kirkuk  311 
Sulaymaniyah  105 
Irbil  111 
Mosul  125 
Basra  110 
Dahuk  111 
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example, during the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920 (Thorat Al- Ashreen) against 
the occupation of Great Britain to the country, the Shi’a alongside with the Sunni, 
wanted to express their unity, as a response to their nationality challenges. So for 
that reason, the Sunni participated in the same rituals as the Shi’a in their 
mosques. At the same time, Shi’a participated in the Sunni rituals in their 
mosques as well.
267
 Actually, there was one of these mawakib at the road at Howr 
Rijeb. The mawkib was on the side of the road close to a military check point. It 
was a big tent with flags on its top and loudspeakers for latmiya. Nearby, many 
men gathered drinking tea close to a signboard that read “Tribes of Al-Dulaim’s 
Mawakib,” which is one of the big Sunni tribes in Iraq. 
Because of the road closure, the best way to drive is through Sunni areas 
because they are not used by walkers. Though, they are open for vehicles carrying 
Shi’a visitors. Roads used by walkers are usually closed. Along highways, armed 
military vehicles were spread. Service mawakib put tents on both sides of the road 
to offer food and drinks to visitors. Our bus, playing Husseinite elegies since we 
set out, turned to a narrow road crossing Al-Neel town Babylon governorate, then 
to a one sided unpaved village road because of the previous collision of two oil 
tankers. The road which was on a bank of a little river could fit only one car. It 
seemed to be used by the villagers only. Suddenly, a group of young boys 
appeared from the trees carrying loaves of bread and palm dates, and asked 
drivers to stop to eat. Then our bus reached Al-Kifil, 30 km away from Najaf. 
That was when the bus stopped and the passengers were asked to stop at a service 
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mawkib to have lunch. They made the driver take an oath by Al-Hussein’s love to 
do so. After a short stop for free food and tea, we continued our journey until 
Najaf where Ali’s shrine is. We arrived there by midday. The journey took four 
hours for 160 km because of traffic jams and security-related road closures. 
We started walking with others from Imam Ali’s shrine on a road that cut 
through the biggest Shi’a cemetery (Wadi Al-Salam) to reach the road that leads 
to Karbala (see photograph 5).  
 
Photograph 5: Visitors (Mashaya) walking on the Najaf-Karbala road.    
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Thousands of walkers moved rapidly carrying Husseinite flags whose bearers 
made sure to wipe them by Ali’s shrine to gain symbolic sacredness for their 
upcoming journey. On both sides of the road stood sellers of Husseinite flags and 
sandals which were designed for walking long distances because of their light 
weight and quality of material. Walkers preferred using these sandals, instead of 
many other brands. 
We walked on an unpaved side road before reaching the main road which was 
getting more crowded because other walkers joined in from other side roads. The 
Karbala bound side of the road was closed for walkers’ use only, while the other 
side of the road was used for cars leaving Karbala. 
From the start of the road, electricity posts were numbered; number one was 
in Najaf and number 1457 was at Al-Hussein’s shrine representing a total distance 
of 83 km. This method of numbering was used to guide walkers and to inform 
them of what remains of the road to Karbala. 
Walkers (mashaya) walked with quick steps through service mawakib spread 
on both sides of the road. After a few kilometers, we saw passion play tashabih 
walking amongst crowds. It was composed of children carrying long spears ended 
with plastic slaughtered heads banded in green stripes, followed by a group of 
children in green clothes. Their hands were tied with a rope held by a man in red 
and yellow clothes. Close to them, a group of men were waving their swords in 
the air. One man with long blond hair was acting like he was flogging the 
children, to show how the kids were treated in the actual event. This passion play 
procession walks with other groups of walkers without stopping. This is to reenact 
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a scene of Al-Hussein’s family in captivity by the Umayyad army after Al-
Hussein’s martyrdom and the hanging his and his companions’ heads on spears 
for revenge and as a way of frightening others. One could recognize Al-Hussein’s 
family from their green clothes, while Umayyad soldiers were in red clothes. The 
man with long blond hair was Shimr bin Thil-Jawshan, Al-Hussein’s killer. The 
long and blond hair of Shimr bin Thil-Jawshan, signifies an important meaning in 
this play.  Historically, there is no source to indicate that Shimr bin Thil-Jawshan 
had this kind of hair. In addition, the region of Iraq is not familiar with long blond 
hair, since most people have dark hair. It may be used to represent the 
significance of that Shimr bin Thil-Jawshan as a negative character who is 
symbolically foreign to this particular region. First, he rebelled against the Arab 
Islamic traditions, since he killed the grandson of the prophet. Second, he 
offended the Arabic rules. He did not value the rule of respecting the women and 
children of Imam Al-Hussein’s family, and instead he mistreated them by burning 
their tents and abusing the family. For these reasons, it is probably an attempt on 
the part of the actors to show that someone this negative would not be from this 
region, and thus give him characteristics that are foreign to it. 
In another place, another procession was displaying mannequins of cloth and 
leather stuffed with other materials, which depicted another side of the Karbala 
battle. Al-Hussein appeared dying on the ground, while hugging his child as blood 
covered the white and green clothes. Meanwhile, there was a woman who was 
wrapped in black, with her hands on her head; Zainab, Al-Hussein’s sister, was 
reciting elegies for her killed brother. Others appeared killed to represent some of 
186 
 
 
the murdered family members of Al-Hussein. All mannequins were in glass 
displays on the side of the road. Women stopped and put money in the glass 
displays, while tying green strips close to the mannequins as symbols of their 
pledges to achieve their wishes and hopes (see photograph 6). 
 
Photograph 6: Women mourning and placing money in displays. 
When the sun was about to set, a few people stood amid the road and asked 
walkers to spend the night in their mawakib. Others asked walkers to join them in 
their homes to host them in the most proper way. The number of walkers 
decreased gradually because they started to stop for the night in a mawkib or a 
close by house before it was too cold and dark. When we reached Al-Karama 
quarter, a young man seized my arm and said, “You and your friends are my 
guests, allow me to serve you for the night.” My assistants signaled to accept the 
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offer, which I did. We left the main road and turned onto a side one where we and 
other walkers were given a lift to his house, 3 km away from the main road, by 
the young man whose name was Sayid Basim with other walkers to his home. 
We arrived at the young man’s home. His father (Sayid Jasim Al- Musawy) 
received us and said, “Welcome, visitor of Sajjad’s father (Imam Al-
Hussein)...Welcome visitors of Al-Hussein.” We were taken to the guest room 
and Sayid Basim excused himself to bring more visitors, and in a few minutes, we 
were ten people. Our host, Sayid Jasim, was a kind man in his 60s, and his 
family’s line traces back to the Prophet Mohammed. Saddah268 are usually treated 
with massive respect in Shi’a society and they are titled with Sayid before their 
names. Sayid Jasim said, “Forgive us for our boiler is not working because there 
is no power, we will warm some water up on gas for you to wash up.” Then he 
commanded us, “Take off your socks, I will wash them myself.” By washing Al-
Hussein’s visitors’ socks he would acquire more honor.  Although he explained 
that his deed would be nothing compared to the honor acquired by those who 
would continue walking to Al-Hussein’s shrine. After serving us dinner, tea, and 
cigarettes, Sayid Jasim started telling us stories as an attempt to entertain us to 
fulfill his duty as our host. That is what he did with two groups of visitors he had 
hosted before us. 
Exhaustion was clearly visible on some walkers’ faces. They asked for 
medical sterilizers and cotton to treat their injured feet. There were three young 
men who had walked twelve days from Basra to perform the Visitation of Al-
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Arb‘ain for the fifth time. The other four, who were from Samawa, had walked 
for four days. Another one was from Kufa, and had started walking the same day. 
Before sleeping, I asked some of them about their reasons for walking. A young 
man from Basra said, “Someone is looking for me to blow me up because I love 
Al-Hussein. I am not afraid of anyone. I walk in defiance of this terrorist and 
others to blow me up for Al-Hussein’s love. I am not afraid of terrorism.” He was 
referring to a gory explosion from terrorists that had occurred when he and his 
friends were passing Al Batt-ha in Nasiriya a few days earlier. 
The government’s role during the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain is restricted to 
providing safety to visitors which is not an easy job because of recurrent terrorist 
attacks against Iraqi civilians since 2003. Army and local police troops protect 
visitors of Karbala while federal troops provide safety to cities nearby. A few 
days before the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain, roads leading to Al-Hussein’s shrine are 
closed, then later on, all roads are closed due to the increasing numbers of visitors 
who arrive to Karbala. During my stay in Iraq, these security measures did not 
prevent explosions against mawakib or participants in walking rituals. A suicide 
bomber blew himself up amongst crowds of walkers in Al Batt-ha in Nasiriya 
killing 44 and injuring 81.
269
 In addition, Baghdad and Hilla and other cities are 
facing many explosions targeting crowds of visitors walking to Karbala. 
The first day was eventful, some of the details of which would be repeated in 
the upcoming days, while others would disappear. Tashabih and statues along the 
walking route are attempts for the organizers to crystallize the Karbala battle 
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around the sentiments of the visitors of Al-Hussein. These tashabih, same as the 
one we saw in ‘Ashurā, seek to accompany the walkers in order to keep the tragic 
scene alive and present, and to let participants take part in it, even if symbolically. 
This would have massive impact on the participants and preserve an effective 
relationship between the participants and the rituals. This could be noticed with 
women who deal with tashabih as essential symbols that are capable of 
interacting with their emotions and responding to their various wishes and hopes. 
Anything, big or small could be of high importance in these rituals. That is why 
walkers understand the signs and symbols from their main symbols Ahlul bayt 
(the Prophet and his family) coming to them directly or indirectly from the 
Prophet, which makes them alert to dealing with these symbols suitably. This 
gives them a sacred reality and hence requires a Prophet’s handling. 
Many visitors would reflect some of their values and social background 
during the rituals. Generosity toward guests, feeding them and making sure they 
are well rested are some of the most important social values for most of the Iraqi 
tribes. It is by these and other values that Iraqi tribes and their members acquire 
their status and social importance amongst other tribes through performing these 
values according to the tribe. An individual’s fame as a generous person signifies 
his high social prestige to other people and contrary to that an ungenerous person 
would bring shame to himself and his tribe. The case becomes more important 
when it is about being generous to Al-Hussein’s visitors where it is not only a 
social value but also a religious one at the same time. 
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Under the roof of our generous host, we went to sleep early about 9:00 PM 
and woke up to the sound of Sayid Jasim’s Athan (call to prayer) for morning 
prayers at 5:30 AM. We were served our breakfast and tea, and then said farewell 
to Sayid Jasim and thanked him. Sayid Basim drove us to the exact place where 
he had picked us up from the road to Karbala. 
2. The Second Day: Safar 16, 1433 A.H. (January 10, 2012 C.E.) 
All men and women were walking vigorously. It was 6:00 AM and everyone 
could still easily walk on the Karbala road. But in two hours, it would be difficult 
to walk due to the heavy jam, especially for women who were pushing prams and 
people with disabilities who were accompanied by their family members to assist. 
Mawakib and tents were lined up one next to the other. A big number of them 
carried tribes' names, which sponsored these mawakib. Others carried different 
names like mawkib of students, or Husseiniyat under various names of famous 
people of Iraqi Shi’a, like Sheikh Ahmed Al-Waely (died 2003), one of the most 
famous reciters in Husseinite majalis. 
Husseinite flags of red, black, yellow, and green colors were spread along 
both sides of the road. All kinds of banners and posters were hung in tents and 
power posts. Some of these signify Al-Hussein’s role in the Karbala battle and 
others are just slogans, commandments, or stands whose sponsors' names were 
written underneath them. Some banners were not attributed to anyone. For 
example one read: We, Husseinite, our women are Zainabite, do not wear makeup 
before foreigners (Nahnoo Al-Husseiniyoon, nisaona Zainabiyat, la yatebarajen 
amam alajnby). Some banners expose contradiction between their sponsors and 
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what is written on them. One banner read, “Dear sister visitor, be a Zainabite in 
your hijab during visitation,” sponsored by the Najaf pharmacist trade union, 
though the sponsoring party does not have anything to do with religious or ethical 
aspects since its job is to provide medical care only. Apart from that there were 
many slogans on both sides of the road that intermingle religion with political or 
ethical affairs. This event shows how religion along with culture, politics, and 
ethics combine together. It is very difficult to differentiate between them. This 
occurs because what Turner mentioned, existential communitas. It is the 
confrontation of Shi’a groups, where they feel homogenous and try to represent 
themselves as one unit, with one social style and same cultural and political 
thoughts. These feelings of solidarity are always seen in these huge events. 
Walkers follow this pattern as well. They raise slogans; printed on their bags or 
clothes that express their Shi’a background and their destination. Some walkers 
carried Iraqi flags, and Bahrain’s too, in solidarity with the Shi’a there in their 
recent upheaval. The route looked like a carnival of signs and symbols that offer 
many meanings of participants' thoughts and wishes. In this event, some Shi’a of 
Bahrain who are participating in this event feel that they are part of the Shi’a 
community in general. At the same time, they are trying to receive support from 
all the Shi’a who are also participating in this event. Most of the Shi’a in Al-
Arb‘ain believe they are Shi’a before their nationality.270 
The road might seem as a huge exhibition for various slogans, and a site of 
concurrence of the political, religious, economic, and social issues. In one 
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moment, one might find next to them an outdoor exhibition of old pictures of 
sacred shrines, and the next by known religious leader walking to visit Al-
Hussein. One would, for a while, see a huge banner that read “Sign to help Imam 
Al-Hussein enter into the Guinness Book,” then you would see tens of walkers in 
front of a hundred meter long paper to write their names, wishes, and signatures. 
This paper would be hung by its sponsors at the area amid the two shrines, and 
then sent to London to register it as the longest petition. Not too far away, a 
mobile company offered free calls and had a banner that read “We welcome Al-
Hussein’s visitors.” Then appeared a person who distributed booklets and 
newsletters on religious teachings and fatwas about relevant issues to visitation, 
how to deal with various things on the way of walking, and what visitors should 
read in the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. There are organizations or religious 
institutions that publish these booklets with pictures of the religious leaders or 
Ulama on them, or the authorized publisher, and distribute them to the walkers. 
These groups are considered as “ideological communitas” that perform 
intensive activity during the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. Religious leaders’ followers 
seek to crystallize their religious leader’s thoughts and widely spread them, and to 
stress the role of a leader and his ability to tackle various realistic and religious 
perils individuals might face. These followers also seek to strengthen the ties 
between their references and the participants. To achieve this, the references share 
the practice of the same rituals with all humility. Their images, names and books 
might, by repetition, attract participants' attention and eventually they adopt their 
thoughts. 
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After having had lunch at a mawkib and rested for a while, we resumed 
walking. Then we were surprised by a stampede occurring around a Shi’a 
religious man. In a few seconds, more crowds surrounded this man. He could not 
continue walking. Everyone wanted to shake his hands, which caused a massive 
jam. One of his guards needed to ask the crowd to be quiet and give space for the 
sheikh to continue walking, along other walkers to Karbala. This was Sheikh 
Jaafar Al- Ibrahimy, one of the most famous Husseinite reciters in the recent 
years. His majlis is usually broadcasted on TV. I attended one of his majalis in the 
Jamileh quarter, east of Baghdad, during Muharram. 
Women participate widely in rituals of walking. Sometimes, they outnumber 
men. Women are usually accompanied by their families, while groups of only 
women assisted each other in taking care of children or carrying their luggage. 
Women stop to watch tashabih frequently. They stand in front of a picture or a 
statute of Al-Hussein’s blood-stained white horse and caress it. They also try to 
caress any statue or image of Al-Hussein or Al-Abbas and then wipe their faces. 
Most of the time, they take out money and put it next to those statues or images. 
This money is considered as confirmation as the vow (nadhr) to realize their 
desires. The doll of the slaughtered child Abdullah in his bed and Al-Hussein’s 
horse attracts the most attention from women. Amongst women, there was one 
who was leading a ram to Karbala to slaughter it there and feed visitors on it as a 
vow she made for Al-Hussein. 
The more we walked toward Karbala, the fewer residential quarters and towns 
there were, and the more processions of service (Mawakib Al-Khidmah) were 
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offering their assistance on this and other roads. These mawakib acquire official 
licenses by registering their names and places of services at The Department of 
Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and Islamic World from Muharram 
25 to Safar 10. The number of those who registered their mawakib reached about 
18,000 all over Iraq.
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Mostly, one or more tents or more are set up in the sight of the mawakib, 
where necessary requirements are items like kitchen utensils. Tents are also used 
to shelter and sleep the service providers. Mawakib are not required to offer their 
services to their own cities but at any place they choose. There were hundreds of 
these service mawakib that came from Baghdad, Basra, Umara, and Nasiriya to 
offer their services to the visitors on the Najaf-Karabala route. 
The members in the service mawakib are in charge of providing food, drinks, 
bedding and other services free to visitors. They are also bound by security 
measures. Organizers of mawakib make sure that their expenses come from 
donations from individual members of the mawkib, merchants and social figures. 
Most of these mawakib prefer not taking money from any political party because 
they believe these mawakib are religious and unrelated to politics, besides most 
visitors would not like mixing politics with their visitation.
272
 Mawakib also 
refuse accepting money from undeclared individuals or groups because that would 
obscure the donors’ intentions as they do not look for political rewards, fame, or 
material benefits. They should rather be looking only for Al-Hussein’s blessing 
and intercession. Most Iraqi tribes financially support a mawakib that carry their 
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names either through home towns or other places. Some towns and villages 
support their mawakib, carrying their names, too. 
Although large service mawakib find sponsoring bodies, as merchants and 
other rich individuals, or a prominent person to financially support them, small 
ones comprised of a number of people depending on their own donations. Most of 
these people work in the private sector and save money monthly in a box called 
“Al-Hussein’s Box”. In ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain they use this money to spend on 
services of food, drinks, and bedding provided to the visitors and they stress that 
they do not receive any money from anyone. They say their support comes from 
Al-Hussein only.
273
 Hence, the members of small service mawakib want nothing 
but blessings from Al-Hussein as a reward for servicing his visitors. 
Processions of service differ according to the types of service they provide. 
Most service mawakib focus on provision of food, drinks, and bedding all day 
long (see photograph 7). Mawakib close by would coordinate the times of meals. 
Cooks in the mawakib show their talent to offer delicious food that could attract a 
larger number of Al-Hussein’s visitors. Organizers of mawakib usually stand in 
the middle of the road to humbly ask those to head to their mawkib to have food 
and drinks. Members of a mawkib would carry plates to give to the walkers who 
wish to continue walking. Others offer water and desserts for children. Most 
mawakib offer a wide variety of beverages, hot and cold, nonstop like tea, sour 
tea, cinnamon tea, coffee, juices and others. They call visitors by Zayer for a male 
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and Zayrah for a female, which is a term used to call visitors of sacred shrines. 
Any visitor could be called by that title regardless of knowing their real names. 
 
Photograph 7: A service procession preparing food for the visitors.  
Many mawakib offer bedding, especially in areas where walkers come from 
distant cities to fill in for hotels. Mawakib offer bedding service in different ways; 
walkers might be taken to spend a night at a mawkib member who lives nearby. 
Other mawakib set up massive tents, some for women’s bedding and others for 
men. Many Husseiniyat are built on both sides of the roads and are used for 
bedding and other services. Bedding services, though offered in a very simple 
way, are sufficient. Sleeping under a roof, having a pillow and cover, protection, 
dinner, drinks, a charger for one’s mobile, and warm breakfast with tea or coffee 
for free is a great deal in an area where hotels do not even exist. It is luxurious, 
197 
 
 
and an invaluable service in semi-agricultural areas or arid ones on very cold 
nights.
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The services offered by the mawakib vary to meet the walkers’ needs, but 
might include the provision of a mobile to call family, medical services, 
physiotherapy, and massage. Others offer qualitative services; one hangs a banner 
that read “Mawkib of the two severed hands’ (Al-Abbas), shoe repairer, sewing, 
and fixing mobiles.” There were ten young men sitting at a sewing machine, 
fixing visitors’ shoes or clothes.275 Not far away, another group of young men 
were dismantling cell phones to repair them. In another place, a group of women 
were baking bread in clay ovens. Visitors liked eating the bread fresh from the 
ovens. Some of these women were baking for more than a week. Other mawakib 
were offering massages and medical treatment for the blistered soles that resulted 
from walking long distances. Most mawakib provide information services, 
especially tracing missing people, as vast numbers of children accompany their 
parents, and they sometimes become separated from them or go astray due to the 
massive crowds. Most women wear black cloaks over their clothes which makes 
it difficult for their children to recognize them. A child could mistake any woman 
as his mother. Numbered electricity posts are a guide tool used by walkers and 
mawakib on this route. 
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 I talked with some young people who repair shoes and clothes and asked them for the cause of 
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Service mawakib play an important role in the rituals of Al-Arb‘ain as a kind 
of “normative communitas” when taken as an attempt to mobilize and organize 
selves and resources to preserve social existence. These mawakib, organized 
either by tribes, or quarters, or various groups, all seek to achieve a kind of social 
control. Tribes and residential quarters try to establish their social existence and 
support it by strengthening the relationship of their members, creating, and 
activating social links with visitors. These types of groups acquire others’ 
admiration due to the importance, size of participation, and the role they play in 
their local environment. 
Visitors play a great role in mobilizing themselves during Al-Arb‘ain without 
relying on any government role neither in organizations nor services. Mostly, they 
succeed in organizing this visitation because of discipline of population and 
positive preparedness the participants show during visitation. The best evidence 
on this was when groups of participants showed their ability to organize 
themselves in Al-Arb‘ain 2003.276 The visitation date coincided with the fall of 
Saddam’s regime on April 9, 2003. At that time, there was not any government or 
institution able to organize walking visitors. For the first time in their lives and 
upon their free will after the fall of regime, millions of visitors succeeded in 
practicing their rituals without assistance from the government or religious 
institutions. That brought on the motivation to continue their experience annually 
without the government support, though the current government is Shi’a. It is the 
wish of the population to keep these rituals independent from any government 
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intervention. This might have been caused by their suffering during the long years 
of the ban and the hindering of their practices and rituals by previous Iraqi 
governments. 
After the increase in the number of terrorist attacks on Iraqis participating in 
various Shi’a rituals, apart from disturbances of general security and political 
situation in Iraq, it was difficult to organize these rituals without the intervention 
of the government or religious institutions. The role of the government was 
protection while the religious institution supervised and organized through the 
Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and Islamic World. 
The two sides coordinated to assist in the success of organizing the participants in 
the rituals especially that of Husseinite mawakib and committees. 
The Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Commitees is attached to a 
general trust of Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas’ shrines, and issues licenses for 
mawakib and people participating in the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. The head of the 
mawkib, also known as the sponsor, submits an application after registering two 
assistants. It is required that the sponsor sign a written agreement and submit it to 
the Ministry of Interior stating that he agrees to be bound by the regulations and 
commands issued by general directorate of police (legal affairs). Some of these 
regulations and commands are to maintain security and order, not to carry guns, 
not use the mawkib to cause damage to any official or unofficial aspect, to remove 
the content of the mawkib after the completion of the rituals, and to care for the 
environment. 
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For Al-Arb‘ain visitation of 2011, the Department of Husseinite Mawakib 
issued a statement of 22 items to regulate the visitation. These regulations had to 
be adhered to by all participants in mawakib and committees. Some of these state 
that prayers should be performed on time, no pictures of religious symbols should 
be raised or promoted. Others relate to maintaining the safety and security of the 
sacred places and participants. This section also issues the timing table for 
launching various mourning mawakib like Mawakib of Caravan, Mawakib Zanjeel 
and Mawakib of Latm, coming from various cities of Iraq. It also specifies the 
road mawakib should take and the duration of their rituals. 
In the absence of a clear government role in the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain and 
bringing restrictions to security only, some religious and semi official bodies seek 
to enjoy a more important role. The Department of Husseinite Mawakib and 
Committees in Iraq and the Islamic World, stationed at Abbasid shrine, is 
religious foundation that plays a major role in organizing the visitation of Al-
Arb‘ain especially inside Karbala. This department is under government control 
but has its own independence as well. The funding comes from the Shi’a religious 
department called Diwan Alwaqf Alsheai (Bureau of Shi’a Endowment), which is 
responsible for Shi’a Mosques and holy shrines in Iraq.277 The department is the 
only body that has the authority to grant and cancel licenses for mawakib. It also 
coordinates with security bodies to control mawakib, even those from outside 
Karbala. It also provides services to mawakib in Karbala with their free supplies. 
That includes two slaughtered animals for meat for each mawkib, rice, and other 
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needs. It is in this way that Karbala gains another source of strength, adding to its 
sacred status. The department of rituals controls the rituals in ‘Ashurā and Al- 
Arb‘ain. 
Before sunset, we arrived at Al-Haidariya, midway to Karbala, a place known 
to visitors as Khan Al-Nuss. We decided to spend the night at one of the 
Husseiniyat, called Husseiniyat Ansar Al-Taff. The Husseiniya is a big hall that 
has 70 beds on the floor, and is supplied with electrical heaters. We were served 
dinner and hot drinks. A member of the mawkib was a doctor from Najaf and who 
offered first aid to those in need. I was one of those in need of first aid. The sole 
of my foot was full of blisters, so Dr. Faris performed a quick surgery and cleaned 
my foot from blisters. 
3. The Third Day: Safar 17, 1433 A.H. (January 11, 2012 C.E.) 
Though we set out early before sunrise, the road was full of walkers contrary 
to the last two days. We stopped for breakfast at a mawkib, where we were served 
eggs and broad beans, a famous Iraqi breakfast. One still could not see far because 
of darkness. Unintentionally, we found ourselves amongst a throng of walkers 
following a person carrying a big green flag waved up high, and making a sound 
with the flow of the cold wind. Some walkers were talking with each other, others 
were silent. Sometimes, it is all silence, then a short period of talking. The 
walkers’ attentions, when silent, get attracted to the flapping flag. This scene 
makes walkers feel as if they are walking outside of place and time. Later, a 
member of the group told me that he did not feel the walking; instead he felt he 
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was flying and that Al-Hussein’s flag was his wing with which he beat the air to 
arrive at Al-Hussein’s shrine. 
Walkers’ numbers were increasing as we walked more. When we were about 
to leave Najaf, people seemed to be swaying in their spots because of the heavy 
crowd. For the first time, we saw large numbers of visitors walking the opposite 
direction; they finished their journey to Karbala, and they were returning home. 
But due to road closure by security forces, these early visitors needed to walk a 
longer distance on the return journey to reach a place where cars were allowed at 
the edges of Karbala. Some of these vehicles were trucks, military cars, or public 
buses; all mobilized to transport visitors to certain areas. Other visitors would 
change buses many times before reaching home to mark the end of a long hard 
journey. 
On one side of the road, a group of men stood around a man in a circle. He 
was chanting hosat, plural of hosa, which are poems of tribes of the south of Iraq 
and the mid-Euphrates. They emphasize presenting the values of heroism, 
courage, and good virtues of the tribe or its members. They are usually chanted 
during fights, or elegies to the dead or to mobilize members of the tribe for a 
certain matter. As soon as the man finished his hosa, those surrounding him 
started repeating the last line he said many times while they were dancing in very 
expressive movements and in a circular motion. Three poets took turns while in 
the circle there were young and old men dancing and chanting. A poet recited a 
hosa praising sponsors and members of Husseinite mawakib for the services they 
offer to Al-Hussein’s visitors (see photograph 8). The poem stated that big 
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mawakib sponsors’ reward would be visitors praying for them when they would 
reach Karbala and visit Al-Hussein’s shrine: 
Think of Al-Hussein’s mourner, he even set up a tent 
Welcome, he shouted and received visitors on the road 
May your guest room be thriving, you who served Al-Hussein 
day and night 
We wished to be your guests for it was built with goodness 
For you, expressing words and their meaning become you 
We visit and pray for him 
The Zayer says, the Zayer. 
 
 Photograph 8: Visitors performing hosa on the side of the road. 
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Hosa, being a local ritual practiced by tribal groups, expresses tribal and local 
background. It seems the main function of hosa is not only to express the 
emotional status of individuals, but it is also a ritual, which according to 
Durkheim, elevates the vigor of the society.
278
 In addition, the hosa performs the 
solidarity of the tribe as a whole.
279
 It aims at strengthening their social 
relationships through connecting them to a common emotional and thought 
condition, which eventually leads to building their society. Hosa, same as other 
activities practiced by Iraqi Shi’a in ‘Ashurā  and Al-Arb‘ain, seek to deal with 
what religion is and interact with it, then reproduce it in a cultural framework that 
preserves the pure local spirit and features. 
While walking, we heard different Arabic dialects, sometimes foreign 
languages; it was very diverse. There were a significant number of Iraqi Turkmen 
Shi’a who joined visitors to participate in walking to Karbala. They were from 
Mosul, Kirkuk and Dahuk (northern Iraq). They spoke Turkmen language with 
each other and Arabic with the rest of the visitors.
280
 Those Turkmen walkers took 
buses from the north to Basra in the south, and started walking from there. Some 
of them started walking from Najaf. Non-Arab visitors were there as well like 
Kurds, and foreigners like Iranians, people from Bahrain and India, and Africans 
from Kenya and Tanzania. They all walked side by side with the rest of the 
walkers heading to Karbala. Most of them were wearing traditional dress. 
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  From the time we started from Najaf, we had been listening to many poems 
and latmiya from loudspeakers. This helped visitors maintain a joint rhythm of 
walking. The most famous poem was from members of the service mawakib when 
they asked them to stop at their mawkib to be served for Al-Hussein because they 
are his visitors: 
Welcome Zayer, welcome, Ali may help you 
For walking to Karbala, Ali may help you 
Have a drink of water from us 
Sleep here and then resume walking the next day 
We are Al-Hussein's servants, and servants for walkers  
It’s our honor to say Al-Hussein, for us, is the reward 
Rest at ours for a while, Zayer; hang your flag  
Until morning, a servant of us is awake to drink his water 
His tea is cardamom, welcome Zayer 
Have a sip of water, Zayer 
Rest and tea is ready 
Welcome Zayer, welcome, may Ali help you. 
We also noticed that Husseinite poems and chants express their writers’ wish 
by mixing religion with local culture to work the relationship between them. 
Although religious scholars (Ulama) prohibit singing and warn against chanting 
that resembles singing, most chanted poems on this occasion and others are 
similar to songs and rhythms used in happy occasions. This is normal because 
rhythm expresses its participants’ and listeners’ mood, and popular events have 
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famous rhythms well known to most participants. Words of poems are designed 
on a very big scale to fit the dominant popular culture. Consequently, complex 
religious thoughts become simple and are expressed in the language of daily life. 
Many of the chants are written in simple poetic words and popular rhythms which 
are famous and draw on popular songs, and are listened widely because they are 
related to religious and ideological significances justified, the religious occasion. 
During rest or meal times, we had the opportunity to talk about visitation and 
walking under Saddam's regime with some walkers. Old men insisted they kept 
the rituals of walking to Karbala every year for Al-Arb‘ain visitation, even during 
the years of prohibition and cruelty. The security authority was extremely harsh 
on walkers during the 1990s. Walkers used to be tortured then imprisoned for 
performing “a wrong religious practice.”281 These old men talked about alternate 
routes to the ones known to security forces to avoid being arrested by Baathists 
members or security agents spread along roads used by visitors to Karbala. On the 
other hand, villagers and farmers used to help walkers on those alternate routes. 
They started fires in fields as a guide for walkers, and left food and drinks next to 
these fires and disappeared to avoid arrest by security forces. 
a. Confrontation of the Participants and Security Forces in 1977  
 The rituals of walking in Al-Arb‘ain visitation have been practiced by visitors 
using the same current routes to reach Al-Hussein’s shrine in Karbala before 
Saddam’s era. The number of visitors was not as phenomenal as today, where 
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walking to Karbala attracts more participants one year after the other. A 
participant, Ihreiz Sachit Imaaeydi, (see photograph 9) who was born in 1927 and 
served at his father’s service mawkib, close to Khan Al-Nuss, mentioned that he 
was offering service with his father to visitors on the Najaf-Karbala route at the 
same place where he was standing and that visitors used to come by foot or on 
horses since the mid 1940s.
282
 And he added that the number of walkers has kept 
increasing till the famous clash between walkers and government armed forces 
happened in Khan Al-Nuss 1977. After that, walking visitors had to take side 
routes through villages and farm lands away from the highway and agents of 
security forces who wanted to arrest any walker to Karbala. 
 The confrontations of February 4-7, 1977 during Al-Arb‘ain visitation was the 
first important clash between visitors’ collective will and government security 
forces.
283
 The Baathist party followed a policy of restriction on participants in 
Shi’a rituals after assuming power in 1968. In the early 1970s, the government 
imposed severe limitations on mawakib and their sponsors and used videoing for 
surveillance on participants' moves in various Shi’a rituals.284  
In 1977, the Karbala local authority prohibited the rituals of Al-Arb‘ain 
visitation in the governorate and cancelled all licenses to participating mawakib. 
That led to escalating the challenge for walkers who participated in bigger 
numbers in walking from Najaf to Al-Hussein’s shrine on Safar 15, February 4, 
                                                 
282
 I did a private interview on January 11, 2012 with Ihreiz Sachit Imaaeydi, who was born in 
1927 and had been blind for several years, now. Near Khan Al-Nuss, he was involved in one of 
the processions service where he sat on a chair near the road, offering packs of cigarettes to 
visitors. 
283
 Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, (London: Saqi Books, 2003) 198. 
284
 Jabar 198. 
208 
 
 
1977.
285
 Many clashes occurred between walkers and security forces in Khan Al 
Nuss, and then participants were besieged by government forces in Al Nakheleh 
(15 km away from Karbala). On February 6, visitors were besieged by tanks and 
armed forces supported by planes. The clashes finished after many visitors were 
killed or wounded and 30,000 participants were arrested. A number of them were 
executed after short trials.
286
 
 
  Photograph 9: Ihreiz Sachit Imaaeydi participating in service processions. 
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 The confrontation between walkers and security forces was the most 
important example of resistance practiced by Shi’a against the regime up to that 
date. The events of 1977 showed that the rituals of Al-Arb‘ain visitation did not 
only have religious meanings for the participants, but they also held other 
significances such as the spirit of challenge, confrontation, and the consolidation 
of Shi’a collective identity against the persecution practiced by an authority of 
high Sunni majority. Walking to Karbala in Al-Arb‘ain visitation was a kind of 
total confrontation between Iraqi Shi’a and the side that was different to them. 
The authority backed by Sunnis worked hard on strengthening its differences and 
animosity to Shi’a, as well as restricting, persecuting and banning their rituals 
which represented their most important connection with their main symbols. 
Consequently, the rituals of walking to Karbala have become an endeavor for 
expressing the unity and harmony of Iraqi local Shi’a groups from all over Iraq. 
 On the way to Karbala, the best time for walking is during the early hours of 
the day. The distance walked in the first four hours equals all that is walked for 
the rest of the day because of exhaustion and heavily populated roads. Walkers 
walk silently. Some read invocations from booklets they carry with them. Others 
recite short prayers and count them on the rosary (sibha). At the end of the third 
day, blisters filled my feet, so I stopped at a medical squad that cleaned my feet. I 
would be able to walk tomorrow in a better way now that we were 20 km away 
from Karbala. We were expected to reach Karbala the next day around noon. 
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4. The Fourth Day: Safar 18, 1433 A.H. (January 12, 2012 C.E.) 
As in the previous days, crowds of walkers set out early morning toward 
Karbala while morning invocations were heard from loudspeakers and soon 
became a rhythm that walkers followed. Signs of happiness and serenity were 
apparent on visitors' faces because they were about to reach their destination. 
They could arrive at Al-Hussein’s shrine by midday. All were positive, visitors 
and service mawakib. Most participants had expressed their best positive attitude 
all along the last few days in the way they treated others, something they were not 
familiar with in their daily lives. They showed massive readiness to help each 
other. Everyone shared food and drinks with one another. The previous night, a 
visitor came late to the Husseiniya and did not find a place or bed to sleep. A 
group of people called him in and gave him a space and one offered him a 
blanket. Today after hours of walking, a walker called me to offer a dessert that, 
he said, would help me walk until lunch time. The journey had contributed to a 
change in the participants' traits and behaviors. No one pushed you for anything. 
There were no signs of the animosity or fear which could be seen in the beginning 
of the journey. 
 The visitation rituals, as Turner explains, helped visitors create an “existential 
communitas”. Visitation is the total direct confrontation of Shi’a local identities 
that create in visitors a sense of being all the same and harmonious, and subject to 
no structural authority. Al-Arb‘ain visitation reflects comprehensive collective 
spirit for various social groups and local belonging. Social status is the same for 
everyone. Everyone is Zayer (for man) or Zayerah (for woman) and similar to 
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anyone around them. There is no reason for differences or competition between 
them. The ritual provided an opportunity for participants to free themselves from 
daily materialistic preoccupations and to focus their attention is now focused on 
gaining an opportunity of revelation, to concentrate on the sacred symbols that 
could satisfy all of them equally. 
 The wish to reach Karbala and to see the dome of Al-Hussein’s shrine was the 
only thing walkers wanted at that moment. The more they walked the faster and 
the more active they became, and the more they got rid of the signs of usual 
tiredness they felt during the previous days. One sign read that we were only 
6,000 meters to Al-Hussein’s shrine, but we walked for hours because of 
crowdedness and exhaustion. Then we saw another sign that read 3,000 meters. 
Distance used to be in km in the previous days, now it was in meters. Feelings 
were a mixture of happiness and sadness. Some wept, others bashed their chests 
enthusiastically while chanting: 
Hussein, Abdullah’s father 
Your love runs in our blood 
We came to you, mawlana [our leader]. 
Your visitors, receive us 
On judgment day, do not forget us 
Your visitors and you know us 
Fear would not affect us 
We do not go back, oh our guardian 
Even if they cut our feet 
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To your grave, we crawl 
Hussein, Abdullah’s father. 
These participants summed up the feelings of millions of visitors who came to 
visit Al-Hussein on the occasion of Al-Arb‘ain. They came because of the 
spiritual relationship with Al-Hussein, a one mixed with love and sorrow for 
losing him, and provided them with strength and the capability to defy fear and 
hardships they faced. Nothing stopped them from reaching their destination. In 
return, they asked Al-Hussein to be generous with them and be their intercessor 
and to remember them in life and on the judgment day. These walkers had 
confirmed their presence in a Husseinite space that engulfed their spiritual and 
material surroundings, and sent many strong symbolic messages that documented 
their presence and participation in the commemoration of Imam Al-Hussein. 
It was midday when all loudspeakers stopped broadcasting poems and latmya, 
and unanimously broadcasted a talk about prayers and their importance. 
Preaching of prayers and Athan were coming from the Karbala broadcast attached 
to Al-Hussein’s shrine. They emphasized reviving rituals of prayers and stressed 
praying on time close to Al-Hussein’s shrine and along walking route, where 
many big signs were hung and stressed the importance of prayers and practicing 
them. 
Amid the road, there was a person in black clothes stained with clay who 
carried a tin filled with clay. He put some of it on any one who passed by. This 
clay is called Hussein’s clay (Torbat Al-Hussein) and was taken from the place 
where he was killed in Karbala (see photograph 10). 
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Photograph 10: A man putting Torbat Al- Hussein on the walkers. 
 Many visitors were standing next to this person while he put clay on their 
faces, heads, and clothes. Walkers and visitors believed that Al-Hussein’s clay is 
a medicine, cure, and blessing. The more we moved on, the more people were 
stained with clay. 
On both sides of the road, dry clay shapes from Al-Hussein’s clay are sold. 
They are geometric like circle, rectangle, and multisided. Most Iraqi Shi’a use 
these clay pieces to genuflect on them in their daily prayers. Al-Hussein’s clay 
bears sacred traits because it comes from a sacred place of Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom. Al-Hussein’s clay, either worn on clothes or the face, or in dry pieces 
used in prayers, is a means of symbolic communication between Shi’a and their 
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main sacred symbols which they think have the ability to bring positive change to 
their present and future. 
  We were close to Al-Hussein’s shrine and were able to see the crowds of 
visitors at check points which meant that walking the short distance left is 
difficult. We walked a short distance then we saw a person standing next to a 
wheel chair and talking through a loudspeaker asking people if someone wanted a 
free lift to the check point. His name was Mohammed's father and he did not have 
children, though he got married seven years ago. He helped Al-Hussein’s visitors 
to gain Al-Hussein’s blessing and help to have children. He was doing that for 
more than ten days from early morning until late at night. 
 The check- point designated one passage for women and another for men. 
Visitors were divided into groups; each numbering about a hundred, who were are 
quickly searched by guards. And until the next group's turn, they chanted to 
glorify Al-Hussein and his family, and then they repeated slogans against 
Wahhabis and enemies of Shi’a. The Wahhabis killed the visitors, destroyed the 
city, and burned Imam Al-Hussein’s shrine twice, once in 1802 and the other time 
in 1807, while looting it of its treasures.
287
 The number of visitors at the check 
point increased. People needed to take side roads to reach the shrine. On both 
sides of the road, a group of young men were distributing cards; one side reads 
“Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain” and on the other “Ziyarat Warith” another kind of 
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visitation prayer, and underneath both it read, “Dr. Ibrahim Al-Jaafery’s 
present…We ask for your invocation.”288 
 After a few minutes, all were standing in front of the golden dome of Al-
Hussein’s shrine. Everyone who saw the dome stopped afar with respect and 
reverence raising hands up and repeating the greeting “peace be upon you, Al-
Hussein” (Assalamu Alaika ya Aba Abdullah Al-Hussein) as if they were really 
standing and talking in front of Al-Hussein. Seeing the dome is the first point of 
contact with the sacred symbol, and it carries a mixture of feelings of happiness, 
enthusiasm, awe, and sadness among visitors. It also prepares them for the stage 
of separation from their current condition to another stage before reaching Al-
Hussein’s shrine. The threshold is the outer gate of the shrine which is the pivotal 
change point where visitors will be transformed and experience a state of 
revelation and mysterious spirituality, intermingled with excitation, because of the 
desire for approaching Al-Hussein’s shrine. These are huge feelings and wishes; 
purification from sins and gaining forgiveness with the help of Al-Hussein, in 
addition to wishes of having physical strength, livelihood, blessing, and cure from 
illness and damage. 
 The roads around Al-Hussein’s shrine were full of mourning mawakib of 
zanjeel coming from various places in Iraq. They were parading in front of a stage 
at Bab Al Qiblah of Al-Hussein’s shrine. These mawakib start their rituals 
according to a designated schedule and the visitors wait for the whole procession 
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to pass to the other side then they continue walking toward the shrine. On both 
sides of the road, people waited for parading mawakib while some of them hit 
their chests according to the rhythm of the drums. On what remained of the road 
to the shrine, a big number of children and men were selling green strips of cloth 
to visitors to carry to Al-Hussein’s shrine to wipe against the shrine and to gain 
sacred power from Al-Hussein. At the gate of the shrine, a number of visitors 
stood headed by a religious man, carrying a book, who was reading the Visitation 
of Al-Arb‘ain for them. As soon as he finished, a visitor gave him some money as 
a reward for what he did, then they entered Al-Hussein’s shrine. 
C. Rituals of Al-Arb‘ain Visitation in Karbala  
 Rituals start in Karbala five days before Al-Arb‘ain visitation and are usually 
marked by a parade of various mourning processions Mawakib Al-‘Aza. The first 
mourning mawkib is the Mawkib of Caravan (Mawakib Al-Dh‘an). It is a kind of 
passion play tashabih detecting the return of Al-Hussein’s family from their 
journey in captivity from Damascus to Karbala on the 40
th
 day to Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom. It is comprised of two main groups; the first is the group of the 
caravan guards wearing red and yellow gear and carrying spears and swords and 
riding horses. The second is a group of children of Al-Hussein’s family in green 
gear, surrounded by guards; they appear before a line of camels carrying women 
of Al-Hussein’s family inside special boxes (Houdaj)289 used usually to transport 
women in the desert. In front of the women's caravan stood a man on camel in 
white clothes striped with green, face coved; it is Imam Ali bin Al-Hussein who 
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led his family in their return procession from captivity to their homes. A reciter 
joins this procession for reading elegies. The sad elegies recited by the radood 
and the appearance of the caravan are meant to represent the historic event and 
materialize it for the spectators to transfer them to the real historic moment of the 
return of the captives to Karbala. The entry of the caravan marks the beginning of 
the rituals of Al-Arb‘ain. 
 Caravan processions, parading outside Karbala, carry a big head covered with 
blood, and put in a glass cage which symbolizes the return of Al-Hussein’s head 
with captives to be buried in Karbala. Men and women stood next to the glass 
cage trying to caress it then swipe their faces with their hands. Women, in the 
meanwhile, keep walking behind Al-Hussein’s head, lamenting and weeping over 
it. The Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and Islamic 
World prevent caravan processions parading in Karbala with heads or corpses in 
tashabih because they believe it damages sacred figures and is an unsuitable 
practice. Caravan processions and tashabih are allowed to parade in Karbala only 
on Safar 16
th
-January 10
th
, 2012. 
 Mourning mawakib of zangeel and latm, coming from all over Iraq, parade for 
four days until the visitation day on Safar 20
th
-January 14
th
 , 2012. Mourning 
mawakib of zanjeel practiced back chain-lashing on Safar 17
th
 and 18
th
 from 7:00 
AM to midnight according to the schedule approved by the Department of 
Rituals. 
 Processions of head lacerating (Mawakib Al- Tatbir) do not practice their 
rituals in the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain in Karbala. That is because these rituals are 
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only practiced on Muharram 10
th
 (day of blood) due to this day’s sacred nature, in 
addition to the fact that avoiding tatbir in Al-Arb‘ain is a Husseinite tradition. 
 Processions of chest beating (Mawakib Al-Latm) are practiced on Safar 19
th
 
and 20
th
, which is the last ritual practiced before the visitation. The rituals 
practiced by mawakib of zanjeel and latm during the Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain are 
not different from the ones they practiced during ‘Ashurā day. The only exception 
could be the number of participants, which is bigger in Al-Arb‘ain because of the 
wider participation from all over Iraq. 
 The ceremonies of visitation rituals started after midday of Al-Arb‘ain on 
January 14
th
, 2012 when visitors approached Al-Hussein’s shrine in groups. They 
then stopped to practice latm and recite elegies before entering. Next, they raised 
their hands to greet Al-Hussein’s grave. Visitors enter inside the shrine and orbit 
it while praying and reciting invocations special for Ziyarat Al-Arb‘ain. Same as 
‘Ashurā , books of Shi’a literature give a specific description of rules of 
visitations, like ways of ablution, body refinement, spiritual preparedness, 
walking to the shrine, treating others, and how to pray and recite invocations and 
codes of conduct close to Al-Hussein’s shrine. 
 The long distance the visitors walked and lived an experience of liberation 
from daily materialistic life led them to a state of spiritual liberation and reaching 
out to their inner selves more than any time previously. Everyone, close to Al-
Hussein’s shrine, feels more prepared to fuse with the sacred environment that 
controls everything around them. The visitors, at this moment, after the 
exhaustion of the long journey and the abandonment of usual daily life, feel 
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purified from their sins, and are able to enter the space of sacredness and gain the 
reward of reaching Imam Al-Hussein’s shrine. 
 These rituals are not only about spirituality, but they are also economic 
enterprises. Most participants, at the end of these rituals, make sure they buy 
presents and gifts for their families and relatives, especially those that express the 
individuality of the occasion of Al-Arb‘ain and Karbala, as a way of remembering 
the occasion. Markets in Karbala, especially those close to Al-Hussein’s and Al-
Abbas’ shrines face high numbers of shoppers annually. This also applies to 
hotels which are filled with people all around the year. Home owners, close to the 
two shrines, rent their places for high prices during visitation time to families 
coming from overseas. For them, this is the season to get additional revenue. Due 
to having millions of visitors for two weeks of visitation, trading season in 
Karbala reaches its peak. Karbala trade is the prime beneficiary from the season 
although the city witnesses a large number of vendors from outside who come to 
provide various services for visitors for very cheap prices.
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D. Conclusion  
There are many rituals practiced in the visitation of Al-Arb‘ain, in or outside 
Karbala, or close to Al-Hussein or Al-Abbas’ shrines. The most important rituals 
outside Karbala are walking, offering services to visitors, and tashabih. Inside 
Karbala, there are rituals of Ziyarat Al-Arb‘ainto Al-Hussein’s shrine by 
participants, processions of passion plays called mawakib of Al-Dh‘an, mawakib 
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of zanjeel in addition to service mawakib and bodies that offer food, drinks, and 
bedding. 
 Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain is the occasion of total confrontation of Iraqi Shi’a 
groups, and the feeling that all geographic obstacles and social class differences 
would disappear. Visitation also reveals the strength of collective harmony and 
cohesion amongst Shi’a groups and their ability to mobilize and organize 
themselves in a very distinguished manner. The collective spirit dominant in 
visitation deepens the joint intellectual and social links and ties the participants. 
Consequently, it supports the possibility of building their own community. 
Additionally, the journey of walking done by visitors from their places to Karbala 
helps enrich their spiritual and material experiences and allows them to meet other 
people from other places which results in acquiring different experiences and 
thoughts. That helps improve participants' spiritual and social status. Visitation of 
Al-Arb‘ain reflects roles of various Shi’a groups considering that the visitation is 
a huge chance to promote various thoughts and concepts. Religious groups make 
sure to promote their own ideas on this occasion to consolidate their own visions 
being considered as a best pattern that could help the group to succeed. Every 
group seeks to strengthen its own relationships and with other participants in the 
visitation of Al-Arb‘ain. 
 Visitation of Al-Arb‘ain reflects the powerful role of places and the religious 
institution. Karbala seems to be a place every person and group heads to because 
it has Al-Hussein’s shrine, which all Iraqi Shi’a seek to maintain links with either 
spiritual or material. Al-Hussein’s shrine becomes the first Shi’a goal to reach, 
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visit, gain its blessing, and renew the pledge to him, being considered one of their 
main sacred symbols. The role of the religious institution, represented by the 
Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in Iraq and the Islamic 
World, appears very strong to participating groups and individuals because of the 
strength of control it practices which extends even outside Karbala. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
A. Overview of Mourning Rituals  
This research discussed that mourning rituals, practiced by Iraqi Shi’a on the 
occasions of Al-Hussein’s martyrdom in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, have a 
distinctive influence on individuals’ and groups’ lives in many levels such as the 
religious, emotional, social, political and psychological. The impact of mourning 
rituals varies in its different practices and different levels, but ultimately all rituals 
have a clear impact on Iraqi Shi’a lives as a whole. This study found major 
correlation between religious and social levels, and political and psychological 
levels as well. This signifies the importance of these rituals in people’s lives, and 
their major role in structuring the individual and group among Iraqi Shi’a. These 
notions and thoughts have led the author to argue that mourning rituals practiced 
by Iraqi Shi’a in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain contribute effectively to their lives and 
change their social status. The rituals also assist in showing Iraqi Shi’a as one 
group that has a common symbolic language, which distinguishes them from their 
surroundings, provides them with an opportunity to express and state their unity 
and solidarity, and manifest their collective strength in facing perils and 
challenges, hence leading to maintaining their social existence. 
 Mourning rituals practiced in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain have contributed 
distinctively to the formation and support of Shi’a Islam. The term Shi’a did not 
refer to any specific group of Muslims before Al-Hussein’s martyrdom. The 
nature and principles of Shi’a Islam were not clearly shaped until Al-Hussein’s 
223 
 
 
martyrdom in the Karbala battle of 680 C.E. These rituals performed by Al-
Hussein’s family and his advocates in early times have become a decisive matter 
in attracting the sympathy of the public about the gory tragedy inflicted upon Al-
Hussein, the Prophet’s grandson, and have become a sacred Islamic symbols. The 
Tawaboon (Penitents), one of the earliest Shi’a Muslim movements, made use of 
the sympathy of Muslims with Al-Hussein’s cause after a few years from his 
martyrdom. They did so to gain support for their demands of social justice and 
protest against all forms of oppression, specifically their victimization by the 
Umayyad Caliphs. The Tawaboon movement became the sponsor of collective 
mourning rituals around Al-Hussein’s grave and used that opportunity to mobilize 
its advocates and gain support. It waged war against the Umayyads to avenge Al-
Hussein. Therefore, mourning rituals when practiced not only reflected the 
emotional aspect, but also the ideological thoughts and political tendency of the 
individuals and groups, that later became known explicitly as Shi’a. 
 Al-Hussein’s martyrdom became a center in the beginnings of Shi’a thinking 
and founded many Shi’a principles and concepts in years to come. Shi’a 
mourning rituals have acquired many functions: some ideas contributing to 
organizing Shi’a ideology, and others are political used against Shi’a enemies. 
Historical events, after Al-Hussein’s death, have proved that mourning rituals 
practiced on his martyrdom’s commemoration were emotional rituals that have 
developed later to acquire political dimensions and purposes. Eventually, these 
rituals have developed new roles shaped by early conflicts to become a semi 
struggle between the “authority” of Caliphs and the “opposition” of the Shi’a. 
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Practicing mourning rituals has become an essential function in forming features 
of Shi’a in general and Iraqi Shi’a in specific because they were the first initiators 
of these thoughts. 
 Al-Hussein’s shrine in Karbala has became known as a center for practicing 
mourning rituals in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain, then gradually developed into a city 
that has enjoyed spiritual, political, and economic power not only in Iraq but also 
for all Shi’a worldwide. Karbala has become a sacred Shi’a site that competes 
with other sacred Islamic sites. Shi’a from all over the world head to their central 
meeting site, and they show their various local cultural backgrounds when there. 
The rituals they perform at Al-Hussein’s shrine contribute to bringing them 
together and provide them with a common feeling of belonging. 
 The mourning rituals performed by Iraqi Shi’a on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain for 
fourteen centuries have had a major share in establishing and rebuilding the Iraqi 
Shi’a society within the general Iraqi social structure. Although mourning rituals 
have been prohibited and restricted by various governments that ruled Iraq, their 
practice have never stopped. They have been practiced both publicly and secretly. 
Attempts to prohibit and restrict these rituals have sometimes back fired. The 
more restrictions and prohibitions imposed on ‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain rituals, the 
more resistant the participants become and the greater the numbers of those 
involved. Thus, practicing these rituals is one of the most important aspects of 
Iraqi Shi’a resistance and protest against their enemies. 
 The mourning rituals held every year in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in have 
gradually become a prominent contribution to the rebuilding and formation of 
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main features of the Iraqi Shi’a community. Individual and group participation in 
the rituals have helped change their social status. Some mourning rituals like 
Majlis Al-‘Aza, ziyara, and walking to visit shrines, became rituals of passage that 
assist participants in acquiring a new social status after completing these rituals 
and returning home. Names like Zayer or Zayerah, and Al-Hussein’s servant 
(Khadem Al-Hussein) become titles that provide their bearers prominent social 
status amongst their peers and contribute to their success in work and other life 
aspects. 
 These rituals, as in Al-Arba’in for example, assist in manifesting the strength 
of the system of social solidarity amongst different Shi’a groups and individuals. 
Various practices in this ritual contribute in showing the collective spirit and these 
groups' power to mobilize and organize themselves and appear as one group able 
to face various challenges. The rituals also provide participants with a suitable 
opportunity to deepen their wide variety of thoughts and strengthen their social 
ties. Additionally, this occasion gives participants the chance to experience new 
places and people which results in them acquiring new skills and thoughts that 
help them develop socially in the future. 
 Participating in mourning rituals help improve the participants’ psychological 
status. The unstable security situation in Iraq, especially after the fall of the Baath 
regime in 2003, has deprived most Iraqis of the chance to access entertainment 
and social spaces. Shi’a women in Iraq are forced to stay at home most of the time 
due to security dangers, lack of job opportunities, and social customs and 
traditions. This explains why their participation in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in 
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provides them with an access to a social life and a chance to meet others and 
change everyday monotony. This helps improve most of the female participants’ 
psychologically. And that might explain the phenomenon of the increasing 
numbers of women participating in the mourning rituals of walking. I have 
noticed this while walking with groups of walkers from Najaf to Karbala. 
 The mourning rituals stimulate the economic cycle and help provide seasonal 
jobs for many people. Organizing ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in requires huge amounts 
of meat and drinks for the participants, which creates strong supply and demand 
operations in the Iraqi markets during mourning rituals. The trade of flags, 
images, audio CDs, tools, and folklore costumes designed for these two events 
creates job opportunities for many people, and gives jobs to the unemployed. 
These rituals represent the annual pinnacle of earning potential for a few people 
like reciters and radoods because they are in high demand to perform in many 
mourning majalis. 
 Many individuals and groups use ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in to promote their 
ideological and political thoughts. They appear as the “normative communitas” of 
Turner, and also strive for social dominance over some organizations. These 
groups are active in spreading their thoughts by either distribution of books and 
pamphlets to promote their writers, or displaying and hanging images and posters 
that bear their thinkers’ thoughts. Some political groups participate in offering 
their services to the participants in the rituals in an attempt to gain their 
satisfaction and support. Additionally, political parties organize and finance their 
own processions of Al-Hussein to use the environment of mourning rituals 
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because it attracts such a wide participation of the various stratums of the Iraqi 
Shi’a community. Tribes, in their turn, organize their processions to carry their 
names, participate in the rituals and consolidate their social role. 
 Poetry is considered an effective method used in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in 
rituals because of its direct impact on the participants. Using Arabic poetry of 
high eloquence whose words and meanings come from the depth of history is an 
attempt from the reciter to pull the audience from its present time to the original 
past time of the Arabic language which is relevant to the Karbala battle. The 
reciter would later read popular poetry in the Iraqi dialect understood and used by 
participants in their daily lives to connect their past with their present. This 
process achieves solid connection between poetic address and participants and 
eventually brings about an emotional impact on the audience which results in 
more interaction with the rituals. 
 Husseinite poems recited in majalis represent an important way of protesting 
against the various political regimes that governed Iraq. They are one of the most 
important methods the Shi’a media used against their enemies in order to 
participate in achieving political change. These poems express feelings of 
resistance and protest against previous regimes and use the massive turnout in 
‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in as an audience. They are usually well received by 
listeners because they express oppression to tyranny, to which the participant 
think they have been subjected during previous reigns. Some Husseinite poems 
still play their role in popular protesting and reject wrong current policies by 
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directing strict criticisms to the current government because of its failure in 
providing such essential services such as electricity, housing, and jobs. 
 During the performance of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in rituals, the true strength of 
some religious institutions that practice a noticeable role on participants becomes 
clearer. For example, the Department of Husseinite Mawakib and Committees in 
Iraq and the Islamic World’s headquarters is in Karbala and controls the direction 
of all Husseinite mawakib. This organization has the wide authority to issue 
instructions special for the rituals of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in, and organizes the 
entry and departure of mawakib and their processions in Karbala. It also has the 
authority to withdraw licenses and identity cards it grants to mawakib whenever it 
finds breaches to its regulations. Police forces usually support and help this 
department to see through its regulations. 
B. Repetition of Rituals  
The rituals organized on the occasions of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in have 
become renewed in the life of Iraqi Shi’a. These rituals provide their participants 
with various types of necessary changes to defy challenges they face in everyday 
life. These rituals have become, by repetition over centuries, a part of their daily 
life. More than that, they have gradually become a comprehensive life pattern that 
is reflected in their conduct and reactions toward some issues, and is present in 
their poetry, literature, and proverbs. These rituals have started at one point close 
to Al-Hussein’s blood, and gradually have created numerous ripples of rebuilding 
and consolidation of new concepts for the Iraqi Shi’a participants. 
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 Rituals in general, are a practice that requires separation from usual reality to 
achieve its goals, and need their own special means of expressions and symbolic 
language. The reason behind this is to absorb the phase of separation and express 
the environment of the rituals, which reality and its usual language are unable to 
express. This explains why we find in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in various signs and 
symbols that attempt to reveal the content of the ritual. Body motions in latm, 
zanjeel, tatbir and tashabih are employed as symbolic language for the rituals. 
Flags, hosa and the Tweareej Run are active symbols in these rituals that reflect 
the participants' cultural and social background. 
 If a ritual was in general a practice that represents another incident, then its 
repetition is aimed at organizing main activities of this ritual and maintaining the 
unity of its participants and keeping them within one social establishment. 
Participants, by repeating rituals and practices, adopt them and eventually they 
grow stronger forming trust in them. Repetition is an essential element noticeable 
in practicing rituals. 
 Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406 C.E.), a Muslim sociologist, gave important 
theories in sociology in which he analyzed the states of people, their traits, and 
elements affecting them and distinguishing them from others. In his book, Al-
Muqaddima ‘The Introduction” (1377 C.E.), Ibn Khaldoun presented a crucial 
remark on the importance of repeating a practice. He demonstrates that a 
participant would, by repetition of practice, acquire a new trait which is a kind of 
skill or faculty (malaka) that occurs only by repetition. Repetition of a practice 
renders it into a trait, and then this one gets repeated to become a status which is a 
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trait fixed in itself. This trait by repetition becomes a malaka which is the fixed 
trait. 
291
 
 This faculty malaka becomes part of the participant's nature, and it remains 
with him just like any other skill they learn by practicing and repetition. Ibn 
Khaldoun gives many examples to the importance of practicing repetition such as 
the case of learning a language where repetition becomes one of the most 
important means of learning a language. Eventually, language becomes with time, 
a basic fixed trait to the participants. The value of his opinion is based first on the 
fact that he presents an advanced point of view for understanding outcomes 
resulting from repeating a practice in general, and second, he assists us in 
knowing the influence of repeating a practice and making sure to practice it 
regularly in rituals. His opinion applies directly to ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in rituals. 
Annual commemoration of ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in contributes to the crystallizing 
of these rituals deep into the emotions of Iraqi Shi’a. Thus, Iraqi Shi’a rituals 
become part of the character of individuals and society. 
 While repetition leads to faculty for Ibn Khaldoun, the repetition of a practice 
for Pierre Bourdieu leads to the habitos. Bourdieu builds an argument to claim 
that habitos is “a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating 
past experiences, functions at every moment as matrix of perceptions, and actions 
and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks.”292 According 
to Bourdieu’s definition of habitos, it is also a concept resulting from a relation 
between practice and the social actor's structure that aims at reproducing the 
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reorganization of the physical and spiritual society, which gives a practice the 
ability to bring about change in the normal system. Bourdieu’s idea is of high 
value for studying and realizing the role habitos could play in the participants’ 
lives, for being able to bring about obvious change by the power inherited in 
practicing. Hence, repeating practices is an attempt to change the reality and 
social status of the participants. 
 According to that, repetition of the practices, either to create faculty malaka or 
habitos, in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in seeks to bring about change to the social status 
of participants, and reproduce their new reality by repeating these practices 
periodically. Therefore, ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in rituals contribute to rebuilding a 
new relationship between participants and their social structure. Additionally, 
these rituals are an attempt to achieve some definite results like forgiveness, 
satisfaction, or a feeling of serenity as a result of participating in rituals which the 
participants think will bring them closer to achieving their wishes for being closer 
to their main religious symbols. 
 Participants in ‘Ashurā and Al-Arba’in rituals show feelings of regret and 
dereliction toward Al-Hussein, for failing to assist him in the Karbala battle. 
These feelings could be seen in some mourning rituals like in tatbir, zanjeel and 
latmiya. Though the battle occurred in 680 C.E., the feeling of regret is still 
present in some participants. They feel so not because they have made a mistake 
against Al-Hussein nor failing to participate in a battle that occurred before they 
were even born. It is because they are immensely attached to Al-Hussein as one of 
their main ideological symbols. One could add to that their deep wish to 
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participate in supporting Al-Hussein even if only symbolically through transition 
from their present to the past time, which happens to participants in rituals. 
 Tatbir rituals, for example, are the most dangerous ones practiced in ‘Ashurā. 
These rituals express the participants' wish to show their love, loyalty, by 
renewing vows to Al-Hussein through bleeding during the tatbir process. 
Participants in these rituals consider themselves true fighters in an army prepared 
to stand for and defend Hussein and change the course of history, if they were 
given the chance to return to the past time. Tatbir is a kind of participation in a 
hypothetical war beyond the usual norms of time and place. But the blood bled by 
participants is the ultimate sign of credibility for participating in that battle. 
C. Future Research  
 Since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 until 2003, Iraqi 
Shi’a have not achieved the minimum of their goals, either a Shi’a state, as in 
Iran, or living in a modern civil state that respects them as equal citizens with 
others and provides them with equal opportunity. Iraqi Shi’a have been on the 
peripheries of state structure and its various establishments, and have not been 
treated as equal citizens by the successive governments of Iraq. Sometimes, 
official media described them as foreigners after the 1991 upheaval.
293
 The Shi’a 
in Iraq have suffered from the failure of building a modern state where they could 
live equally with others. Also the failure to build a Shi’a state like Iran in 1978, 
which have resulted in the feeling of frustration and sadness reflected in most 
Iraqi Shi’a. 
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 The pains and sorrows caused by the wars and malpractices of Baath Party in 
Iraq (1968-2003) have helped spread religious phenomenon in general and the 
practice of mourning rituals specifically. Loss, destitution, failure of 1991 popular 
upheaval, and fall of nationalistic concepts have assisted in the rise of strong 
popular religious movements, especially during the 1990s. The governor, in its 
turn, strengthened this trend by the so-called Al-Hamalah Al-Eimaniyyah (faith 
campaigns) after the failure of pan Arabic approach. It had shut down pubs and 
built numerous mosques.
294
 Wars, economic sanction, and failure have led people 
to look for alternatives to compensate for all their losses. Consequently, religion 
has been a suitable haven when their reality failed to yield any solutions. Feelings 
of extreme fear of the catastrophic reality and the lack of any way out have led the 
people in Iraq to adopt a religious course even stronger than before. This could be 
seen especially in regard to the ritualistic symbolic side of religion which is a 
reaction to seek salvation from painful reality replaced by serenity which religion 
provides. The number of mosques goers have increased and the visitors of the 
sacred shrine in Iraq as well especially during the ‘Ashurā time and the 40th day 
visit Al-Arba’in. In 1999, more than two million Iraqis, headed to Karbala (10%-
12% of whole Iraqi population and 20% of Shi’a) to commemorate Al-Hussein’s 
martyrdom. In 2001, the number rose up to 4.2 million.
295
 The increase has kept 
on. In 2003, the rate of visitors to sacred shrines jumped higher than earlier. 
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The increase of participants’ numbers in the mourning rituals in Iraq in the 
‘Ashurā and Al-Arb‘ain rituals is due to many reasons. This wide participation 
started after the fall of the regime in 2003. It does not trace back to the reasons of 
ideology, sociology, politics, or economy only. There is another important reason 
that I have come to know of through my work on this research. This is connected 
to the state of affairs of Iraqi Shi’a specifically, and what Iraq has suffered in 
general because of wars waged from the mid 1970s up to now. 
 The first war out of six is the one the Iraqi government waged against Iraqi 
Kurds in the north, between 1974-1975. Casualties were more than 10,000 
murdered or wounded.  296 That led to a high influx of corpses of Shi’a soldiers for 
burial in Najaf, which in turn resulted in growing feelings of popular Shi’a 
resentment of this war, especially when most casualties were Shi’a who were the 
majority of the Iraqi army. These high Shi’a casualties made Shi’a clergymen 
oppose the war and declared their refusal to it in the ‘Ashurā commemoration in 
1975. That triggered a violent response from the Iraqi government. It arrested and 
executed Shi’a leaders to control the country and end Shi’a wide states of 
resentment.  297  
 The second war was the Iraq-Iran war (first Gulf war) from 1980-1988. It was 
the longest one and World War II was the only war that exceeded it in terms of 
casualties for the 20th century. It caused more than 1,250, 000 casualties killed or 
wounded in addition to Iraqi economic losses of $452.6 billion and 100 billion of 
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debt mainly to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the then Soviet Union.  298  This eight 
year war led to the repetition of the practices of mourning rituals on a daily basis 
in most Iraqi homes; where it was rare not to hear in any Iraqi quarter, especially 
the Shi’a ones, of family deaths and to receive corpses or injured soldiers, or hear 
news of someone missing in action or of prisoners of war. With every dead 
soldier, there was a family mourning for those beloved lost ones. Some mothers 
have remained in ceaseless mourning because they have not seen the corpses of 
their sons and they would not believe they were dead therefore they stuck to the 
hope that they might return one day and knock on their doors again. 
 On August 20, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and declared it as part of 
Iraq and as the 19th Iraqi governorate. After a few months, Iraq faced an 
international alliance led by the US that attacked and defeated Iraqi troops and 
eventually expelled them out of Kuwait in 1991. Though this war did not last for 
years, it was of heavy consequences on Iraqis. During the few weeks of air raids 
of allied forces, bombardment destroyed roads, electricity, water, drainage, 
warehouses of food, factories and most of the infrastructure. That set Iraq back for 
decades especially in terms of industrial production and economic structure.
299
 
 Due to the collapse of the social, economic and political infrastructure as a 
result of the second Gulf war, a few regiments announced a rebellion in the south 
of Iraq on February 28, 1991 and fourteen governorates out of eighteen 
participated in an upheaval that was the strongest during the Baathist reign in 
order to topple the regime. The attempt was not successful, and was crushed 
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violently by Saddam's regime. The regime's cruelty was expressed by writing on 
its tanks which read: “No more Shi’a after today” (La Shi’a baad Al-Yawm). More 
than 100,000 Iraqi were either killed or wounded.
300
 It also made more than 
50,000 Iraqis cross the borders to Saudi Arabia as refugees, while thousands more 
went to refugee camps in Iran. Others chose to flee or hide from the regime in the 
marshes to escape the government.
301
 Big numbers of Iraqi youth were arrested 
and were never seen afterwards. Thousands died in the regime’s jails due to a 
campaign led by Uday, Saddam's son, in 1997.
302
 
This tragic drama has not finished yet. It was aggravated by the sanctions and 
compensation resolution imposed by the United Nations on Iraq. These measures 
did not affect the regime as much as they impacted the civilians, especially the 
poor classes. Another suffering called the International Sanction came in, under 
which Iraqis lived until the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003. The sanctions, which 
Iraqis named the blockade (Al-Hisar), lasted 13 years, started from the Kuwait 
war till 2003. They caused a lot more damage to the Iraqi society than to the 
structure of the state. Iraq was known to have had one of these most advanced 
health care systems previously; during the blockade it became a field for diseases 
like chicken pox and cholera that had disappeared a long time ago then. The 
average of children deaths and the sick was very high because of the embargo on 
medicines.
303
 
                                                 
300
 Davis 222, 231. 
301
 Tripp 215. 
302
 Davis 231. 
303
 Davis 232. 
 
237 
 
 
On April 9, 2003, American troops entered Baghdad, and it was declared the 
day of the fall of Saddam’s regime which had ruled Iraq from 1968 until 2003. 
Shi’a processions in millions set out on foot to visit the sacred shrines of Al-
Hussein in Al-Arb‘ain a few days after the fall. This triggered a state of sectarian 
tension. Terrorists, political parties with conflicting interests and the shelling of 
sacred sites resulted in deepening the Shi’a-Sunni division and confrontations 
between the two sides escalated to a semi civil war in the years of 2005-2006. Yet 
again, death started to devour people and it appeared in yet another war, but this 
time it was about abduction, assassination, and bombing. Once more, the number 
of corpses increased with many never returning home. Mourning rituals and 
lamentation have been ceaseless. 
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